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Susan J. Popkin et al. argue that one of the biggest misfortunes in social welfare
policy is the failure of public housing in most American cities.1 The public housing
debate is one that has caught the attention of policymakers nationwide. What was once
considered an effective solution to slum clearance and affordable housing during the
Depression in the U.S., is now considered by some to be an obsolete, ineffective, and
failed system of low-income housing management. In the 1930's, public housing seemed
a viable social policy solution to low-income housing. By the 1980's, however, public
housing, by most accounts, was considered a social policy failure.
The city of Atlanta has been at the forefront of major U.S. cities that have sought
to redefine and alleviate perceptions of obsolescence and deplorableness in public
housing. Although these perceptions did not originate in Atlanta, the capital of Georgia
now holds the dual distinction of being the first major U.S. city to build public housing
(i.e., Techwood Homes in 1935), as well as the first major U.S. city to completely
demolish its public housing stock by the year 2010.3"4'5 Through innovative policies and
housing development, Atlanta is now considered a national leader in public housing
revitalization strategies.
One such innovation in housing policy is the initiative called Housing
Opportunity for People Everywhere (now, HOPE VI). HOPE VI is a federally-funded
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program that allows local policymakers, business leaders, and housing authorities to
collaborate in their efforts to build affordable housing for residents who need it. HOPE
VI, now recognized as an award-winning innovation in housing policy, was developed
from the belief that public housing in America is commonly "distressed" housing.
Although there is some obscurity in the literature as to how policymakers define
"distressed" housing, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing
identifies families that live in "physical conditions that have deteriorated to a degree that
renders the housing dangerous to the health and safety of residents."6 Through
demonstration grants, HOPE VI allows local housing authorities opportunities to repair,
renovate, or demolish distressed public housing units. In so doing, supporters of HOPE
VI believe that the concentration of poverty endemic in public housing communities -
along with the resulting social ills - will be alleviated. This research offers a case study
examination of policy decisions made by the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) using
HOPE VI federal funds.
Scope of the Problem
Key debates in urban housing policy have to do with issues of poverty and racial
segregation. Social theorists have documented extensively the effects of poverty and
racial segregation on the overall stability of low-income residents.
In his seminal work, The Truly Disadvantaged, William Julius Wilson discusses
the effects of concentrated poverty and "social dislocation" on family outcomes. Social
dislocation, says Wilson, is characterized by incidents of "crime, joblessness, out-of-
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wedlock birth, female-headed families, and welfare dependency."8 Wilson argues that
the social problems of the ghetto underclass are more complex than just a "crystallization
of (an) underclass culture." Rather, says Wilson, there are "some very important
structural and institutional changes in the inner city that have accompanied the [BJlack
middle- and working-class exodus .. . ."9 As Wilson explains, without a "social buffer"
- that is, the presence of middle- and working-class families in the inner-city - the social
problems of the underclass increase. Wilson argues that
... in such neighborhoods the chances are overwhelming that children
will seldom interact on a sustained basis with people who are employed or
with families that have a steady breadwinner. The net effect is that
joblessness, as a way of life, takes on a different social meaning; the
relationship between schooling and postschool employment takes on a
different meaning. The development of cognitive, linguistic, and other
educational and job-related skills necessary for the world of work in the
mainstream economy is thereby adversely affected.10
He goes on to write:
In short, the communities of the underclass are plagued by massive
joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness, and low-achieving schools,
and therefore tend to be avoided by outsiders. Consequently, the residents
of these areas, whether women and children of welfare families or
aggressive street criminals, have become increasingly socially isolated
from mainstream patterns of behavior.''
And so, it is this concept of "concentration effects" that has been used to
undergird theories in public housing policy. "Concentration effects," says Wilson is a
term used to describe differences in experiences between low-income residents of the
inner-city and other residents in non-poverty areas of the city. Alexandra Curley (2005)
explains Wilson's contribution to housing policy:
Recently, theorists and policymakers have taken Wilson's poverty
concentration thesis and argued that if concentrated poverty contributes to
unwanted behavior and social ills, then deconcentrating poverty should
reverse this effect. This rationale has led to recent housing dispersal
programs and mixed-income housing initiatives that intend to deconcen-
trate poverty, and consequently, reduce the social problems attributed to
poverty concentration in urban public housing developments.12
Similarly, Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denson, in American Apartheid,
discuss "hypersegregation" as a leading cause of social disenfranchisement among low-
income, urban, and especially African-American residents.1 Hypersegregation is a term
used to represent an extreme level of segregation that intersects across multiple
dimensions."14 They explain:
[Segregation - or the general tendency for [B] lacks and whites to
live apart - may be conceptualized in terms of five distinct dimensions of
geographic variation ... [B]lacks may be distributed so that they are
overrepresented in some areas and underrepresented in others, leading to
different degrees of unevenness; they may also be distributed so that their
racial isolation is ensured by virtue of rarely sharing a neighborhood with
whites. In addition, however, [B]lack neighborhoods may be tightly
clustered to form one large contiguous enclave or scattered about in
checkerboard fashion; they may be concentrated within a very small area
or settled sparsely throughout the urban environment. Finally, they may
be spatially centralized around the urban core or spread out along the
periphery.15 (italics in original text)
"Massey and Denton point out that [B] lacks living in hypersegregated areas are
especially socially isolated because they are unlikely to have contact with others unless
they work outside of the ghetto."16 Theorists advancing the notion of "neighborhood
effects" (e.g., Brown and Richman, 1997; and Leventhal et al., 1997) claim that
neighborhood poverty - rather than family poverty - is a stronger and more valid
indicator of social outcomes for the individual resident. It is the neighborhood that
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matters most, says Curley, not the individual or family unit.17 But linking causality to
social outcomes is challenging, according to Small and Newman. They state, "It is
extremely difficult to test the hypothesis that, everything else being equal, an individual
living under any particular neighborhood condition is worse off than in the absence of
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that condition." They go on to say that "most neighborhood studies are unable to make
causal links and can only point to strong associations."19
Furthermore, research supports the theory that neighborhood poverty does not
result only in negative outcomes. Other characteristics found within poor neighborhoods
can also lead to positive social outcomes. For example, "studies have found that rich
social networks .. . exist in low-income communities and that these kin networks provide
an important safety net for the poor (Edin & Lein, 1997; Stack, 1974; Vale, 2002). These
studies point to tight functioning social networks as one of the greatest assets in poor
communities and challenge the notion that the social networks of the poor are inferior."20
However, what Curley points out is that while low-income householders have
strong "social support," they are lacking in "social leverage."21 Citing Mark
Granovetter's work on the "strength of weak ties," Curley re-emphasizes that the failure
to leverage "weak" social ties is a contributing factor to the lack of social mobility found
in poor communities. She writes,
people most often find jobs through weak rather than close ties. Thus,
there is "strength in weak ties" because weak ties provide individuals with
information they do not already have, such as job opportunities. There
fore, having relations, albeit informal or weak, with different types of
people who have access to different resources and information is critical to
learning about new opportunities and becoming upwardly mobile.22
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Theories that blame the victim for their impoverishment also abound. For
example, the "culture of poverty" paradigm is one that has relegated poverty status to a
"culture" of the underclass. That is to say, a "culture of poverty" suggests that
generations of poor residents hold values that run counter to mainstream. It "connotes a
set of behaviors and attitudes that are transmitted intergenerationally and run counter to
national values. It is believed that this subculture impedes progress by preventing
individuals from adopting the mores of the larger culture that leads to integration and
social mobility (Coward et al. 1974)."23 The "culture of poverty" has been used to
explain countercultural values of poor Black Americans, and therefore, "implies that
basic values and attitudes of the ghetto subculture have been internalized."24
The decisions of the Atlanta Housing Authority to raze traditional public housing
units in favor of mixed-income models are ostensibly rooted in this "culture of poverty"
paradigm. Wealthier African Americans are often complicit in the dominant view that
poor Blacks are, somehow, responsible for their own oppression. Furthermore, there is
an underlying paternalism in dominant prescriptions that mandate Blacks' responsibility
for their own social mobility. This "racial uplift ideology,"23 as expressed by Shayla C.
Nunnally and Niambi M. Carter, lies at the heart of decisions made by the Atlanta
Housing Authority to revitalize public housing. They write, "the degree to which one
believes personal behavior leads to poverty greatly influences one's policy
prescriptions."26 For those promoting "racial uplift ideology" - e.g., Atlanta
policymakers and AHA leadership - "it is necessary to emphasize the role of [B]lacks in
creating their own negative circumstances, as opposed to dwelling on the societal factors
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that shape the conditions and multiple-structures of [B]lack families (Billingsley
1992)."27
If the Atlanta Housing Authority and its partners believe that the poor are
counterculture to the mainstream, then the development of mixed-income housing and the
integration of income and race will ostensibly alleviate poor residents from poverty-
induced cultural traits. Public housing - characterized by a concentration of race and
poverty - contributes to a "ghetto subculture" by breeding opportunities for crime, drugs,
and a lifestyle of hopelessness.28'29'30 According to Nunnally and Carter, those living
within the culture of poverty must be "given a new set of values" in order to be fully
integrated into the social mainstream.3'
One of the expectations of HOPE VI is that post-relocation residents will form
tight social networks with their new neighbors, and therefore, leverage those networks to
secure better jobs and upward mobility.32 But, does involuntary displacement of the poor
necessarily generate the will or personal agency to reach out to new neighbors? If the
Atlanta Housing Authority maintains that poor public housing residents are counter
culture to the mainstream, then will moving them in close proximity to upper-income
residents (through mixed-income housing) dissolve the countercultural values that the
poor have internalized?
Given such varying perspectives in the literature on how low-income house
holders leverage social networks, this research suggests that the social outcomes of
HOPE VI need further evaluation. Further study is needed to determine whether or not
AHA's expectation of resident uplift has, in fact, occurred.
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While HOPE VI has proven beneficial to some, others would argue that not all
families have fared so well.33 A HUD report states, "Although the physical improve
ments have often been dramatic, the HOPE VI program should ultimately be judged on
its effectiveness in helping low-income families improve the quality of their lives and
move toward self-sufficiency as well as its accomplishments in bricks and mortar." 4
This study, therefore, is intended to augment extant literature on HOPE VI in Atlanta.
While neither national nor longitudinal in its scope, it does seek to supplement the
discourse by examining survey and focus group responses of local Atlanta public housing
residents. It further seeks to buttress survey and focus group data with interviews from
local community stakeholders. Particularly, those stakeholders (e.g., church or civic
leaders) who are intimately familiar with the neighborhood as well as with residential
families pre- and post-demolition will be targeted for their unique perspective.
The significance of the study lies in the evaluation of policy. This study is
concerned with how changes in policy have affected the lives of those already living in
precarious housing situations. Decisions made by local government leaders and
policymakers disproportionately impact the lives of those who are marginalized. Public
policy invariably privileges some while disenfranchising others. Granted, politicians,
policymakers, and government leaders make decisions that affect the lives of us all. But
these decisions can often have a detrimental impact on those with weak socio-political
leverage. Even in collaborative processes - of which there were many in Atlanta's public
housing revitalization efforts - the views and opinions of public housing residents, by
some accounts, were reportedly excluded or ignored altogether.33
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The lack of agency on the part of public housing residents contributes to the need
to center their voices in this case study. If decisions were made for the benefit of public
housing residents, then how much did the voices of the residents lend themselves to the
decision-making process? To what extent were residents able to determine, or at least
contribute to, their own fate?
This research offers a review of why decisions were made to demolish Atlanta's
public housing, who made those decisions, what alternative voice (if any) was
incorporated, and what benefits and consequences occurred as a result of those decisions.
The History of Affordable Housing in the United States
"Nearly eleven million families and individuals in the United States depend on
some form of government-subsidized housing."36 However, the federal government has
not always provided for the housing needs of its low-income citizens.
Betsey Martens, Senior Vice President of the National Association for Housing
and Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO), offers a brief, but thought-provoking, historical
look at how public housing policy in the United States evolved. While many harken back
to the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 as the genesis of affordable housing in this country,
Martens points out that the U.S. government's effort to provide housing for its poorest
citizens is actually attributable to industrialization in the 1800s. During industrializa
tion, workers began migrating from rural areas to urban cities in order to secure work.
With this influx of workers, housing was in short supply. Interestingly, it was not the
government that took responsibility for housing migrant workers. Rather, housing during
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the late 1800s fell to the hands of the private sector. Developers sought to turn a profit by
transforming large, single-family tenements into multi-family dwellings. Multiple
families began occupying homes that were once occupied by single families. Such
crowded conditions were less than optimal, "characterized by a lack of fresh air, ventila
tion, fire protection and indoor plumbing.. .."37
The New York Housing Act of 1879 was the initial governmental response to
these early and deplorable housing conditions. As is true today, political leaders of that
time believed that poor housing would lead to "the three great scourges of mankind -
disease, poverty and crime...."38 Subsequently, thought leaders of the early 20th century
also debated whether deplorable housing was an issue of declining character, moral
turpitude, or neighborhood and community health.39
According to Madeline Howard, "one of the principle (sic) goals of the federal
subsidized housing program has been to promote morality in families. The primary goal
of the first public housing developments was to provide a safe haven from the slums that
developed during the Depression, when the supply of affordable housing failed to keep
pace with the influx of workers into cities."40 The goal, says Howard, was not to provide
for "deeply impoverished" families whose sustained impoverishment extended across
generations. Rather, "[t]he stated goal of this policy was to ensure that only 'poor but
honest workers' would occupy the units."41
World War I was a key factor leading to the U.S. government's involvement in
housing workers. Since workers on both coasts were needed to build ships for the war,
housing became a necessary concern. President Woodrow Wilson, therefore,
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appropriated $100 million towards housing through the U.S. Shipping Act of 1917
Although the establishment of public housing authorities came 20 years later in 1937, it
was not until the 1949 Housing Act that the federal government took responsibility for
providing decent housing for all of its citizens.43 In fact, the basic concept of "housing
policy" is found in the federal government's attempt to provide decent and affordable
housing to U.S. citizens.44
In 1969, Congress enacted the Brooke Amendment, named for then-Senator
Edward Brooke, a leading advocate for fair and anti-discriminatory housing. The Brooke
Amendment instituted limitations on housing rent in relation to one's income. At the
onset, the Brooke Amendment limited rental expenditure to 25% of overall household
income. Today, the standard rental expenditure for poor families is capped at 30%. That
is, poor families are expected to pay no more than 30% of their income for housing
(although it is documented that, in some cases, families pay up to 40% of their income on
housing).45 Reiss acknowledges that any cost beyond 30% of a household's incomes
constitutes "unaffordable" housing - "a consensus," he says "that serves as the basis for
federal housing policy."
Rental expenditure over and above 30% of one's income is considered a financial
hardship, especially for families already living in precarious financial and social
situations. Other data reflect this financial hardship. In 2007, the American Housing
Survey indicated that "nearly 16 million out of a total of 35 million renters in 2007 paid
35% or more of their income for rent and utilities, and more than 9 million paid more
than 50%."47 Moreover, the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that "in 2009, 5.6 million
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households with incomes below the poverty line - or about 60 percent of all poor renter
households - paid at least half of their income toward rent and basic utilities."
Furthermore, data from the 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) estimate that
approximately 3.4 million households are inadequately housed. Betsey Martens states,
"Of these 3.4 million inadequately-housed households:
• 750,000 are homeless
• 1.9 million are paying more than 50% of their income in rent
• 765,000 are living in substandard housing, doubling up and/or are constantly
moving."49
These statistics reveal that federal rental housing assistance is grossly inadequate to meet
the prevailing need nationwide.50
The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (Public Law
101-235) (herein referred to as the "Commission") was established in 1989 for the
purpose of addressing "severely distressed" public housing. Public housing, it was
believed, offered deplorable conditions for those already living with multiple disadvan
tages. The Commission defines "severely distressed" public housing in terms of both its
physical and social characteristics.51 Public housing communities, in many cases, had
become spatial pockets of concentrated race and poverty, breeding grounds for criminal
activity, and havens for hopeless living. The goal of the Commission, then, was to
examine the lives and well-being of families living in distressed communities, and to
develop more effective policies in public housing administration.
In 1992, the Commission submitted its Final Report ofthe National Commission
on Severely Distressed Public Housing to members of Congress, out of which the HOPE
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VI legislation was written. "HOPE VI was created by the Departments of Veterans
Affairs and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1993 (Pub.L. 102-389), (and) approved on October 6, 1992."52 The
HOPE VI Program set as its goal the elimination of severely distressed housing by year
2000. The objectives of HOPE VI were:
• To improve the living environment for residents of severely distressed
public housing through the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, or
replacement of obsolete projects (or portions thereof);
• To revitalize sites on which such public housing projects are located and
contribute to the improvement of the surrounding neighborhood;
• To provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very-
low income families; and
• To build sustainable communities.53
Initially, HUD stipulated that any public housing unit that is demolished due to
severe distress must be replaced with HOPE VI funds. However, the early years of
HOPE VI also allowed for wide discretion on the part of HUD to determine if a housing
unit should be preserved or demolished. In 1992, HUD awarded the first of HOPE VI
demonstration grants for preservation and revitalization of public housing stock. But by
1994, the focus of HOPE VI grants shifted from the revitalization of public housing units
to demolishing them.54
The HOPE VI Program provides funds to serve the dual purpose of improving the
physical structures of public housing, as well as improving the social well-being of its
residents. Proponents of HOPE VI believe that by demolishing severely distressed public
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housing units, the distressed lives of its tenants will also be alleviated. In response, many
of the major metropolitan cities have developed mixed-income, mixed-use communities
for the purpose of improving the lives of families living in poverty. By moving families
from distressed communities, proponents of urban renewal believe that the overall quality
of life for these families will also improve. Furthermore, offering families a myriad of
support services will ostensibly relieve them of the social ills that seem to plague low-
income communities. As the Commission reminds us in its Final Report, the intended
beneficiaries of this goal are the residents themselves, and therefore, social outcomes
should be the criteria by which the effectiveness of HOPE VI is measured. The reports
states, "The failure to meet the needs of the people living in severely distressed public
housing will eventually result in the failure of any physical rehabilitation and housing
management improvement program."55
One of the most critical reports of the HOPE VI program is the 2002 report of the
National Housing Law Project et al. According to the report, there has been inadequate
administrative oversight of family relocation, particularly as it affects marginalized, racial
population groups. Furthermore, the report states, the very problems that HOPE VI was
designed to solve have actually been exacerbated by HOPE VI. For example, HOPE VI
was intended to address affordable housing needs of the very poor. However, due to
demolition goals of HOPE VI programs, affordable public housing has become less
available for the poorest of the poor.36
Without administrative oversight as to the relocation of former public housing
residents, critics cite the need for further evaluation of HOPE VI.
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Affordable Housing in Atlanta
Contrary to its original goal of providing quality housing in a livable environ
ment, public housing - in many cities, including Atlanta - came to represent spatial
pockets of concentrated poverty. The concept of public housing as a viable housing
option for the poor and elderly is now believed to be outdated by Atlanta's policymakers.
In Atlanta, decisions were made towards innovative housing policy that would alleviate
the concentration of poverty.
But questions remain as to how those decisions were made, and which stake
holders were allowed input into those decisions. Existing reports indicate that Atlanta
public housing residents were not effectively seated at the decision-making table.57
Some reports indicate that residents were not asked what they wanted. Yet, decisions
around how to expend HOPE VI funds disproportionately impacted the lives of those
residents.
The problems with public housing in Atlanta were not unique to the city. Rather,
public housing across the U.S. were (and are still) fraught with a myriad of concerns and
deficiencies. Not only has the concept of public housing come to represent a failed
housing model across the U.S., it has marred public perceptions towards those who dwell
in them. Structurally, most public housing within the U.S. has become obsolete and
distressed housing. But perhaps even more importantly, the lives of public housing
residents are also viewed as "distressed" in the eyes of the policymakers.
When the Commission examined public housing inventory prior to making its
report and recommendations, it found that only 6% of public housing nationwide (or
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about 86,000 units) met the requirements for "severely distressed" conditions. The
remaining 94% of units were not considered "severely distressed," although the report
indicated that they would need attention soon.58 What, then, prompted the Atlanta
Housing Authority to demolish all of its public housing units?
According to AHA's 15-year progress report, Atlanta's public housing
communities were plagued with a multitude of social problems. In addition to the
dilapidated conditions of the housing structure, the crime rate in and around housing
projects was 35% percent higher than the rate of crime within the entire city.59
Education was substandard. "The elementary schools embedded in housing projects
ranked at the very bottom of all Georgia schools."60 Retailers and quality grocers were
not available or accessible to public housing residents. And health problems proliferated
in public housing due to the effects of concentrated poverty. "Had change not come, says
AHA board member Eva Davis and a former resident of the East Lake Meadows housing
project, the losses would have been greater. 'We would have had so many more high
school dropouts, so many drug addicts, so many prostitutes, so many babies having
babies, they would have been lost,' she says."61
With an initial grant of $42.5 million in HOPE VI funds,62 the Atlanta Housing
Authority and key leaders within the city of Atlanta set out in 1994 to revitalize,
renovate, and ultimately demolish severely distressed public housing. The impetus for
this vast undertaking was the widely-anticipated 1996 Olympic Games. Atlanta business
leaders recognized that the world would witness Atlanta's blight during its hosting of the
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games. With Atlanta now on the international stage, city and housing leaders sought to
remedy the situation.
When defining Atlanta's blight, one can point to a multitude of bleak conditions
that characterized Atlanta's public housing complexes. These conditions may have been
key determinants in AHA's policymaking decisions. Thomas Boston, a Georgia Tech
economist and researcher, describes it thus:
Eighty eight percent (88%) of inspected units did not meet minimum
safety and sanitary standards, and 7,100 maintenance work orders were
backlogged. Many units were simply boarded up, and others had missing
or defective windows and doors, electrical hazards, leaking and backed up
toilets, rodent infestations, and lead-based paint exposures.63
Other social dimensions also paint a grim picture. Crime was rampant in public
housing. Drug traffickers operated with relative impunity within the housing
communities. Children (age 16 and under) accounted for nearly 49% of the public
housing population, and were often used as "lookouts" by drug traffickers. Women
accounted for about 86% of single heads of households, and only 13% of the non-elderly,
able-bodied adults were actually employed.64
The federal HOPE VI program provided a much-needed resource in which to
formulate a viable solution to Atlanta's public housing woes. Initially, the goal of HOPE
VI funding was to remodel or revitalize the housing units. In fact, during the 1980's and
early 1990's, the Atlanta Housing Authority spent $18 million in renovations to
Techwood/Clark Howell Homes. But the renovations were short-lived. "By 1994," says
Boston, "none of these improvements were visible."65
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The year 1994 was also pivotal in that it brought new leadership to the Atlanta
Housing Authority. Renee Lewis Glover was hired as AHA's new President and Chief
Executive Officer. Glover set out to establish a new plan for meeting the housing needs
of Atlanta's poor. No longer willing to simply "warehouse the poor,"66 Glover
envisioned a sustainable community where low-income and marginalized families would
be integrated into the "economic and social mainstream" of society.67 According to
Glover, "AHA's tenants were effectively locked out of the mainstream; they were
economically marginalized, politically disenfranchised, and systematically being
destroyed." Glover sought to rethink public housing, and to offer public housing in a
manner that would allow low-income residents to thrive economically and socially
through what was to become a mixed-income model.
Under Glover's leadership, the main goals of HOPE VI in Atlanta were "to de-
concentrate poverty, create more livable communities for public housing assisted families
and build sustainable neighborhoods."69 While these are indeed worthy goals, limitations
in the literature point to a lack of strong data to support such sustainability.
According to a report prepared by the National Housing Law Project (NHLP),
HOPE VI has fallen short of its original goals.70 It reads:
While the first purpose set forth under the HOPE VI statute is to
"improve the living environment" of families in severely distressed public
housing, HOPE VI is doing little to improve the lives of most of the
families it affects. Contrary to impressions conveyed by HUD, only 11.4
percent of former residents overall have returned or are expected to return
to HOPE VI sites; only about 30 percent of displaced residents are
relocated with portable Housing Choice Vouchers. The bulk of residents,
49 percent, are simply transferred to other public housing developments.
And, a disturbing number of the residents who are officially relocated are
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"lost" along the way, meaning that they no longer receive housing
assistance."71
Where did the people go as a result of public housing demolition and forced
eviction? What lasting social effects has HOPE VI in Atlanta provided?
Theoretical Framework
The myth undergirding public policy is that those on the margins of society do not
have the wherewithal to determine their own outcomes. Politicians speak for the under-
served. Scholars draw conclusions about them. But what say the people themselves?
As HOPE VI resulted in the forced displacement of the poor, the theoretical
assumption is that those facing forced eviction may have had little political voice prior to
the policymaking decisions of the Atlanta Housing Authority and their HOPE VI part
ners. When community leaders make decisions that impact the lives of those with the
least leverage, who ultimately benefits? How do families who already live at the social
and economic margins of society negotiate their continued existence when policy leaders
determine their fate for them? Often silenced, ignored, or disenfranchised, this study
seeks to bring the voices of former residents closer to the center of policy discourse.
Landis and McClure suggest, "[s]ome policies are created using the rational
model: An important problem is identified, its dimensions described, and responses are
formulated and put forth. Other policies come about when constituencies mobilize
around a particular issue, ideology is brought to bear, programmatic responses are
negotiated among stakeholders, and money is appropriated."72
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HOPE VI, as implemented by the Atlanta Housing Authority, is representative of
such a rational model. A problem was identified (i.e., Atlanta's public housing units
were distressed and dilapidated); the dimensions or scope of the problem defined (i.e., all
of Atlanta's public housing stock fell under this definition, with the exception of a few
senior high-rises); and a response or solution was formulated (i.e., demolishing the units).
But how much input was sought from the residents who occupied the units? According
to some tenant association leaders, not very much.
Depending on whom you ask, public housing tenants had little or no involvement
into the actual decision-making of HOPE VI implementation in Atlanta. Glover writes
that the Atlanta housing board began meeting with tenant leaders in the summer of 1994
to gain their support of the HOPE VI vision. By August 1994, the Techwood-Clark
Howell Resident Association signed an agreement with the AHA that allowed plans to
move forward in developing a mixed-income community on the site of Techwood-Clark
Howell Homes. However, public housing tenants have criticized efforts to gain their
support in AHA's plans. Tenants have claimed that decisions were already made when
they met with the AHA. The meetings, say tenants, were merely informational meetings
to report to tenants the plans already decided upon by AHA and developers.
HOPE VI policy is based on the assumption that public housing produces spatial
pockets of race and poverty.73 According to the National Housing Law Project, about
95% of residents displaced by HOPE VI are families of color. Seventy-nine (79%) of
them are African-American. Therefore, it is significant to point out that the policies of
HOPE VI in Atlanta effectually removes and displaces communities of color. A primary
21
goal of HOPE VI in Atlanta is to reduce poverty and deconcentrate race. Like urban
renewal efforts of decades past, the underlying assumption to achieving these goals is to
racially integrate communities, and disperse families of color to other outlying
communities.
With federal funding, the goal of HOPE VI is to disperse concentrations of
poverty in favor of mixed-income, mixed-race rental communities.74 Although HOPE VI
has gained national attention as well as positive reviews for its provision of mixed-
income housing models, it has not been without its critics. For example, Thomas Boston
points out:
In recent years, several studies have used resident surveys to longitudin
ally track the effect ofHOPE VI mixed-income revitalization on original
residents of public housing projects (Brooks, Wolk and Adams, 2003;
Holmes, Moody et al., 2003; Buron, Popkin et al., 2002). Because these
studies are designed to track residents longitudinal (sic) over a long period
of time, they are not yet able to provide definitive answers to how HOPE
VI has affected public housing assisted families.75
Boston further states,
In a recent report by the National Housing Law Project, the authors
criticize the HOPE VI program. Among other things, they point out that,
"HOPE VI plays upon the public housing program's unfairly negative
reputation and an exaggerated sense of crisis about the state of public
housing in general to justify a drastic model of large scale family displace
ment and housing redevelopment that increasingly appears to do more
harm than good." (National Housing Law Project, 2000: pp. ii). The report
asserts that empirical data to support the claims of HOPE VI is lacking.76
According to Boston, one must consider important policy questions surrounding
any program of revitalization. In the case of HOPE VI, he maintains that
one question is whether revitalization causes a loss of housing assistance
for families affected by it. Nationally, very little information is known
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about this process. In fact, HUD did not track residents affected by HOPE
VI revitalization until 1998 and did not require grantees to report the
location of residents until 2000. (U.S. GOA, 2003:8) Therefore, this issue
continues to create concern and controversy (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh;
1997: 89).77
Research Questions
One of the overarching questions in assessing the outcomes of HOPE VI in
Atlanta is to ask, "Where did the people go?" When addressing the question of
residential mobility, studies contradict reports of the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA).
According to AHA, 80% of former public housing families stayed in the city of Atlanta
following demolition. The remaining families, says AHA, moved to outlying areas.78 At
least one source offers a different perspective. The Christian Science Monitor maintains
that "[o]nly about 17 percent of the residents relocated in Atlanta during the 1990s were
able to come back to the new complexes; another 40 percent remain in voucher-
subsidized housing. No one can say what happened to the rest."79
A second research question addresses the deconcentration of poverty. An analysis
of HOPE VI policy will seek to define what is meant by "deconcentration." How has the
Atlanta Housing Authority sought to measure decreasing concentrations of poverty? Has
poverty been dispersed across the Atlanta metropolitan area, or have pockets of poverty
simply moved from one locality to another? The literature reveals that poverty has been
reduced where public housing once stood. But where did those people go? One
underlying theory is that former public housing residents relocated to other low-income
communities, thereby, contributing to new pockets of poverty in outlying areas. A study
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by Georgia State University's (GSU) Urban Health Initiative supports this theory. GSU
researchers state that "most residents are moving to neighborhoods where the poverty rate
ranges from almost 20 percent to almost 76 percent."80 Furthermore, they write, "there is
a visible geographic clustering pattern implying reconcentration or resegregation."
(Italics in original text). Was this a policy goal of HOPE VI - i.e., to relocate the poor to
neighboring counties - or merely an unintended outcome?
And finally, a third research question engages whether or not residents of pre-
demolition public housing have experienced better outcomes following demolition.
Again, who defines what constitutes "better?" Is this defined by policymakers and
analysts, or by the residents themselves? In other words, what "voices" have contributed
to the assessment of relocation outcomes?
Overview
This paper offers an exploratory account of how HOPE VI was implemented in
the city of Atlanta. What follows is an historical account of HOPE VI from conception to
implementation. Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of HOPE VI as an innovative housing
policy. It discusses political players on the national scene as well as in Atlanta. It
chronicles who made decisions around affordable housing, and seeks to address why
those decisions were made at a given time in history.
Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on HOPE VI. While much has been written
on HOPE VI as an innovative policy, the literature is still emerging. There is yet no
general consensus as to the overall success or failure of HOPE VI. While most scholars
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agree that HOPE VI is the most ambitious and innovative policy changer in recent
history, not everyone is able to tout its success with unequivocal fervor. There are indeed
some critics of HOPE VI. Chapter 3, therefore, seeks to offer a balanced overview of
HOPE VI - its triumphs, its challenges, and areas for further evaluation and growth.
Chapter 4 discusses methodology. It outlines the research design, data collection,
and data coding processes. It describes the challenges and limitations in gathering
primary data, and describes contemporary methods for locating potential respondents.
For example, an original resident survey was developed and placed on Survey Monkey in
August 2011. Early efforts were made to solicit potential respondents through local
homeless shelters and the Atlanta Housing Authority. Although personnel from shelters
were supportive of the project, no residents were identified. Neither did the Atlanta
Housing Authority provide access to public housing residents. By December 2012, no
surveys had been completed.
In early 2013, efforts to locate potential respondents were extended to social
media. A Twitter account was set up to publicize the study to the general public. In
addition, a static webpage offered details about the study, as well as provided a direct link
to the survey. In all of these efforts, respondents for the primary survey were not
forthcoming.
Secondary survey and focus group data were gathered in lieu of, and in addition
to primary survey data. Baseline and evaluation studies provided secondary responses
from former Capitol Homes residents. Chapter 4 describes in detail the coding process
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for a text analysis of these data. It lays out the argument for conducting a case study
analysis of HOPE VI in Atlanta.
Chapter 5 presents findings in this study, and includes numerous graphs, maps,
and figures as visual representation of findings. Most interesting are the maps, which
visually show the shifting of poverty concentration by census tracts. By the same token,
the bar graphs also tell a story of how race and poverty concentration have fluctuated in a
10-year span.
And finally, Chapter 6 is the policy review and evaluation. In this chapter, the
findings are summarized and discussed within the context of findings within the
literature. Efforts are made to address each of HUD's goals for HOPE VI, and to
establish whether or not those goals were met. An overall critique of HOPE VI is
provided.
A brief discussion of housing policy that works is incorporated into Chapter 6.
The New York Housing Authority, although fraught with its own challenges, is one that
has survived and prevailed. Nicholas Dagen Bloom provides the content of this
discussion in his book, Public Housing that Worked.
Finally, Chapter 6 sets forth recommendations for HOPE VI in the future. What
is next for HOPE VI? More importantly, what is next for the residents of our nation who
are most in need of affordable housing? Hopefully, this study will contribute to the ever-
evolving literature on public housing policy in Atlanta and the U.S.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF HOPE VI
Hope VI is a federal demonstration grant that was developed out of various
attempts to rethink and restructure how public housing administration is implemented in
the United States. The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing was
created by Congress in 1989 in an effort to devise a National Action Plan by which to
eradicate, eliminate, or renovate "severely distressed" public housing. By some accounts,
public housing had become "second-class housing and the people living there felt that the
government treated them as second-class citizens."1 Not only was public housing viewed
as "severely distressed" structural units, but the lives of its residents were also considered
to be in a state of "unimaginable distress."2 Public housing had become "unfit, unsafe,
(and) unlivable" in the opinion of Congress members, and they set as their goal the
elimination of this "national disgrace" for the benefit of public housing residents.3
This chapter, therefore, unfolds the evolution of HOPE VI, and illustrates how
innovative-thinking policymakers transformed the way we think of public housing and its
residents.
According to Madeline Howard, "Nearly eleven million families and individuals
in the United States depend on some form of government-subsidized housing." Since
1937, the federal government has provided subsidized housing for low-income people.
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While government housing was originally intended for traditional families - that is,
husbands and wives - the structure of families in public housing has shifted. According
to Howard, by the 1950s, the face of public housing had become largely African-
American, elderly, and female.7 This is an important concept since public policy is
invariably shaped by the constituents it serves:
For the millions of people who live in government-subsidized housing or
attempt to access it, the government's concepts of family rights and
responsibilities may determine very fundamental aspects of their lives,
such as whom they can marry and live with, whether certain family mem
bers must be excluded from the home, and how to cope with violence
within the family. In addition to interfering with family structure, sub
sidized housing program often perpetuate racial and economic segregation
by isolating residents from the larger community.8
Racial segregation and economic isolation were two primary challenges that had
come to plague public housing communities. The issue of poverty and the challenges
therein became a focus of national policy in the 1980s. Some scholars credit the 1987
publication of William Julius Wilson's The Truly Disadvantaged with the revival of
national discourse on poverty. In this seminal work, Wilson discusses "concentration
effects" of poverty. Concentration effects are the "experiences of low-income families
who live in inner-city areas [that differ] from the experiences of those who live in other
areas in the central city."9 Wilson states,
In short, the communities of the underclass are plagued by massive
joblessness, flagrant and open lawlessness, and low-achieving schools,
and therefore tend to be avoided by outsiders. Consequently, the residents
of these areas, whether women and children of welfare families or
aggressive street criminals, have become increasingly socially isolated
from mainstream patterns of behavior.10
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Once designed to offer a temporary solution to affordable housing for low-income
families, public housing in modern times has come to represent poverty entrapment and
isolation from mainstream society. The very system that was originally intended to lift
families out of poverty had become a system that, in essence, simply "warehoused" the
poor.
As a remedy to the concentration effects of conventional public housing
communities, the federal government also began providing housing assistance through
the issuance of housing vouchers. In 1970, what is now commonly known as "Section 8"
housing assistance was created. Although initially developed as the Housing Allowance
Experiment, this new policy became law with the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1987. Section 8 allows low-income families to rent market-rate housing using
government funded housing vouchers. Vouchers are typically paid directly to landlords
as rental subsidies, with the remaining balance (not to exceed 30% of renters' income)
paid by the renter. Under the voucher program, all parties hold responsibility for their
part in the rental contract. That is to say, the tenant, landlord, and the housing authority
all have HUD-mandated obligations to ensure that suitable and affordable housing is
provided to the tenant.''
In 1998, however, changes were made, including the program name from Section
8 to Housing Choice Voucher program. Also, according to Landis and McClure, the new
program allows vouchers to be issued to residents who can then wield their rights as
renters to withhold the voucher from the landlord if an unresolved maintenance issue
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were to occur. The vouchers, furthermore, became portable in 1999, thereby allowing
renters to take the voucher to other units if they should decide to vacate the property.12
The mid 1980s saw a greater shift towards devolution in housing policy
implementation. "For example, Congress enacted the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Program in 1986 and the HOME program in 1990. Both programs gave state and local
housing officials greater authority and responsibility for designing housing strategies
tailored to their respective housing markets."13
One of the key initiators of housing policy change is former HUD Secretary, Jack
Kemp. As a cabinet member of the George H.W. Bush Administration (1989-1993),
Kemp, made several attempts to revamp public housing. One idea for which he strongly
advocated was resident ownership of public housing and improved housing management.
Although it was widely believed that public housing no longer provided a viable solution
to low-income housing, the idea of public housing demolition was anathema to Secretary
Kemp. Kemp was the first to initiate a series of housing programs called Homeowner-
ship and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE). These programs, first
implemented in 1990, eventually fell under new legislation passed by Congress in 1992
called the Urban Revitalization Demonstration (URD). "The Urban Revitalization
Demonstration ... was sponsored by Senators Barbara Mikulski and Christopher Bond,
and incorporated into the FY 1993 appropriations law."14 URD eventually came to be
known as HOPE VI, which authorized funds to be used for the revitalization, renovation,
and demolition of blighted and "distressed" public housing units.15
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By 1989, concerned members of Congress made a commitment to address the
growing issue of "severely distressed" public housing. The National Commission on
Severely Distressed Public Housing was created to develop solutions to eradicate
blighted and distressed housing. According to Bruce Katz,
Over eighteen months, the commission and its staff visited public housing
developments in twenty-five cities, held twenty public hearings, and
talked extensively with a broad range of individuals and constituencies.
The commission's final report to Congress, presented in August 1992,
portrayed public housing residents as fearful and languishing in unhealthy,
unsafe communities without access to jobs or programs designed to enable
self-sufficiency.16
Through a National Action Plan, the Commission made recommendations in three
vital areas: "physical improvements, management improvements, and social and
community services to address resident needs."17 By the time the Commission submitted
its report to Congress in 1992, it had determined that 86,000 of all public housing units
(about 1.2 million units nationwide) were "severely distressed." Although scholars
disagree as to whether a definition of "severely distressed" was formally established,
Katz maintains that "severely distressed" referred to the existence of concentrated
poverty, "the incidence of crime, the nature and extent of management challenges, and
the physical condition of the housing."
There were several influences and drives that sparked changes in housing policy.
While Secretary Kemp pushed for his public housing homeownership plan, other policy
thinkers were advocating for mixed-income models and housing mobility. The mixed-
income model was advanced by developers and housing authorities across various cities
who were "using federal waivers and other tools to redevelop public housing sites and
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other subsidized housing .. . ,"19 establishing the assumption that economic integration
would lead to sustainability. By the same token, the success of the Gautreaux project in
Chicago (discussed in Chapter 3) influenced policy in housing mobility through the use
of vouchers. Proponents of housing vouchers were encouraged by the fact that house
holders who moved to the Chicago suburbs following Gautreaux v. HUD achieved better
outcomes in employment and childhood education than those who did not move.20
Along with poverty deconcentration and economic integration, the Commission's
National Action Plan also called for the coordination of social services for public-assisted
housing residents, as well as encouraging housing authorities to pursue public-private
partnerships in order to facilitate better management of housing properties. Popkin et al.
state:
The HOPE VI program was intended to fundamentally transform public
housing by combining the physical revitalization of distressed public
housing properties with community building and supportive services.
HOPE VI funds covered capital costs to reconstruct replacement units,
fund Section 8 vouchers, and improve management practices. Reflecting
the commission's focus on community building and resident empower
ment, the law also set aside 20 percent of the initial $300 million
appropriation for community service programs and for supportive
services, including literacy training, job training, day care, and youth
activities.21
In 1992, legislators were in agreement that public housing revitalization needed to
be addressed without delay. The "distressed" lives of public housing residents demanded
no less. In October 1992, appropriations for a new program - HOPE VI - was author
ized, even before the enactment of legislation authorizing the new law.
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"The enactment of HOPE VI in 1992 coincided with the election of President Bill
Clinton and the appointment of Henry Cisneros, the former mayor of San Antonio, as
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development."23'24 Although Kemp and others had set
out various initiatives leading to the enactment of HOPE VI, it is Secretary Cisneros that
is most credited with breathing life into HOPE VI. Cisneros has been described as
Clinton's "passionate crusader against racial and economic segregation." 3
One of Cisnero's primary goals in HOPE VI and public housing revitalization is
the deconcentration of poverty. In 1992, another demonstration initiative, Moving to
Opportunity (MTO), was authorized. Based on the Gautreaux initiative in Chicago, the
MTO demonstration project was established with the goal of moving low-income
residents to low-poverty communities. The idea was to give low-income families the
chance to move to better opportunities by moving to better-income neighborhoods. And
so, with this demonstration project coinciding with the enactment of HOPE VI, the
deconcentration of poverty became a patent goal of HOPE VI.
But the deconcentration of poverty is achieved not only with the demolition of
distressed housing. Along with public housing revitalization and reconstruction, another
method for deconcentrating poverty is residential mobility through the use of Section 8
housing vouchers. Section 8 vouchers allow displaced residents the opportunity to move
into market-rate rental housing with the hope that the new location is in a low-poverty
area. However, reports are mixed as to whether or not the use of vouchers has led to
poverty dispersement or to new enclaves of concentrated poverty. Critics have pointed to
HUD and to public housing authorities for failure to keep track of residents' relocation.
39
"[H]ousing authorities generally have not assembled data on the characteristics of the
neighborhoods to which their Section 8 families moved...."26 Where did displaced
public housing residents go? Reports have been inconsistent. But, Alexander Polikoff
maintains that voucher relocation "has been one of HOPE VFs weak spots."27
In 1993, Secretary Cisneros made a visit to Atlanta to discuss the revitalization of
Atlanta's public housing stock with city leaders. At that time, Cisneros met with public
housing residents to gain their input into what public housing could become. Following
the tour of Atlanta (as well as other city tours), Cisneros began to understand the severity
of the public housing crisis. He resolved not only to revitalize distressed housing, but to
overhaul the entire public housing system.
Several political and business leaders were at the forefront of this overhaul:
Senators Alfonse D'Amato (R-New York), Christopher Bond (R-Missouri), Barbara
Mikulski (D-Maryland), Donald Riegle (D-Michigan), and Paul Sarbanes (D-Maryland);
Representatives Henry B. Gonzalez (D-San Antonio, TX), Rick Lazio (R-Long Island,
NY), Jerry Lewis (R-Southern California), Louis Stokes (D-Cleveland, OH), and Maxine
Waters (D-Los Angeles, CA). From the business community, Richard Baron
(McCormack Baron Salazar) was instrumental in proposing how public housing
communities could be effective. Finally, leading housing authority executives rounded
out this cadre of leadership. They included: Richard Gentry from Richmond, VA; Sally
Hernandez-Pinero from New York, NY; and Renee Glover from Atlanta, GA.29
In the case of Atlanta, the overhaul of public housing could not come soon
enough. According to Glover, "Atlanta had more public housing per capita than any
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other large city in the United States."30 Approximately 13% of Atlanta's population (or
50,000 people) were residents of Atlanta Public Housing.31 "Atlanta had the nation's
second-highest poverty rate, with more than 27 percent of the population living below the
federal poverty line. It had the country's highest rate of violent crime and one of the
highest unemployment rates for African Americans. The public schools were failing, and
middle-class residents - [B]lack and white - had been fleeting the city in droves for at
least three decades."32 Finally, says Glover, AHA was not providing the "safe and
decent" housing that it was intended to provide.33
HOPE VI provided the much needed financial and legislative resources to revamp
Atlanta's public housing. Furthermore, the appointment of Renee Lewis Glover as
AHA's new President and Chief Executive Officer was also necessary in "getting things
done," as Glover herself explains.34 Under Glover's leadership, "AHA has had to
overhaul its policies, operations, business processes and systems, and personnel with the
new model in mind." 5 Under this new model, the Atlanta Housing Authority envisioned
itself as a facilitator of the public housing system. Having established partnerships with
investors and developers, the Atlanta Housing Authority is now a real estate venture.
AHA owns the land on which new development sites are located; however, managing
partners (or "owner entities")36 develop the communities and finance them.
AHA boasted of its success of implementing a public housing system utilizing a
model of mixed-income, mixed-use developments. As Glover states, no other city was
utilizing the mixed-income, mixed-use model prior to the conceptualization by AHA.
Not only was this new territory for AHA, but also for HUD. Glover maintains that many
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HUD officials "were flying blind because HUD had never granted permission for an
entity other than a local housing authority to own public housing units."37
According to Cisneros, HOPE VI not only helped to revitalize the physical
structure of public housing, it also led to public policy change. There emerged "working
principles" from the evolution of HOPE VI that led to a renewed concept in public
housing - New Urbanism. New Urbanism is an architectural concept that extends from
urban design to encourage shared space, social interaction, and a sense of ownership by
the residents. It became "a guiding set of principles in the field of community design,"39
says Popkin. New urbanism is characterized by "houses facing the streets, with ... a mix
of housing types, prices, and sizes to attract a mix of people; shopping and parks
accessible via footpaths and sidewalks; a grid of streets."40
According to Peter Calthorpe, four key principles of New Urbanism were at the
core of HOPE VI: diversity, human scale, restoration, and continuity.41 Diversity is
achieved with the implementation of mixed-income, mixed-use developments. The goal
in New Urbanism is to bring back to city neighborhoods what public housing and urban
sprawl took away. No longer warehousing homogenous populations in city high-rises,
New Urbanism encourages a mix of people, housing types, and social interaction. Thus,
diversity brings vibrancy back to city life.
Human scale refers to the concept of providing "walkability" and pedestrian space
in urban design. It promotes Jane Jacobs' concept of "eyes on the street" - that is, safety
and security because residents are closer to the street. It also clearly delineates public
versus private spaces.
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Restoration refers to the preservation of historic buildings and public space, and
restoring the basic infrastructure of the community.
Likewise, continuity links public housing with the vibrancy of city life, which
includes access to transportation, safety and security, and architectural design that relates
to the history of the city.
Despite the positive concepts of social interaction generated by New Urbanism,
one drawback to this urban design was the repeal of the "one-for-one" replacement rule
in 1995. In 1981, Congress enacted a law prohibiting the demolition of housing units
without one-for-one replacement. Eventually, because New Urbanism under HOPE VI
encouraged smaller-scale communities, and construction other than high-rises, the
number of units demolished could not be replaced feasibly at a rate of 100%, on the same
community site. New construction design favored green space, "defensible space," and
"eyes on the street," - i.e., contemporary concepts advanced by urbanist, Jane Jacobs.
In response, advocates for the one-for-one replacement rule insisted that HUD
authorize alternatives to conventional public housing. Low-income residents who do not
or cannot return to the original housing site should be allowed other types of housing
assistance. For Cisneros, providing housing to every resident displaced by demolition
was a must. He stated, "I personally insisted that without exception a housing authority
had to be able to show that every resident who was in public housing before would be
provided some form of housing, either a unit or a voucher."44 Evaluations of HOPE VI to
date, have shown that this has not been the case.
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In 1997, the Secretary of HUD position was filled by Andrew Cuomo. According
to Cisneros, "Cuomo gave prominence to HOPE VI."45 Cuomo reinvented HUD and
improved management processes. According to HUD's website, the Management
Reform Plan that Cuomo designed "cracks down on waste, fraud and abuse, and
addresses decades-old management problems at the Department."46 In essence, the
Management Reform Plan has been hailed by analysts as "one of the most ambitious,
fundamental and exciting reinvention plans in the recent history of the federal govern
ment."47
Under Secretary Cuomo, major HUD accomplishments include: bringing
integrity to HUD processes; cracking down on landlords who abuse Department policies;
the launching of housing inspections nationwide for public-assisted housing that are
privately-owned, and subsidized or insured by HUD (e.g., Section 8 housing); opening up
"storefront" HUD offices to serve residents better; reforming public housing and rental
assistance; increasing homeownership; reducing housing discrimination; and developing
the "Continuum of Care" program - a program that helps homeless Americans become
self-sufficient.4
The largest public-assisted housing program in the U.S. is the Housing Choice
Voucher Program. Serving "[approximately 2 million households,"49 the Housing
Choice Voucher Program serves the same population as does conventional public
housing. However, the Housing Choice Voucher Program allows for greater flexibility in
securing suitable housing:
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In 1998, reflecting the new emphasis on mobility and location
choice, the Section 8 program was renamed the Housing Choice Voucher
program. By the end of the decade, the voucher program had surpassed the
public housing program to become the largest housing assistance program
in the United States, and was increasingly recognized as an essential tool
for helping low-income households obtain affordable housing without
reinforcing the concentration of poverty.50
Vouchers can come in two forms: project-based vouchers and tenant-based
vouchers. Project-based vouchers are "attached" to a particular housing unit, and can
only be used with that unit. In other words, the funding assistance stays with a particular
unit. Tenant-based vouchers, on the other hand, are flexible and transferable. In other
words, the assistance goes with the resident. If the resident should vacate a property, she
could potentially retain her voucher assistance when moving to another property.
Contrary to project-based housing, the tenant would not necessarily lose her assistance
when she vacates the rental property.51
In 2001, the Atlanta Housing Authority was awarded $35 million for the demoli
tion and revitalization of Capitol Homes. A total of 694 original units were demolished
with an expected 1,140 units to be built as replacement units, now called Capitol Gate
way. Of the 1,140 units, 639 units were expected to be rental units and 501 units were
expected to be for-sale units. Of the rental units, 138 units were expected to be HUD-
subsidized units, 308 non-subsidized units, and 193 market rate units. So, although the
total number of units exceeds the original number of units demolished, only a small
percent of replacement units were expected to be subsidized units for the poorest of the
poor. In essence, the plan for Capitol Gateway was that only 22% of the original capacity
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will be used for subsidized public housing. What happened, then, to the remaining
original residents?
Now that HOPE VI has demolished, revitalized, and redeveloped public housing
around the U.S. over the last 20 years, what will the future of housing policy bring to
U.S. citizens? What is the next phase in affordable housing? Will HUD continue to
provide funding in the name of HOPE VI for the upkeep of revitalized housing? Will
HOPE VI continue to be reappropriated for the continued issuance of housing vouchers?
Will HOPE VI increase its efforts to provide support services to low-income residents?
Will HOPE VI funding help to revamp how we address homelessness and the unhoused?
Will greater efforts move towards homeownership assistance rather than revitalized
public housing?
In Appendix A of From Despair to HOPE, G. Thomas Kingsley offers a look at
the future of HOPE VI nationwide. He writes,
the developments associated with the 240 grants awarded through the end
of 2007 will have entailed the demolition of 96,226 original, on-site public
housing units but ultimately will yield a total of 111,059 new and
rehabilitated units for occupancy, for an average yield of 463 units per
grant. More than half (54 percent) of the post-revitalization units will be
public housing units .... Of (these) units, 89 percent will be rental units
and 11 percent will be homeownership units. Of the remaining post-
revitalization units that will not be public housing units (46 percent), 62
percent will be rentals (rented either through other, shallower forms of
public subside or at market rates), and 38 percent will be homeownerships
units.52
HOPE VI funds continue to be administered through appropriations and
announced in Notice of Funds Availability (NOFAs), the latest of which was published
on August 25, 2010. Currently, applicants for HOPE VI funding must have "severely
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distressed housing in their inventory, as mandated by NOFA. Only public housing
authorities can apply for funding. Housing authorities that only administer Housing
Choice or Section 8 vouchers are not eligible to apply.53
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CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Literature on HOPE VI and its outcomes is ever-growing. While most public
reports on HOPE VI laud the revitalization efforts of city housing authorities, others
reveal skepticism as to the overall effects of public housing demolition. The most
pressing concern is what happened to the families who were displaced? Were these
families able to successfully achieve housing stability? Are there negative outcomes as a
result of HOPE VI displacement? In addition to gains won by exiting public housing,
what social costs were borne by residents who were displaced?
The overall effectiveness of HOPE VI is the focus of many housing policy
studies. Researchers have looked at comparable housing policies and their outcomes to
gauge HOPE VI effectiveness. For example, case studies in Chicago's Gautreax
program; Louisville, Kentucky's Park DuValle Revitalization Project; and various MTO
(Moving to Opportunity) programs nationwide have all been examined as possible
benchmarks by which to compare HOPE VI relocation outcomes. These case study
analyses examine how city housing authorities were able to implement innovative
housing policy and whether or not the overall objectives of HUD were ultimately met.
Chicago's famous Gautreaux program was an experiment in residential mobility
and its effects on social behavior. A result of a 1966 class-action law suit, the Gautreaux
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program was named for Dorothy Gautreaux, a tenant whose attorneys filed suit on behalf
of all public housing residents against the discriminatory practices of the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA).' Although not fully resolved until 1981, the case resulted in
an agreement by the CHA to remedy acts of racial discrimination within its office:
As part of a court-ordered legal settlement to redress past racial discrimin
ation, from 1976 to 1998 the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) provided
a limited number of low-income African-American families the means to
relocate, with an emphasis on moving to predominantly white suburbs.
Each year, thousands of people vied to apply by telephone for a few
hundred vouchers handed out on a first-come, first-served basis. These
vouchers could be used in the private rental market, with the federal
government making up the difference between a unit's rent and the
individual's contribution (based on income). Over the program's 22-year
history, some 7,100 families relocated into private housing in Chicago and
its suburbs.2
The Gautreaux program, furthermore, was an effort to assist public housing
tenants in moving to neighborhoods that had low minority populations (i.e., less than
30%).3 The intent was to increase tenants' chances for upward mobility by assisting
them in moving to less minority segregated communities.4
Many HOPE VI programs of today have their antecedence in the Gautreaux
program.5 What both Gautreaux and HOPE VI programs have in common is the primary
goal of desegregating public housing communities. The programs differ, however, in the
selectivity of residents. Whereas HOPE VI involves forced eviction and relocation of
residents, families relocating in the Gautreaux program chose to do so, voluntarily.
The Park DuValle Revitalization Project (Louisville, KY) is another revitalization
effort that is useful in assessing the overall effectiveness of HOPE VI. In contrast to the
Gautreaux program (which sought to disperse race and poverty), the Park DuValle
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Revitalization Project utilized HOPE VI funds to resegregate African Americans.
Brazley and Gilderbloom state that this program "chose to build a new housing
community for African Americans on an isolated site previously utilized for public
housing."6 Although much of public housing across the country has been criticized for
its entrenched model of racial segregation, developers of Park DuValle chose to maintain
racial segregation.7 Despite current trends in mixed-income models, Park DuValle, with
its emphasis on racial resegregation, has been noted for its success in reshaping public
housing.8
Also spurred by the success of the Gautreaux project is the Moving to
Opportunity (MTO) program. This program was designed by HUD under Presidents
George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and includes as its goals the following:
• Reduce cost and achieve greater costs effectiveness in Federal
expenditures;
• Give incentives to families with children where the head of household is
working, is seeking work, or is preparing for work by participating in job
training, educational programs, or programs that assist people to obtain
employment and become economically self-sufficient; and
• Increase housing choices for low-income families.9
But MTO programs do not tell the whole story in assessing HOPE VI relocation
outcomes, say Jens Ludwig et al. "MTO estimates are informative only about the effects
of mobility programs like MTO on the types of low-income families who would choose
to participate in such programs. MTO is silent on the effects of involuntary mobility
programs, which is an important point, given ongoing HOPE VI activities across the
country to demolish some of our highest-poverty housing projects."10
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But what is informative about the MTO program is the emphasis on economic
class, not race. "Under the criteria established by MTO .. . Gautreaux's explicit
emphasis on race was lost and the focus shifted to class.""
Economic integration is a key goal in contemporary housing policy, says Thomas
C. Kost.12 Moving out of public housing will lead to "greatly improved socio-economic
outcomes," agrees Boston.13 HOPE VI in Atlanta allows mixed-income housing options
where low-income residents are placed in residential units alongside middle-income
residents.
Kost also upholds the benefits of racial integration. He writes: "Racial integra
tion would further 'provide opportunities for exposure and interaction between whites
and minorities [that] appear to contribute to greater tolerance, fair-mindedness, and
openness to diverse networks and settings.' In other words, residential integration is
beneficial for members of all races."14
Kost advances the concept of "vertical equity" in achieving housing parity.
According to Kost, those residents with the greatest need (i.e., the poorest of the poor)
should benefit the most from new housing policy.15 Unlike the housing vouchers where
residents may still encounter barriers and restrictions in securing suitable housing,
vertical equity in housing policy would ensure that all displaced residents actually find
suitable and sustained housing. Not only would neighborhoods achieve greater racial
integration, but poor residents with the greatest economic and social need would more
likely find upward mobility.16
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But linking residential space to social outcomes of its residents can be method
ologically problematic, say Susan Clampet-Lundquist and Douglas S. Massey.17 For
example, when using survey data, how does one extract causality in neighborhood
effects? In other words, do poor neighborhoods create poor families, or do poor
neighborhoods simply attract people who are already poor? How does one determine
what is cause and what is effect?
The concept of "neighborhood effects" - i.e., the effect of residential space on
residents' behavior - is famously captured in William Julius Wilson's seminal book, The
Truly Disadvantaged. Wilson's attention to "neighborhood effects" is often a prime
focus for HOPE VI studies,19 given that transformation of social behavior is one of the
expected outcomes of HOPE VI mobility programs. However, the engagement of The
Truly Disadvantaged for promoting involuntary displacement of poor housing residents is
misguided, says Wilson. He explains,
Nowhere do I suggest the forced relocation of the urban poor from
housing projects or other centers of concentrated poverty as a policy
option. On the contrary, my extended discussion of policy options, which
flows from my analysis of the social transformation of the inner city,
highlights macroeconomic policy to generate economic growth and tight
labor markets; fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate noninflationary
growth and increase the competitiveness of American goods on both the
domestic and international markets; and a national labor market strategy to
make the labor force, including the [B]lack labor force, more adaptable to
changing economic opportunities. I also advocated a family allowance
program, a child support assurance program, and a child-care strategy.20
Other scholars, such as Clampet-Lundquist and Massey, maintain that neighbor
hood effects are revealed through more than just relocation.21 Neighborhood effects are
also a product of time and space. Clampet-Lundquist and Massey acknowledge that most
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studies of neighborhood effect examine behavioral change "at a certain point in time,
rather than in a dynamic way."22 In other words, assessing a measure of neighborhood
effects requires that the resident remain in the neighborhood for a length of time.23 They
suggest that longitudinal studies may be more effective in drawing conclusions about the
positive effects of HOPE Vl-related mobility. Simply moving to a better environment
does not guarantee better social outcomes, especially if the tenant should choose to vacate
the environment after a passage of time.24'25 A local study by Emory University concurs
with this finding:
[S]imply moving families out of a distressed public housing community is
not sufficient to ensure that families attain economic self-sufficiency,
particularly given the very low incomes of most public housing residents.
Successful transitions to self-sufficiency would require on-going
community and support services to enable former public housing residents
to secure employment and connect to the opportunities provided by
mainstream society.26
Regardless of duration in a given neighborhood, the fact remains that tenants are
"human agents."27 No measure of neighborhood effects can be calculated "devoid of
human agency."28 That is to say, one must consider residents' choices and decisions in
housing selection. The calculation of neighborhood effects must take into account
residents' free will, despite whether or not HOPE VI contributed to their reason for
moving.
Locally, studies of HOPE VI effectiveness have been conducted by: (1) Emory
University's Office of University-Community Partnerships (OUCP), (2) Clark Atlanta
University's Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy, and (3) Georgia State
University's Department of Sociology.
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First, Emory conducted an evaluation of the McDaniel Glenn housing program.
In this study, face-to-face interviews were conducted with residents of the former
McDaniel Glenn housing project. The goal of the study was to assess the effects of
relocation on the lives of residents formerly residing in McDaniel Glenn and the
Mechanicsville/Pittsburgh areas prior to revitalization efforts. Investigators explain,
A baseline interview was conducted between December 2006 and April
2007 and a follow-up interview was conducted between July and
September 2009. We also analyzed administrative data obtained from the
Atlanta Housing Authority regarding the characteristics of the former
residents of McDaniel Glenn. In addition, to provide a comparative
perspective on perceptions of housing and neighborhood conditions
between former residents of the McDaniel Glenn public housing
community and Mechanicsville and Pittsburgh neighborhoods, the
evaluation team completed face-to-face interviews with a sample of 100
households each in the Mechanicsville and Pittsburgh neighborhoods at
baseline and follow-up.
Findings of Emory's study reveal that the residents, in general, have experienced
positive or improved outcomes in living conditions since relocation and revitalization.
"Specifically, more than eight out often (83%) former residents interviewed in 2009
agreed that the razing and redevelopment of McDaniel Glenn was the 'right thing to
do.'"30 Some improved areas include,
• Quality of housing;
• General satisfaction with neighborhood characteristics; and
• A stronger sense of neighborliness and community trust.
Areas in which residents continue to experience challenges, or at least a lower rate
of satisfaction, include,
• Increased household expenses and housing costs;
• Food insecurity;
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• Residential instability (i.e., multiple moves and shortened duration of
residency);
• Access to public transportation (rate of satisfaction was lower than when
residing in McDaniel Glenn, but still rated as at least "good"); and
• An overall decline in access to jobs, adult education, and other human
capital resources.3
Emory's findings, furthermore, reveal that "multiple movers" (i.e., residents who
moved more than once since leaving McDaniel Glenn) generally experience greater
satisfaction with their current neighborhoods and amenities than those who moved only
once.33 Investigators, however, caution against generalizing the outcomes of interview
participants with the overall population of McDaniel Glenn residents. It could be that
those who chose to participate in the study were the ones experiencing more favorable
outcomes than those who chose not to participate.34
Second, the Southern Center for Studies in Public Policy at Clark Atlanta
University offered a local evaluation of HOPE VI. The Capitol Homes HOPE VI
Evaluation Study: Update #1 is both a qualitative and quantitative look at how relocation
impacted the lives of residents formerly residing in Capitol Homes. Researchers
maintain,
A prime goal of the HOPE VI program is 'improving the living environ
ment for residents of severely distressed public housing' by 'providing
housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of very low-income
families.' HOPE VI aims to achieve this goal by creating mixed-income
communities which offer aesthetically pleasing buildings, open recreation
spaces, and a comprehensive array of social services.35
When asked whether or not their living conditions are better than when they were
residing in Capitol Homes, a majority of respondents indicated that living conditions are
indeed better.36 Others expressed disappointment and worse conditions:
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[T]here were some relocated residents who did not think that their quality
of living had improved and in some cases considered the living environ
ment a "disaster [with] too many visitors - rats." . . . [O]ther residents
thought that their quality of life had decreased because of added financial
burden (sic) caused by having to spend more money on utility bills...,37
Over time, however, positive sentiments about living conditions post-relocation
seem to wane. The percentage of residents who are satisfied with their post-relocation
living situations tends to decrease as time in new location increases. Researchers report,
The percentage of respondents that rated their current living situation as
better than Capitol Homes has decreased. Overall only 8.6 percent of the
respondents rated their overall living situation as better than Capitol
Homes, while 37.5 percent rated it as being about the same and 12.5
percent stated that it was worse than Capitol Homes.38
Deirdre Oakley of Georgia State University has focused her studies on relocation
outcomes and residential segregation (or re-segregation). Along with various cohorts and
graduate students, Oakley conducted personal interviews with public housing residents.
Prominently featured in her research is the question of race (and racism). Because a
majority of poor housing residents are Black, her research seeks to examine whether or
not housing policy, as implemented by the Atlanta Housing Authority, is couched in a
veil of racism. It is well-noted that the majority of displaced housing residents did not
return to AHA-revitalized communities. Rather, the majority of qualified residents were
given housing vouchers, through which they could move into market-rate housing.
But vouchers provide for limited options if landlords are at their discretion to
accept vouchers or not. Oakley et al. maintain that displaced Black residents tend to
relocate to other low-income Black communities (where vouchers are more likely to be
accepted), and are therefore, not necessarily afforded the improved living conditions
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being touted by the Atlanta Housing Authority. She cites structural reasons for this
reality:
The Black neighborhoods are where the majority of voucher subsidized
housing is located ... [A]s the percent of voucher housing increases so do
the percents for Black residents and poverty. Thus, it is clear that
residents' choice on where to relocate is constrained by the location of
voucher subsidized housing.39
Returning to Revitalized Communities
In HOPE VI data nationwide, it is indicated that very few residents
actually return to revitalized housing. Rich et al. state,
According to the HOPE VI Tracking Study, which followed the housing
choices of former residents in eight early HOPE VI projects, 19 percent of
the households surveyed returned to a revitalized HOPE VI development.
Other studies have reported return rates that varied from less than 10
percent to 75 percent, with larger proportions returning to HOPE VI
projects that involved rehabilitation as opposed to redevelopment.40
There are various noted reasons in the literature why residents may or may not
choose to return to their former communities. Within the McDaniel Glenn community,
only 12% of former residents actually returned to the revitalized property.41 However,
71% of the respondents at follow-up expressed an interest in returning. In addition to
being pleased with the new units, other top reasons residents wanted to return were the
familiarity of their previous community, and to be near family and friends.
But Emory's researchers found that the mixed-income development at McDaniel
Glenn allows for a mixture of income levels, thereby reducing the number of units
available for public housing residents. This, in effect, limits the concentration of poor
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residents within the same low-income bracket, and therefore, limits the number of
residents who actually return.44
Also, with revitalization come new AHA regulations. For example, the Moving
to Work program within the Atlanta Housing Authority allows AHA to be more selective
in who returns to the revitalized housing. Residents must meet more stringent guidelines
in terms of employment and employability in order to qualify for relocation back to the
revitalized property.
And finally, the residents themselves may simply choose not to return to the
revitalized community. Particularly those with housing choice vouchers, moving back to
the revitalized community may cause residents to lose their voucher, thereby limiting
their freedom ofmovement when selecting housing.
Political Engagement of Public Housing Residents
Finally, this literature review is not complete without a discussion of resident's
political participation and the right to engage in their own future. Sarah K. Bruch et al.
discuss several theories of policy design and their influence on the civic and political
participation of the constituents served by the policy. The authors write, "We find that
policy designs can have significant effects on civic and political engagement among the
poor. .. and such effects tend to be more positive when a policy's authority structure
reflects democratic rather than paternalist principles."46 They point out that political
disenfranchisement of the poor is not a natural or inevitable phenomenon. Rather, it is a
social construct - and one that is particularly unique to the American political system.
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Bruch et al. examine three different government programs - Temporary Aid to
Needy Families (TANF), Head Start, and public housing assistance programs - and
discuss how levels of political participation vary with each program policy design.
First, the authors hypothesize that an incorporating authority structure - such as
Head Start - maximizes political involvement. For example, in Head Start programs,
poor parents are politically empowered by the mandated parental involvement component
of the program. "The emphasis on parental participation ... reflects the program's
origins as a Community Action Program created by the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, which sought to encourage the 'maximum feasible participation' of poor people as
an empowerment strategy."48 Participation by the parents is incorporated into the policy
design, thereby, allowing parents the political involvement to engage in their own lives.
A second hypothesis states that a paternalistic authority structure - as found in
TANF programs - has a negative effect on political participation. Government workers
who have wide discretion to determine rules and mandates as requisites for social service
benefits are considered negative influences for poor people's political involvement.
Under this authority structure, aid recipients must contend with a paternalistic policy
design - i.e., one in which recipients can receive sanctions for noncompliance of rules.
Finally, Bruch et al. hypothesize that formal-bureaucratic authority structures
have a null effect on political involvement. Policies that are entrenched in bureaucratic
processes will have little or limited effects on the civic and political participatory levels
of residents. According to Bruch et al., these policies rely on centralized processes that
seek to "ensure impartial treatment in application and assignment processes. Interactions
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between officials and recipients are more limited than in the other programs we consider,
emphasizing neither participatory involvement nor directive and supervisory
i • • ,,49
discretion.
In essence, Bruch et al. find that the level of political participation is more
positive when the authority structure of the policymaker is democratic and participatory.
Each of these examples - Head Start, TANF, and public housing assistance - fall along a
democratic continuum, with public housing assistance falling somewhere in the middle.
Nonetheless, say Bruch et al., if the authority structure of the policy organization is such
that the constituents are allowed a voice in policymaking decisions, then the social
outcomes for those constituents are more favorable to their wants and needs.50
In the current dissertation study, this student argues that HOPE VI housing
policies as implemented by the Atlanta Housing Authority are exemplary of a paternal
istic design. If Bruch et al. advance the notion that paternalistic authority structures "tell
poor people what to do,"51 then HOPE VI in Atlanta would fall under this scope.
According to many voices of public housing residents, AHA did little to hear their
concerns about forced eviction. Rather, the leadership of AHA persisted in their beliefs
that demolishing distressed public housing and forcing the relocation of thousands of
residents was the best option for the residents. In essence, AHA told residents they had
to move, and so they did.
But other reports deny this charge. For example, according to an Emory-led
evaluation report, the decision to revitalize the McDaniel Glenn housing community was
strategic. It was, in fact, due to the overwhelming amount of community support and
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organizational partnerships that McDaniel Glenn was recommended for HOPE VI funds.
Furthermore, AHA officials and community organizational leaders reported confidently
that the concerns and comments of the McDaniel Glenn residents were incorporated into
plans for revitalization. For example, some residents' concerns included: "community
supportive retail, safe and attractive outdoor play space for young children, additional
recreational facilities, a community room, a new state-of-the-art early childhood develop
ment center, improved safety and security through new streets, sidewalks, and lighting,
and greater connectivity among the elements of the McDaniel Glenn revitalization and
the surrounding neighborhood."52
But other stakeholders contradict this assessment. According to the same Emory
report, there were some community stakeholders who would have liked a more active and
visible role in the revitalization planning process. "One leader of a human services
organization in Mechanicsville stated that 'the community was apprised of the HOPE VI
application only once it was determined by the higher ups that that's what was going to
happen.'"53 Likewise, the report went on to say that "McDaniel Glenn residents did not
have much of a say in deciding whether the AHA applied for a HOPE VI grant.
According to this key informant, 'the AHA has a tried formula for executing HOPE VI
grants, and they realize that there will be some resistance from neighborhood groups and
residents.'"54
In summary, the literature is expansive with varying assessments as to whether or
not HOPE VI has been successful in its implementation. While few critics would argue
that HOPE VI has successfully revitalized "severely distressed" public housing units,
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what is at question is whether or not HOPE VI has revitalized the distressed lives of
public housing residents. Questions still remain as to how HOPE VI has improved the
lives of pre-demolition residents. By most accounts, housing experts agree that
dilapidated and distressed public housing does not benefit low-income residents.
Furthermore, the concentration of poverty and racial segregation that are so endemic to
public housing communities tend to weigh negatively on the social environments of
residents.
Alternative theories that speak to the positive impact of public housing on the
lives of its residents exist, albeit, not as frequently. One such theory is advanced by
Brian A. Jacob, who suggests that public housing is actually beneficial to children and
families. He writes,
public housing may provide benefits that are not available to low-income
families in private housing, including adequate quality housing, greater
access to social services and a close network of friends and family...
Finally, while living in private housing in better neighborhoods and
attending better schools may increase academic achievement, some
evidence suggests that the disruption of the move itself may have a
negative impact on school performance, particularly in the short run.
There is a substantial literature that documents the negative association
between school mobility and student achievement (Gary Ingersoll et al.,
1989; Karl Alexander et al., 1994; David Kerbow, 1996). It is important to
note that the analysis here involvesforced relocation as opposed to those
in Gautreaux and MTO in which relocation was voluntary.55
In short, Jacob seeks to advance the notion that demolishing public housing does
not necessarily lead to improved social outcomes for families and children. On the
contrary, public housing may actually hold more benefits to residents than the current
literature and HOPE VI proponents would have us to believe. Forced eviction from
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public housing to "better" communities may not provide better outcomes overall if the
negative effects of leaving family, friends, and stability outweigh those outcomes.
Further support for the benefits of public housing is found in Nicholas Dagen
Bloom's book, Public Housing That Worked.56 In this monograph, the author provides
an extensive study of public housing in New York, and how, despite some imperfections,
it has proven to be a viable solution to providing low-income housing. The details of
how New York has successfully managed its public housing are discussed in the policy
review in Chapter 5.
In summary, the literature on HOPE VI highlights the general success of HOPE
VI implementation - mainly that HOPE VI funds led to the demolition and revitalization
of "severely distressed" public housing units. In so doing, it also helped to alleviate the
"distressed" living environments of poor residents by deconcentrating poverty in the
original sites of public housing communities.
What is yet at issue is how well did the relocation of public housing residents
improve their overall well-being? Have residents achieved self-sufficiency as a result of
public housing revitalization? Has education outcomes improved for the children? Have
householders been able to form new social networks in their new communities, leading to
improved job opportunities and higher income potential?
What is broadly lacking in the literature are the direct voices of displaced
residents. What this study advances is an analysis of focus group responses from
residents of one of Atlanta's public housing communities - Capitol Homes. It offers an
indepth look into the relocation experiences of Capitol Homes residents, as depicted in
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their own voices. It seeks to analyze what is of most concern to these residents, and
offers perhaps an alternative voice to the theories and goals of policymakers and housing
experts.
Finally, this study offers a critical look at the migration patterns of poor and
minority population groups in Atlanta since the implementation of HOPE VI. It provides
a limited response to the post-demolition question, "Where have all the people gone?"
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN
This research offers a case study analysis of HOPE VI in Atlanta. Although there
are numerous articles and reports on HOPE VI as a national initiative, this research
examines the effects and outcomes of HOPE VI policy as implemented by the Atlanta
Housing Authority. Thus, this study offers a single-case design with embedded multiple
units of analysis.
Robert K. Yin explains the goal of the case study in conducting research. "In
brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real-life events - such as individual life cycles, small group behavior,
organizational and managerial processes, neighborhood change, school performance,
international relations, and the maturation of industries."1 Furthermore, Yin offers a
basic definition of a case study: "The essence of a case study, the central tendency
among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions:
why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result."
Within this single case study, there are various units of analysis. First and
foremost are the resident surveys. This survey is intended for former residents of
Atlanta's public housing units, residing particularly during the years of 1990 to 2010. It
is an attempt to understand how the demolition of public housing units affected the lives
of residents. Therefore, primary data was gathered from former public housing residents.
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A second unit of analysis is the community stakeholder interviewee. To buttress
the voices of public housing residents, this study incorporates primary data from personal
interviews. Stakeholders within communities surrounding pre-demolition public housing
were asked to sit for a 30 - 45 minute interview in an effort to gather their views and
opinions on neighborhood changes post-demolition. Community stakeholders expressly
targeted for this study include church pastors, educators, political and civic leaders, and
social service providers. During the course of the research process, managers from
Atlanta public branch libraries also became vital and unexpected sources of information,
and were included as interviewees.
Secondary data was taken from the Capitol Homes baseline and evaluation update
studies. Survey and focus group responses were examined using a text analysis due to
the paucity of primary survey data collected.
Other data utilized in this study are taken from the U.S. Census American
Factfinder and the American Community Survey. Data from these sources include
poverty rates for families per census tract, and individuals per county, taken from the
2000 Census and the 2010 Census. Table 1 shows what media were used, what dates
data were collected, and in what form data were used. (See Table 1.)
Conducting a case study analysis in this research is useful in examining how
HOPE VI funds were put to use in Atlanta. What were the decisions made by the Atlanta
Housing Authority? Why were these decision made, and what were the results?
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The case study, says Yin, "is preferred in examining contemporary events, (and)
when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated."3 In other words, respondents'
answers to the survey or interview questions are not manipulated by the investigator.
Table 1. Data Resource Table
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Rather, in this study, the survey and interview questions are gathered in an effort to
elucidate occurrences within a contemporary event - i.e., HOPE Vl-led public housing
demolition in Atlanta.
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Furthermore, policy analysis in this study is grounded in public choice theory. In
public choice theory, the decisions of those in power are examined. Public choice theory
assumes an interaction between public officials, bureaucrats, and the interests of the
general public. In an ideal society, policy decisions on public housing might be achieved
by housing authority officials after systematic input from the general public, or the
housing residents themselves. Although reports from the Atlanta Housing Authority
suggest that residents were allowed verbal input into the decision-making, viewpoints
from critics and residents suggest otherwise. For example, an article by the Atlanta
Progressive News (APN) point out that at least some residents did not wish to move. It
states,
[W]hile the majority of residents attending association meetings at Bowen
Homes and Bankhead Courts say they want to move, this does not reflect
all of the communities. The majority of residents at Hollywood Courts and
Palmer House have signed petitions stating they do not want to move.
APN has no information regarding the wishes of residents at Herndon
Homes, Thomasville Heights, or Roosevelt House.4
Furthermore, some reports cite statements made by housing association
representatives. For example, Bankhead Courts' residents association president, Jeff
Walker, says that the demolition and forced evictions were unfair. "We didn't ask to be
moved,"5 says Walker.
If housing authority officials make policy decisions based on the perception of
improved social welfare of its constituents, then an examination of the social lives of
residents - from their perspective - will shed light on the efficacy and practicability of
those decisions. Thus, survey and focus group responses from former public housing
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residents, along with interviews from community stakeholders, will provide the data for
this policy analysis.
A survey has been designed to gather the opinions and perspectives of residents
who lived in pre-demolition Atlanta public housing and were affected by demolition and
involuntary eviction. It consists often (10) questions, plus a statement of certification, if
taken online. The online statement of certification asks if the respondent is a former
Atlanta public housing resident. If answered yes, the respondent is taken to the 10-
question survey. If answered no, the respondent is exited from the survey.
The survey is available online at www.surveymonkey.com/s/PublicHousing.
This researcher sought to locate potential resident respondents by speaking to
various community association groups. Such groups included Neighborhood Planning
Units (NPU) H, I, and T. Also, AHA affordable housing tenant association meetings
were addressed: Barge Road and Cosby Spear. Also, postcards were printed and
distributed by hand at local Atlanta Public Library branches, and sent via U.S. mail to
local churches.
Potential respondents had the option of taking the survey on paper. Twitter posts
indicated this availability. The principal investigator also made paper copies available
when attending community or NPU (neighborhood planning unit) meetings.
Furthermore, a handful of surveys (8 - 10) were sent via U.S. mail to apartment housing
managers (at their request), along with return addressed envelopes. None of the surveys
were returned and no surveys were taken via paper hardcopies.
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Sample and Data Coding
Data for this research consist of three units of analysis: (1) primary data from
survey responses of pre-demolition public housing residents, (2) secondary data from
focus group resident comments published in two HOPE VI evaluation reports, and (3)
primary data from interview responses of key community stakeholders.
Locating potential survey respondents and interview participants was challenging
at best. The original online survey yielded only three (3) respondents after nearly three
(3) years online. Initial efforts to locate potential respondents were through word of
mouth beginning in 2011. By December 2012, more concerted efforts were made to
locate former public housing residents and potential respondents.
In December 2012, 758 churches around metropolitan Atlanta were identified,
including churches in Fulton County (City of Atlanta), Clayton, Dekalb, Douglas, and
Fayette Counties. Of those 758 churches, 147 email addresses of senior pastors or key
church administrative personnel were gleaned from their websites, and initial contact was
made via email. The email introduced the project to the pastor and requested his/her
participation and support in locating potential survey respondents.
For those churches whose email addresses were not located, a postcard was
designed and sent via U.S. mail to the church address. A total of 500 postcards were
printed; however, only 200 churches were selected for mailing (due to a shortage of
funding). The remaining postcards were distributed throughout the community at public
libraries, community or NPU meetings, or given to interviewees for distribution amongst
their constituents.
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Two (2) batches of emails were also sent to Atlanta Public Schools. Sixty-eight
(68) email addresses were collected from the schools' websites, and two (2) emails were
sent to a total of 68 APS schools. The first batch of emails was sent in the Spring of
2013; the second batch of emails was sent in the Fall 2013.
Overall, an aggregate of 130 emails were sent over the course of three years -
from January 2011 through December 2013 - to church pastors, school educators, social
service providers, community leaders, and political leaders.
In addition to email, postcard mailings, and word of mouth, another strategy used
was social media (Twitter). By posting comments, requests, and updates to Twitter
(@ATLHousingStudy), viewers were directed to a static webpage (Alexander-
study.info), which offered detailed information about the study, and included a direct link
to the online survey. Any person who is (or was) an Atlanta public housing resident and
was affected by HOPE VI could click on the link to take the survey. Furthermore,
anyone from any geographic location could potentially view the Twitter posts and
respond accordingly, even those residents who might have moved out of state.
To support survey data, interview questions were also designed for community
stakeholders. Church pastors and community librarians were particularly targeted for
interviews. In the initial stages, the Atlanta Public School (APS) teachers and principals
were also targeted. However, due to stringent guidelines for conducting research within
its system, APS was eventually eliminated as a target population.
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In addition, interviews were also conducted with an apartment housing manager,
community leaders, and a social worker. These stakeholders were targeted for their
access and insight into the lived experiences of public housing constituents.
The evaluation studies of Capitol Homes provided secondary data. A total of 537
householders relocated from Capitol Homes and provided survey and focus group data
for the 2003 baseline study. Of this population, 101 persons participated in focus groups.
Also, 195 householders relocated to other conventional public housing (CPH), and 342
relocated using the Housing Choice Voucher program (HCV). Demographics for this
population include: 91.1% female; 99.4% non-Hispanic; 99.3% African American; and
99.4% single. "The average age of CPH householders (48.5) is 10 years older than the
average HC householder (37.6)."6
Children (ages 6-12) account for a large percent of the HCV households
(22.1%), as well as a large percent of young adults. Adults younger than age 24 account
for 18% of the CPH population and 22.1% of the HC population. Finally, older adults
(age 62 and over) account for 19.5% of the CPH population.7
A total of 685 households were part of the 2004 evaluation study update. In this
study, 72 residents participated in seven (7) focus groups. Demographically, not much
changed since the 2003 baseline study. Within this population, 90.9% of householders
were female, 99.4% non-Hispanic, 99.2% Black, and 99.4% single. Also, in the 2004
study, 166 residents were from conventional public housing households, 330 were
Housing Choice householders, and 189 households had been terminated.
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In addition, three (3) residents responded to the original online survey through
SurveyMonkey. Of these respondents, two (2) were in the 31-50 year age group, and one
(1) was 51 years or older.
A total of 263 focus group responses from the 2003 baseline study were coded
and analyzed for the purposes of this dissertation project. From the 2004 evaluation
update, 455 focus group responses were coded and analyzed. The total aggregate number
of resident responses coded and analyzed is 718.
A text analysis of words, phrases, and sentences of the residents was conducted,
establishing eighteen categories or topics of concern. They include: SATISFACTION
(i.e., with one or more aspects of the relocation experience); DISSATISFACTION (i.e.,
with one or more aspects of the relocation experience); MONEY OR LACK THEREOF;
PROXIMITY (to bus, schools, shops, hospital, etc.); COUNSELING OR ASSISTANCE;
CHILDREN AND/OR FAMILY; CRIME OR LACK THEREOF (i.e., feelings of safety
or security, peace and quiet); AMENITIES (e.g., washer and dryer, carpet, space, etc.);
HOUSING COMPLAINTS (i.e., with maintenance or physical structure); MOVING
BACK (i.e., to Capitol Homes); EMPLOYMENT OR ADULT EDUCATION; AHA
MISINFORMATION (i.e., perceptions of unconcern for residents); HOUSING CHOICE
voucher program (i.e., Section 8, vouchers, etc.); SELF-ADVOCACY; MEDICAL OR
MENTAL HEALTH issues (including disability); POWER AND POLITICS;
EVICTION OR FEAR OF HOMELESSNESS (e.g., not knowing where they would go);
and COMMUNITY CONNECTION THROUGH CHURCH INVOLVEMENT (or
CCCI).
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The categories are not mutually exclusive. Any one response may contain coding
for several categories. For example, a respondent may express satisfaction with their new
home, but express concerns about excess bills, about which she is dissatisfied. In this
case, the response would be coded for three categories: SATISFACTION, MONEY OR
LACK THEREOF, and DISSATISFACTION.
Although Survey Monkey offers a text analysis tool, it was not feasible to utilize
it with the secondary data. Had this project yielded sufficient primary survey responses,
the Survey Monkey text analyzer could have been used to calibrate the responses into
categories, and to generate charts and tables. Instead, the secondary data responses were
examined manually, categorized and color coded, calibrated for standardization, and then
entered into a spreadsheet using Microsoft Excel. The Excel spreadsheet was used to
generate the charts and graphs found in Chapter 4.
The coding process was necessarily meticulous. First, responses from the
baseline study (n = 263) were obtained online and simply copied electronically into a
word processing tool (Microsoft Word). From there, responses were read through and
coded using different colors of text highlighting. The color coding made it easier to
calibrate the frequency of categories. After an initial coding process, about 13 categories
were identified. A second and third read-through helped to refine the process and
eventually yielded a total of 18 categories.
Responses from the evaluation update {n = 455) were received in hardcopy, and
presented a couple of challenges. First, in order to code them, each response had to be
painstakingly typed into the computer, again using Microsoft Word. However, the most
82
challenging aspect of working with these data is the fact that these responses contained
bolded words and phrases followed by a number in parentheses. The original researchers
attempted to reduce the number of repetitions in the responses by holding frequent words
or phrases, and then placing within parentheses the number of times the word(s) or
phrase(s) appeared in responses. Thus, an additional 1,166 words and/or phrases were
counted in the calibration of categories. Although 455 complete responses were typed
into the computer, the actual number of words coded into categories is inflated due to the
addition of repetitive phrases or words.
Finally, after having written the findings and discussion (and after being several
days removed from the coding process), the responses were read through a final time to
ensure that there were no needed adjustments or changes in how the data was coded.
This, hopefully, helped to ensure a more rigorous analysis of the data.
Interview data was analyzed compositely. Ten (10) community stakeholders
agreed to sit for a one-on-one interview with the principal investigator. Representation
came from church pastors, library workers, apartment housing managers, social service
providers, and a retired educator. Local politicians were also contacted; and while there
was strong interest among some, none consented to the interview.
Limitations
The survey was designed and made available online at Survey Monkey. While
the online availability was intended to achieve accessibility, it is not without its
challenges. For example, there were no mechanisms in place to prevent someone from
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taking the survey multiple times. Furthermore, an online survey does not guarantee that
the respondent is an actual public housing resident. However, the consent form and
statement of certification offered at the beginning of the survey was intended to
encourage integrity of response and identification. (The full consent form is included in
Appendix A.)
The primary barrier to collecting data from the residents was locating former
residents of public housing. Although social media was helpful in getting the word out
about the study, this was not enough to get the residents to actually take the survey. The
webpage and survey were viewed by a few curious people, but only three persons
actually completed the survey.
Five hundred (500) postcards were designed, printed, and distributed to churches,
public libraries, and at community neighborhood meetings where residents were believed
to frequent. Although positive interest was expressed from residents and community
stakeholders at neighborhood planning unit (NPU) and community meetings, there was
obviously an unspoken barrier to completing the survey.
In the Capitol Homes baseline and evaluation studies, it is acknowledged that the
principal investigator "established early working relationships" with the Atlanta Housing
Authority.9 Perhaps residents in the Capitol Homes studies felt compelled to cooperate in
these early studies since they were still receiving assistance from AHA. On the contrary,
an independent doctoral student whom they had never met may not have elicited the
necessary trust to gain access to their thoughts and voice. Even the hardcopy surveys that
were mailed to housing managers (at their request) were never returned.
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During the course of three (3) years, two AHA employees were contacted. Early
in the project design (2011), phone calls were made to the Office of Communications,
and subsequent emails were sent to the Chief External Affairs Officer (CEAO). The goal
at that time was to secure AHA data on the number of housing units demolished and the
number of residents relocated.
In an email to the CEAO, dated April 13, 2011, the following data was requested:
• List of public housing developments and number of units prior to
demolition;
• Names and number of units of replacement housing;
• Number of families displaced;
• Number of families eligible and receiving vouchers;
• Number of families not eligible to receive vouchers.
Although several phone conversations transpired between the CEAO and student
investigator, the data were not made available.
In November 2011, AHA's Vice President of Innovation and Strategy (VPIS)
voluntarily reached out to the student investigator by telephone. She indicated that the
CEAO had asked her to call. Although she advised that residents could not be made
available for this study due to privacy and confidentiality issues, she did ask for an
abstract to the study, which was subsequently sent to her via email on November 28,
2011. A second email was sent to the VPIS on February 13, 2012 after receiving no
response to the November email. There was also no reply to the second email. Follow-
up phone calls during this time also yielded no return call. The VPIS was contacted
again by telephone in the fall of 2013 following the departure of the housing authority's
CEO. This time, the call was returned. It was during this phone conversation that the
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VPIS advised as to the online availability of evaluation studies on Capitol Homes, Grady
Homes, McDaniel Glenn, and Harris Homes. Because the Capitol Homes study included
resident responses, and because the student also had the evaluation update study in-hand,
responses from these studies were used as secondary data.
A third barrier to data collection involved the Atlanta Public School system
(APS). For several months, numerous attempts were made to arrange interviews with
APS teachers and principals. After receiving little response from the educators, phone
calls were made as follow up to the emails. Finally, in September 2013, an APS
administrator advised by phone that a study proposal must be submitted to APS' Office
of Research & Evaluation for prior approval. However, due to the extensive review
process that conflicted with the expected completion of this project, the research design
was modified to exclude active duty APS personnel as potential interviewees. It is with
regret that this important component (educational outcomes) was omitted from the study.
Efforts were made, however, to reach retired, inactive educators through word of
mouth. As a result, data in this study include interview responses from one retired
educator.
The lack of primary survey data was extremely problematic in achieving the goal
of this study. Without benefit of pre-demolition addresses, forwarding addresses, or
telephone numbers of residents, attempts to locate public housing residents and obtain
their cooperation and participation were widely unsuccessful. Initially, it was believed
that residents were concerned about possible backlash from the Atlanta Housing
Authority. However, once the postcards were distributed to the public libraries, several
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phone calls were received by the student investigator from potential respondents. There
were two primary concerns or requests made by the prospective respondents: (1)
payment for taking the survey, and (2) help in getting their needs met. Though
sympathetic to the challenges faced by the residents, the student investigator was not able
to promise either. There was no compensation available to pay residents for taking the
survey, and there are no specific long-term plans or means beyond the dissertation to
offer support services to respondents. Given the myriad social challenges faced by public
housing residents, the academic needs of an independent graduate student and total
stranger ultimately provided little incentive to allow access to residents' voices and
opinions.
Computer access may also have been a barrier to completing the survey.
Although the majority of phone contacts with former residents came through the public
library - where the postcards were widely distributed - few residents took advantage of
the computer access provided by the branch library. Future attempts to reach public-
assisted housing residents may require a dedicated and private location where residents
can take the survey, along with an incentive of food or money to get them there. Based
on comments by the librarians, food is a strong incentive to getting patrons into the
library for events such as workshops and informational meetings.
There were limitations also in the collection of secondary data. For example, in
the Capitol Homes baseline study, focus group responses were compiled in an ongoing
list without benefit of the questions preceding them. However, it does appear that like
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responses are grouped together, and therefore, coding for categories was made easier
because of grouping.
Focus group responses in the evaluation update study are listed following the
inclusion of researchers' questions. However, a limitation to coding and calibration in
this study is that researchers attempted to avoid duplication in typing. Words, phrases,
and sentences that were repeated often by more than one resident were bolded, tabulated,
and the frequency placed in parentheses. This actually made coding all the more
cumbersome.
Furthermore, the Capitol Homes studies, like The HOPE VI Resident Tracking
Study, do not include pre-relocation baseline data. All of the responses pertain to post-
relocation outcomes. Therefore, another limitation to this study is the lack of pre-
relocation data. Although quite short in length, the original survey seeks to capture some
aspects of residents' living conditions prior to demolition and relocation. The goal was to
draw comparisons between pre- and post-relocation living conditions.
A copy of the resident survey is included as Appendix B. The interview questions
are included as Appendix C.
Nonetheless, resident responses from the Capitol Homes baseline and evaluation
update studies provide secondary data for post-relocation analysis.
Finally, a potential limitation was the lack of GIS software, which is no longer
available in the University computer lab. However, the mapping tool in the U.S. Census'
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
In general, HOPE VI outcomes across the nation have revealed mixed results. On
the one hand, residents who were relocated due to HOPE VI demolition or revitalization
report "moderately enhanced"1 outcomes over pre-demolition public housing conditions.
Jones and Paulsen state: "A key of any examination ofHOPE VI is that nearly any
location outside of the most severely distressed public housing is likely to be an improve
ment for the residents ... ."2 Yet, results also indicate that HOPE VI did not meet some
of its targeted goals "because new neighborhoods are still significantly associated with
the measures identified as problematic in the HOPE VI literature."3 According to Jones
and Paulsen, "the new neighborhoods may still be areas that are troubled by crime,
poverty, unemployment, and racial segregation."
By analyzing original (online) survey data, interview responses, and focus group
responses from two evaluation studies on the effects and outcomes of relocation for
residents of Capitol Homes, this project seeks to assess whether or not HUD's goals for
HOPE VI were met. Although HOPE VI has been criticized for the obscurity of its goals,
Jones and Paulsen identify five key areas that HOPE VI has sought to address across the
nation. These goals are coordinate with the goals of the Atlanta Housing Authority:
1. to improve living conditions of residents of severely distressed public
housing through demolition and renewal projects (Gilderbloom, 2008;
HUD, 2010; Popkin et al, 2004);5
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2. to revitalize communities in an effort to reduce the concentration of
poverty;6
3. to create opportunities for residents to become self-sufficient through the
use of services that provide various types ofjob training and
employment;7
4. to reduce public housing residents' exposure to incidents of crime; and
5. to reduce the amount of racial segregation.
In addition to the above, the Atlanta Housing Authority has established a subset of goals
and objectives stemming from HOPE Vl-related policies:
• develop quality living environments in mixed income communities;
• enhance AHA's economic viability and sustainability;
• build AHA's human development and supportive services efforts to
increase self-sufficiency.
Goals and Outcomes
Goal 1: Improving the Living Conditions of Residents
Focus group responses from the Capitol Homes Evaluation Studies reveal mixed
findings. In the baseline study (2003), the majority of residents indicated a greater level
of dissatisfaction than satisfaction. Of the 263 responses analyzed, 29% of the responses
contained language expressing a level of dissatisfaction with one or more aspects of their
relocation and living conditions. Only 19% of the responses contained verbiage
indicating a level of satisfaction (see Figure 1).
Coding for SATISFACTION and DISSATISFACTION are not mutually
inclusive. That is to say, a single response may contain coding for both SATISFACTION
and DISSATISFACTION. For example, a respondent may have stated, "I like my
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apartment," yet included within the same response a complaint about maintenance. Or,
many residents may have expressed satisfaction with the quality of their new
neighborhood, yet forged a complaint about lack of transportation to shops or Grady
Hospital.
Interestingly, the Capitol Homes evaluation update (2004) yielded more state
ments of SATISFACTION than in the 2003 baseline study. In the evaluation update,
78% of responses (« = 455) contained verbiage indicating SATISFACTION, while 43%
of the responses contained verbiage indicating DISSATISFACTION. Again, responses
coded for SATISFACTION include (but are not limited to) such verbiage as: "I'm very
satisfied," "I love my neighborhood," and "It's quiet [or peaceful]." Language coded for
DISSATISFACTION include (but is not limited to): "I don't like .. ., "Mine is worse,"
or "I want to move" (see Figure 2).
Overall, data indicate that residents seem more satisfied in the evaluation update
(2004) than in the baseline study (2003). This could reflect the fact that they have had
more time to settle into their new surroundings. Whereas 18% of responses reflect
residents' intent to move back to the revitalized Capitol Homes community in the base
line study (2003), only 5% indicate a desire to move back in the evaluation update
(2004). Furthermore, the baseline evaluation reveals that 6% of the responses reflect a
fear of eviction or uncertainty as to where residents would move, as opposed to only 1%
in the evaluation update. This is captured in the category, FEAR OF EVICTION OR
BECOMING HOMELESS. Not surprisingly, residents in the baseline study expressed
more fear or apprehension about where they would end up following eviction (6%) than
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Figure 2. Frequency of Categories in Capitol Homes Evaluation Update Study (2004)
those in the evaluation update (1%). Having settled in their new environment, residents
in the evaluation update did not express many concerns about eviction or homelessness.
In the original survey data (online), two out of the three residents indicated that
their quality of life is "better" now than before relocation. Only one respondent stated
that quality of life is "worse." No comments were provided as explanation.
POWER AND POLITICS is another category where residents seemed to mellow
in the 2004 evaluation update. Whereas 6% of responses in the baseline study (n = 263)
indicate a sense of powerlessness in residents' choice of housing, only 2% of responses in
the evaluation update (n = 455) contain language indicating powerlessness. For example,
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language that was coded for this category might include such statements as: "It wasn't
my choice," "...I had no choice," "I'm stuck," "I had to take it," "They can and will
manipulate you," or "They will push you around." While all statements regarding choice
were included in this category, the majority of these statements pertain to feelings of
helplessness and powerlessness. Of the total collective responses (n = 718), less than 1%
indicate that residents felt a sense of empowerment or personal choice in their living
arrangements. On the contrary, the majority of responses coded for POWER AND
POLITICS indicate that residents felt they had little or no choice in when and where they
would move. (It is important to note, too, that the majority of responses coded for
POWER AND POLITICS came from the baseline study (see Table 2).
Following SATISFACTION and DISSATISFACTION, issues pertaining to
MONEY OR LACK THEREOF were of primary concern to the residents. In both
studies, money was prominent in their language. In the baseline study (n = 263), 13% of
responses contained verbiage pertaining to money, while in the update evaluation study
{n = 455), 44% of responses contained verbiage about money. Collectively, 34% of
responses included verbiage about money issues (n = 718). This is of interest since in
both Capitol Homes studies, only one question was posed to the residents about money
(or income, specifically). In the baseline study, one out of 24 questions (.04%) was about
money: "Would you say that your overall financial living condition/income has
improved, stayed the same or declined since your participation in the Housing Choice
program?" Likewise, only one out of 32 questions (.03%) posed to the residents was
about income in the 2004 update study: "Would you say that your income has increased,
95




M MONEY OR LACK THEREOF
jB PROXIMITY TO SHOPS, SCHOOLS, BUS, HOSPITAL ETC.
■H CRIME OR LACK THEREOF (SECURITY)
I] CHILDREN OR FAMILY
U AMENITIES (WASHER/DRYER, CARPET, HVAC, SPACE,
H YARD, ETC.)
H COUNSELING OR ASSISTANCE
H HOUSING COMPLAINTS, MAINTENANCE, STRUCTURAL
pi ISSUES
fj MOVING BACK TO CAPITOL HOMES
■ EMPLOYMENT OR ADULT EDUCATION
H AHA MISINFORMATION, UNCONCERN FOR THEM
| HOUSING CHOICE, VOUCHERS, SECTION 8
SELF-ADVOCACY
M MEDICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES, DISABILITY
U POWER AND POLITICS
H FEAR OF EVICTION OR BECOMING HOMELESS
\\ COMMUNITY CONNECTION THROUGH CHURCH









































































































stayed the same or declined in the last year?" Respondents (in both studies) were not
questioned specifically about excess bills, having to pay utilities, or challenges making
ends meet. Yet, 34% of responses collectively contained verbiage about money issues.
For example, in the 2004 evaluation update study, researchers posed a question to
residents about Barriers to Finding and Sustaining Housing using Housing Choice.
The majority of these responses (75%) contained language pertaining to money issues -
e.g., utility bills or rent. Most of them were complaints about utility bills being too high.
Although the question did not specifically query residents about money issues, the issue
of money was prevalent as a "barrier" to finding and sustaining housing.
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Goal 2: Revitalizing Communities and Reducing the Concentration of Poverty
One of the overarching questions considered in this research is where did public
housing residents go following demolition, eviction, or relocation? If the razing of public
housing units within the city of Atlanta resulted in a deconcentration of poverty, then
where have displaced families gone since public housing demolition? Did families
relocate to other areas of poverty, or were they, in fact, able to move into lower-poverty
communities?
In this study, data were compiled from the U.S. Census Bureau in an effort to
determine which metropolitan area counties saw a significant increase in rates of poverty
and racial segregation. Poverty rates were pulled from the U.S. Census Bureau's website,
and data were gathered from the 2000 and 2010 censuses. A comparative analysis of the
data between 2000 and 2010 reveals significant trends in population.
While the data for this study do not track relocation addresses for families
formerly residing in pre-demolition public housing, comparisons can be made for poverty
rates in communities before and after the implementation of HOPE VI. Within this
study, ten (10) metro area counties were examined for poverty rates overall. The
following charts, graphs, and maps tell an interesting story as to how HOPE VI has
impacted poverty concentration across selected parts of metropolitan Atlanta.
Figure 3 shows a graphic comparison of poverty rates for individuals. This bar
graph shows poverty rates in the City of Atlanta and across surrounding counties during a
10-year span. It is worth noting that the poverty rate within the City of Atlanta is
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Figure 3. Percentage of individuals below poverty, including the City of Atlanta and surrounding
counties. (Source: U.S. Census 2000 and 2010)
Poverty concentration is defined at various levels across the literature. For
example, Wilson establishes "poverty areas" at a rate of at least 20% per census tract.11
So do Georgia State University's Oakley et al.12 Other rates of high-poverty have been
defined at 30% and above, based on the Gautreaux project,13 while still other rates of
"extreme-poverty" have been described at 40% and above per census tract.14'15'16 By the
same token, "low" rates of poverty have been defined at "no more than 10%" per census
tract.17
In this study graphics that follow, "low" poverty rate is established at less than
20% and is visually represented in the graphics using the color green. "High" poverty
concentration is established at 25% and above, and is represented with the color red.
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Poverty concentration between 20% and 25% are color coded as yellow, establishing the
notion that these areas are approaching high poverty levels.
It should be noted that the color scheme on the spatial maps are limited. Because
the maps were generated using a built-in tool in the American FactFinder, only gradients
of one color could be selected for each map. For example, if a map has census tracts
ranging in the "high" poverty rate of concentration, only a graduated color scheme of red
is permitted. The built-in tool does not allow for all three colors - red, yellow, and green
- to be represented in one map, corresponding to "high," "approaching high," and "low"
levels of poverty, respectively. By the same token, if a county has census tracts only in
the "low" rate of poverty range, then the darkest shade of green will represent the highest
concentrations of poverty in that particular county, yet remaining in the "low" range (i.e.,
below 20%). Graphs generated with Microsoft Excel, however, employ all three colors,
as necessary, since they are easily manipulated by the end user.
A primary goal of Renee Glover and the Atlanta Housing Authority was to
deconcentrate poverty in Atlanta. Reviewing the poverty rates in Fulton County (where
most of Atlanta's pre-demolition public housing units were located), we can compare
how the rates of poverty have changed between the 2000 Census and 2010 Census.
Figures 4 and 5 offer a spatial comparison of high poverty concentration in Fulton
County by census tract. Areas shaded in the dark red have poverty rates at 25% and
above. While high poverty concentration is quite evident in 2000 - before HOPE VI
implementation - it is interesting that, in Fulton County, there is an increase in the
number of census tracts at the "high" poverty level in 2010, as revealed by the map
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Figure 4. Spatial concentration of poverty in Fulton County. (Source: U.S. Census 2000)
Thematic Map of All families - Percent below poverty level; Estimate; FamolSes
Geography: by Census Tract











ftems ip . text are not visible at ttis zaa\
level
Modrty the map using the options below.




Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2O&6-2Q12 American Community Survey
Figure 5. Spatial concentration of poverty in Fulton County. (Source: U.S. Census 2010)
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comparisons. Areas shaded by the lighter pink are areas approaching high poverty. The
rates of poverty in these pink areas are between 20% and 25%, and are represented on the
following graphs in yellow.
Figures 6 and 7 show changes in the poverty rates in Fulton County by census
tract between 2000 and 2010. Each of these census tracts were characterized by high
rates of poverty in 2000, and are still in the high range in 2010 (distinguished by two
shades of red). In 2000, there are thirty (30) census tracts at the "high" poverty rate. By
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Figure 6. High poverty concentration in Fulton County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Fulton County Poverty Concentration Rate Change
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Figure 7. High poverty concentration in Fulton County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
Also, notice that although census tract 37 had a significant reduction in its rate of
poverty, it is still above 40% poverty in 2010. The same is true of census tract 86.02.
Even more startlingly are census tracts that began with high rates of poverty prior to
HOPE VI demolition, but increased in poverty concentration after HOPE VI - e.g.,
census tracts 17, 23, 28, 38, 39, 48, 55.02, 58, 63, 67, 68.02, 73, 74, 78.07, 78.08, 82.02,
and 106.01.
Figures 8 and 9 show census tracts that were at least 20% poverty, but less than
25% in 2000, distinguished by the yellow color coding. Areas in the yellow range in
2000, but increasing to the high poverty area in 2010 include: 21, 40, 62, 66.02, 81.02,













Fulton County Poverty Concentration Rate Change























2010 24.4 .. 7
-2SC
16.
41 43 52 61
Census Tracts
62 66.02 70.01 76.02 78.05
102
Figure 8. Poverty concentration in Fulton County by Census Tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
that are increasing to the "approaching high poverty" (in yellow) level - i.e., census tracts
52, 76.02, 78.05, 78.06, 80, 81.01, 92, 105.07, 105.10, 106.03, and 106.04.
Other than Fulton County, Dekalb County is the only other county examined here
that had areas of high-poverty concentration during the 2000 census (see Figure 10).
Census tract 206 had a poverty rate of 38.1% in Census 2000, and census tract 237 had a
poverty rate of 36.2% in Census 2000. By Census 2010, thirteen (13) census tracts had
high poverty concentration rates in Dekalb County (see Figures 11 and 12). Of those
thirteen (13) census tracts, eight (8) of them were not identified in the 2000 Census (see
Figure 12).
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Fulton County Poverty Concentration Rate Change
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Figure 9. Poverty concentration in Fulton County by Census Tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Figure 10. Spatial concentration of poverty in Dekalb County. (Source: U.S. Census 2000)
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Figure 11. Spatial concentration of poverty in Dekalb County. (Source: U.S. Census 2010)
Dekalb County Poverty Concentration Rate Change
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Figure 12. Poverty concentration in Dekalb County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Furthermore, eleven (11) census tracts in Dekalb County were characterized by
low poverty (e.g., less than 20%) in Census 2000 (see Figures 12 and 13). However, by
Census 2010, two (2) of them had spiked to high-poverty rates (see Figure 12). Census
tract 231.03 had a poverty rate of 11.2% in Census 2000, but spiked to 33% by Census
2010. Likewise, census tract 219.08 had a poverty rate of 12% in the 2000 Census, but
reached 36.3% in the 2010 Census. The remaining nine (9) census tracts (i.e., 208.02,
213.01, 219.09, 225, 231.02, 234.10, 234.11, 236.02, and 236.03) that started with low
poverty in 2000 have surged into the "approaching high poverty" range by Census 2010
(see Figure 13).
Dekalb County Poverty Concentration Rate Change


























205 208 01 208.02 213.01 213.08 219.09 219.11 220.09 225 23102 234 1 234 11 234.21 234.28 236 02 236.03 237
Census Tracts
Figure 13. Poverty concentration in Dekalb County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Although Cobb County did not have rates by census tracts ranging in the high-
poverty area in Census 2000, there were two (2) census tracts "approaching high poverty"
- i.e., census tracts 307 and 308. After HOPE VI implementation, twelve (12) census
tracts now fall either into the "approaching high poverty" range or the "high" poverty
range. They are: census tracts 303.44, 304.11, 304.12, 304.14, 307, 308, 309.04, 310.04,
311.01, 311.15, 311.16and313.1 (see Figures 14, 15, and 16).
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Figure 14. Spatial concentration of poverty in Cobb County. (Source: U.S. 2000)
The remaining counties examined in this study - Cherokee, Clayton, Coweta,
Douglas, Fayette, Gwinnett, and Henry - were all characterized by low-poverty concen
tration in Census 2000. Cherokee, Douglas, and Fayette counties remained in the low-
poverty range for all census tracts in Census 2010. However, Clayton, Coweta, and
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Figure 15. Spatial concentration of poverty in Cobb County. (Source: U.S. 2010)
Cobb County Poverty Concentration Rate Change











303.44 304.11 304.12 304.14 307 308 309.04 310.04 311.01 311.15 311.16 313.1
Figure 16. Poverty concentration in Cobb County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Gwinnett counties all have census tracts that surged into the high-poverty range in
Census 2010.
Figures 17 and 18 show comparisons in poverty concentration in Clayton County
between Census 2000 and Census 2010. Prior to HOPE VI implementation, Clayton
County had no levels of poverty concentration in the "high" area, nor "approaching high
level." The highest levels of poverty concentration (in the dark green) are between 10%
and 17%.
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Figure 17. Spatial concentration of poverty in Clayton County. (Source: U.S. Census 2000)
However, Figure 19 shows those census tracts that have entered into the "approaching
high levels" of poverty and the "high" level of poverty. Census tracts
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Figure 18. Spatial concentration of poverty in Clayton County. (Source: U.S. Census 2010)
Clayton County Poverty Concentration Rate Change
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Figure 19. Poverty Concentration in Clayton County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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403.02, 403.03, and 406.11 had low poverty in 2000, but have increased to levels at 25%
or above in 2010. Census tracts 403.06 and 403.08 are also characterized by "high"
poverty, but were not identified in the 2000 U.S. Census.
Census tracts 404.1, 405.14, and 405.18 were in the low-poverty range in 2000,
but have entered into the "approaching high poverty" range in 2010. Note that census
tracts 403.07, 404.15, 404.17, 405.19, and 405.22 were not identified in the 2000 U.S.
Census, but are also in the "approaching high poverty" range.
Coweta County, likewise, only had poverty rates of up to 14% in census tracts
during Census 2000, but yielded a poverty rate of 28% in census tract 1706.01 by Census
2010 (see Figures 20, 21, and 22). (Notice that census tract 1706.01 is not identified in
the Census 2000, but is spatially captured in the 10% - 14.4% range in Figure 20.)
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Figure 20. Spatial concentration of poverty in Coweta County. (Source: U.S. Census 2000)
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Figure 22. Poverty concentration in Coweta County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Census tract 1707 is "approaching high poverty" at 22% in 2010 (see Figure 22), but is
captured on the 2000 spatial map at 12%.
In Gwinnett County, there were no census tracts with high-poverty concentration
in 2000 (see Figure 23). The dark green areas in Figure 24 capture poverty rates at only
10% - 15.1%. By Census 2010, eleven (11) census tracts [six (6) of which were not
identified in Census 2000] soared into the high-poverty range (see Figures 24 and 25).
Five (5) census tracts are in the "approaching high poverty" range in Census 2010, with
three (3) of them having started out in the low-poverty range in Census 2000 (see Figure
25).
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And finally, Henry County was characterized by low-poverty in 2000 (see Figure
26). By Census 2010, only two (2) census tracts had risen to "approaching high poverty"
range: i.e., census tract 701.13 at 20.4% and 705.01 at 21% (see Figures 27 and 28).
None of the census tracts in Henry County reached "high" poverty level in Census 2010.
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Figure 26. Spatial concentration of poverty in Henry County. (Source: U.S. Census 2000)
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Figure 28. Poverty concentration in Henry County by census tract. (Source: U.S. Census)
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Goal 3: Creating Opportunities for Residents to Become Self-sufficient
Closely related to MONEY OR LACK THEREOF is the category,
EMPLOYMENT OR ADULT EDUCATION. This category is intended to capture
residents' goals for personal development in order to move towards self-sufficiency. A
distinction was made between responses that capture the goal of achieving or maintaining
employment versus responses that capture income as a monetary amount (i.e., either
increasing or decreasing). EMPLOYMENT OR ADULT EDUCATION captures
responses that pertain to personal development or sustainability rather than income
amount, which would fall into the MONEY OR LACK THEREOF category.
Interestingly, the EMPLOYMENT OR ADULT EDUCATION category occurred
more frequently in the evaluation update study than in the baseline study (9% versus 2%,
respectively). Collectively, 7% of the responses contained language relating to employ
ment and/or adult education. If one of the goals of HOPE VI is "to create opportunities
for residents to become self-sufficient through the use ofservices that provide various
types ofjob training and employment, "18 then perhaps the relocation efforts contributed
to residents' increased concern for self-development.
Responses pertaining to services received through AHA are coded under
COUNSELING OR ASSISTANCE. The questions include: Residents' Experiences
with AHA Relocation Services, Residents' Experiences with the Delivery ofCounseling
Service, Experiences with the delivery ofmoving services, and Effectiveness ofthe
Community Support Services program. This category appears in 20% of responses
across the board - i.e., in the baseline study (n = 263), the evaluation update (n = 455),
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and collectively overall (n = 718). It is important to note that this category was second in
frequency in the baseline study. This makes sense, as it is indicative of researchers'
attempts to assess the immediate effectiveness of AHA support services. In the
subsequent evaluation update, residents were further removed from the provision of
services, and therefore, this topic may have dropped in its rank of importance.
Another category identified is AHA MISINFORMATION. In the literature and
in HOPE VI evaluation studies, there have been findings to indicate that residents are
either confused or distrustful of the information they receive from AHA. This notion is
also borne out by comments from interviewees (e.g., public librarians), who indicated
that patrons turned to them for assistance because they did not trust information from
AHA.
Overall, the level of trust towards AHA did not change much from the baseline
study to the evaluation update (8% and 5%, respectively.) Comments coded in this
category include such statements as: "When I needed y'all [AHA], you weren't there for
me;" "When you leave your name on the answering machine they never call you back,
because they (sic) not interested in you;" ".. . they need to treat us right;" "... they talk
real nasty to you;" "I feel that if they wanted to do something for us, they could;" "they
[white people] want the city back and that's what they (sic) getting."
Another resident elaborated in her comments:
As a component of going through the HOPE VI process, we were
supposed to do a self sufficiency plan. In my self-sufficiency plan — me
and several other tenants of Capitol Homes chose to do entrepreneurship.
Before and during relocation, AHA never took that into consideration.
They destroyed and eliminated that entrepreneurship part so we have no
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place to work. They never gave us support. They never brought in a
counselor for entrepreneurship. They [did] not recognize our plan like
they said.19
Closely related to residents' perceptions of AHA is whether or not residents felt a
sense of empowerment to help themselves. A category for SELF-ADVOCACY was
created for comments expressing the need to advocate for oneself.
Findings suggest that residents seemed slightly more prone to voice an attitude of
self-help in the baseline study (7%) than in the evaluation update (2%). Statements such
as: "I found my own home," "I painted my own kitchen," "I did all of my shopping
around [for housing] myself," "I got out there and hustled," and "You got to do it on your
own," were all typical of residents' sense of self-advocacy.
In the original online survey, 66% of the respondents indicated that they moved
voluntarily, as opposed to a forced eviction. One respondent (33%) was forcibly evicted.
Residents who relocated on a volunteer basis might be indicative of respondents who
were more willing to take the online survey. Given findings indicating levels of mistrust
towards AHA and HOPE Vl-related outcomes, perhaps this apprehension led to
unspoken barriers to taking the original online survey.
And finally, self-sufficiency is closely related to issues of transportation. If
residents can move around with relative ease, then they are more likely to feel self-
sufficient. Thus, PROXIMITY to schools, day care centers, public bus transportation,
shopping centers, and Grady Hospital is another important category that reflected
prominently in the responses. Most of the residents were pleased that their new housing
unit was located near public transportation and shops. Comments include, but are limited
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to: "I wanted it to be convenient - in the reach of everything . . . grocery stores, schools
- all that. So it's convenient because it's within walking distance to everything;" "Right
here's where everything at. I'm right next door to the bakery. I'm right by the grocery
store. I'm right by the bus stop and right by all the day care centers even though I don't
need 'em. Everything I need is right down here;" "I enjoy living near the MARTA stop
right by my door;" "I'm close to MARTA and the store;" and "it's convenient."
However, a common theme in the responses was that Capitol Homes was closer to
Grady Hospital, from which they felt somewhat removed in their new surroundings.
Goal 4: Reducing Public Housing Residents' Exposure to Incidents of Crime
Of fairly equal importance to residents are CRIME OR LACK THEREOF and
CHILDREN AND FAMILY. In the original online survey, 66% of the respondents
indicated that crime was a primary challenge while living in public-assisted housing.
However, in the evaluation studies, crime was reduced significantly in the living
environments of the residents. In the evaluation responses collectively, 18% of all
responses contained language pertaining to crime or the lack thereof. Many residents
spoke of the "peace and quiet" of their new environment, which they enjoyed for the
safety of their children and for themselves. Responses reflected an increased sense of
security due to the absence of "drug boys/dealers" in their new surroundings. For
example, comments about crime (or the lack thereof) include, but are not limited to: "It's
quiet. [A] different environment than what I had in Capitol Homes;" "I've gotten more
things than I was able to have because when I was in Capitol Homes, I was scared people
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would break into my house if I had this or if I had that. But now I don't have a fear of
that;" "There ain't nobody hanging out in front of the house;" "It's still a drug area;" "I
like it because it's security. We got security that walks around 24/7. It's a gated
community;" "I don't know the thugs now like I knew the thugs in Capitol Homes;" "I
was right in the dope trap;" and "I ain't up there where the trouble is."
The category of CHILDREN AND FAMILY was reflected in about 17% of the
responses collectively, with the evaluation update study reflecting more prominently than
the baseline study (20% versus 11%, respectively). Most of the responses involving
children were closely related to the lack of crime in the new surroundings. For example,
parents often expressed that they wanted a "better environment" for their children. Also,
parents seemed deeply concerned with the potential for their children to play safely near
their home (e.g., in safe playgrounds or parks). Comments about activities and recreation
for the children include, but are not limited to: "They [the children] can run all the way
around my house and play as they want to;" "They [the children] don't have a play
ground. They don't have no where to play, they got to ride their bikes in the street;"
"[M]y children can go out and ride they (sic) bikes in the street;" "[T]hey have a bike
activity for the kids;" "So overall just the children going outside to play without having to
worry about their safety;" and "There is nowhere for my kids to play 'cause my kids can't
ride bicycle, skate .. . Too strict of rules for the kids."
MOVING BACK TO CAPITOL HOMES was also a prominent theme in the
baseline study (18%), but not so much in the evaluation study update (5%). In the
baseline study, most of the residents who indicated an opinion about whether or not to
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move back expressed an interest in going back to Capitol Homes. Although many of the
responses were non-committal, prominently featured in the responses was concern that
criteria for moving back would be more stringent. Examples of such responses include:
"They (sic) going to be way stricter than when it was just regular Capitol Homes," and
"We won't be able to do nothing." The residents also feared mandatory background
checks and having to pay relocation expenses back to AHA. "[T]hey gon' do a back
ground check, you can't have nothing on your background before you can move back;"
"Your background is checked, [and] how you pay your bills;" "You got to pay all the
deposits back . .. and you have to have good credit." Overall, residents from the baseline
study seemed distrustful of the process and doubtful that they would be allowed to return.
Although fewer residents spoke of returning to Capitol Homes in the evaluation
update, those who did expressed an interest in returning. None of them voiced any
concerns about stringent rules; however, one resident did question whether or not money
would have to be paid back.
Respondents of the original online survey indicated they were now residing in
non-AHA affiliated rental units (one house and one apartment), and one respondent is
now a homeowner. None of the respondents moved back to revitalized housing.
Goal 5: Reducing the Amount of Racial Segregation
The distribution of race in the metropolitan Atlanta area during a 20-year span
(i.e., 1990 to 2010) has noticeably shifted (see Figures 29, 30, and 31). Given that the
goal of HOPE VI was to reduce racial segregation in the city of Atlanta, it is remarkable
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Figure 30. African American and race distribution by county. (Source: U.S. Census 2000)
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Figure 31. African American and race distribution by county. (Source: U.S. Census 2010)
that the concentration of African Americans in Fulton County (which encompasses the
city of Atlanta) has shifted only slightly. Whereas in 1990, African Americans
represented nearly 50% of the city's population (49.9%), the percentage of African
Americans in Fulton County dropped to 44.6% in 2000, and slightly lower at 44.1% in
2010.
In real numbers, the total population in Fulton County increased 42% from 1990
to 2010. During this same time span, the African-American population increased by
25%; Caucasians increased by 32%; and all others increased in population by 600%!
While this does not directly speak to the levels of racial segregation in areas where pre-
demolition public housing once stood, it does implicate an influx of other minority
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populations into the city, thereby weakening the concentration of African Americans who
largely populated Atlanta's public housing.
Other Findings
As already stated, only three (3) residents completed the online survey. Although
few in number, when asked about overall quality of life, 66% of the respondents (n = 2)
indicated that their quality of life is better. Only one respondent (33%) indicated that
quality of life is worse.
Of all data analyzed, an unexpected finding is in the COMMUNITY
CONNECTION THROUGH CHURCH INVOLVEMENT (CCCI) category. As stated
earlier, initial efforts to reach out to community stakeholders was directed at churches
and local pastors. It was believed that local pastors would have key insight into the lived
experiences of residents who are members or constituents in their congregations.
Furthermore, it was believed that church involvement is an important component in the
lives of public housing residents. Churches were, therefore, targeted as viable resources
in examining community connectivity.
The investigator in this study sought to examine responses reflecting a theme of
"spirituality" as a proxy for church involvement. However, issues pertaining to church
involvement did not figure prominently in the responses. In fact, less than 1% (before
rounding) of responses contained church-related or "spiritual" themes.
Interviews with local church pastors, however, were informative. Of the pastors
interviewed, only one was familiar with HOPE VI prior to my contacting them. This
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particular pastor was very familiar with the Atlanta Housing Authority, and even
acknowledged a "partnership" between AHA and his nonprofit organization. The
nonprofit organization was birthed out of the outreach ministries of the church, and
evolved into a separate 501(c)3 entity. It is through this organization that the pastor is
involved with AHA business.
The nonprofit organization owns 32 units of project-based apartments. Funding
for the organization has come from loans and from the city of Atlanta. Other partners
include Fulton County, which provides social workers to assist residents; and a local
seminary that provides counseling for married couples.
All pastors interviewed had mixed opinions about the razing of Atlanta public
housing. Despite overall appreciation for the improved aesthetics of public housing units,
all pastors interviewed believed that the community and the residents were negatively
impacted. One pastor, commenting on the loss of community, stated: "[RJegardless of
how people felt about those housing developments, there was community." Most of the
pastors interviewed concurred. Chief among the complaints was that the people
scattered. All pastors interviewed within the city of Atlanta stated that they lost church
members as a result of public housing demolition. Residents were scattered to Clayton,
Dekalb, Cobb, and Douglas counties, the pastors said. The people to whom they hope to
minister are the very ones who were forced to leave the area. "They had to go where they
could find housing," stated one pastor.
In the original online survey, the three respondents indicated that they moved to
Cobb, Dekalb, and Fulton counties.
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When asked what they would like to see in Atlanta's housing policy, most of the
pastors agreed that they would like to see displaced residents return to revitalized
housing, or at least to the area. Two of the pastors believed that the mixed-income model
is a viable solution to housing problems, however, almost all of the pastors expressed
concern that those who need affordable housing the most are not receiving it. Concerns
about ex-convicts and women with children were strong. For example, one pastor
believed that a criminal record unfairly prevents someone in obtaining needed housing.
As he so aptly explained, "People living in deprivation are more prone to criminal
charges than people who are not, and especially people of color." He went on to state:
"Some of them were ruled out (of housing opportunity) due to felony convictions. This
relegated them back to the streets or jail. We have to rethink our strategy towards those
who have been convicted. They ought not to continue to be penalized."
Likewise, this same pastor also believed that more flexibility should be extended
to women with children. Most of the pastors agreed that bad credit histories and stringent
rules for moving into revitalized housing are unnecessary barriers to housing poor women
and children. "You can't just pick the 'cream of the crop' and only house them," stated
one pastor. "We rule out people who really need housing," he said.
Discussion
Findings in the original baseline study were calibrated differently than in this
study. For example, researchers in the baseline study found that the majority of
respondents were satisfied with their quality of life after relocation. They write: "In
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every category assessed on quality of life in the focus groups, a majority of respondents
report they are satisfied (29.9%), somewhat satisfied (23.2%), or very satisfied (10.4%)
with their post-move experience."20 This reflects a collective of 63.5% respondents who
are satisfied with their post-relocation experience. How this differs from the current
study is that the assessment in the baseline study is one-dimensional. That is to say,
respondents appear to answer affirmatively on SATISFACTION, exclusive of any
dimension of DISSATISFACTION. As stated earlier, in this current study, responses are
coded multi-dimensionally. The categories of SATISFACTION and DISSATISFACT
ION are not mutually exclusive. A single response could very well contain a dimension
of satisfaction overall, yet also express a level of dissatisfaction on some aspect of the
housing unit or the relocation experience. One category was not captured at the expense
of the other.
Furthermore, data in the Capitol Homes baseline study consisted of survey as well
as focus group responses. While the survey captured responses using a Likert-like scale
(e.g., ranging from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied"), the focus group captured
qualitative data that are more richly detailed. Researchers of the baseline study acknow
ledge that "there are often substantial disparities between the questionnaire survey and
the focus group comments which tend to be much more critical of their HOPE VI
experiences."21
It is stated above that the goals of HOPE VI may not have been fully achieved
because new neighborhoods are typically saddled with the same social ills and
characteristics as the communities from which residents relocated. This is true for
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residents of Capitol Homes, at least during the time of the evaluation studies. A
summary of neighborhood status from the baseline study states that relocatees who
moved to conventional public housing units were more likely to move to "Bowen,
McDaniel Glenn, University, Carver, Herndon, Grady Homes and Thomasville
Heights." Furthermore, most of these households relocated to "block groups with
slightly higher percent (0-5%) [BJlack than the referenced Capitol Homes block group."23
Thus, Goal 5, "Reducing the amount ofracial segregation" was not achieved for this
population.
For Goal 2, "Reducing the concentration ofpoverty," researchers of the baseline
study found that the relocatees who moved to conventional public housing did not
necessarily fare better in terms of moving to neighborhoods with less poverty concen
tration. They summarize their findings:
Movers to the Villages at Carver, Herndon, and Bowen Homes, 36 house
holds, found their new neighborhoods to be at least as poor as Capitol
Homes. (As defined here, neighborhoods encompass more than the
immediate area around the AHA property.) Twenty-three (23) households
moved to AHA properties - Crosby Spears, U-Rescue, Grady Homes,
Englewood Manor - in less poor block groups. The remaining house-holds
moved to McDaniel Glenn, University Homes, Thomasville Heights, and
other AHA properties with essentially equal poverty characteristics.24
Similar findings are borne out in the current study. The maps and graphs indicate
that census tracts in Fulton County (where conventional public housing is sited) are not
necessarily devoid of high-poverty concentration. On the contrary, twenty-seven (27)
census tracts that began in the high-poverty range in 2000 continue to be characterized by
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high-poverty concentration in 2010. An additional eight (8) census tracts have moved
into the high-poverty range in 2010 from the "approaching high poverty" range in 2000.
Housing Choice (voucher) relocatees have fared better than relocatees who moved
into conventional public housing. Sixty-two percent (62.5%) of Capitol Homes
relocatees selected the Housing Choice voucher program. Of these householders, the
majority of them improved their poverty status by moving to communities with greater
racial diversity.25
The expected goals ofHOPE VI were that all residents, regardless of housing
preference, would improve their economic status, living conditions, and become self-
sufficient. The expectation of policymakers was that living in close proximity to
neighbors of mixed-income would improve residents' social networks, therefore, leading
to improved life chances. Researchers in The HOPE Resident Tracking Study state,
One of the premises of the HOPE VI program is that deconcentrating
poverty and creating mixed-income communities will benefit the poor.
Low-income families will interact with neighbors in their new
communities, forming new social networks. These networks are
hypothesized to offer a range of benefits for original residents, including
positive role models for adults and children, access to information about
economic opportunities, and peer groups for children and youth that are
less likely to support delinquent activity. However, survey respondents
reported fairly low levels of social interaction with neighbors.26
Despite strong expectations, findings in the baseline and evaluation update studies
indicate that residents do not necessarily seek out social networks with their new neigh
bors. Although many residents spoke of their appreciation for "quiet neighbors," many
also expressed their tendency to keep to themselves. Examples of such comments from
the baseline study include: "I don't deal with people in my neighborhood," "I stay to
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myself," "I choose not to interact," "I'm not wanting to know my neighbors," and "I
don't even speak." From the evaluation update study, comments about new neighbors
also revealed a lack of familiarity with them. Most of the residents expressed a favor
able, but casual relationship with neighbors: "Well I know them (but) I don't hang out
with them," "I just speak to them and say 'hey,'" and "I speak and keep going." In both
studies, residents did not confirm the tighter social networks with new neighbors as
anticipated by HOPE VI policymakers.
But researchers of the baseline study point out an important fact. Residents from
Capitol Homes are not a homogenous group. They are quite diverse, consisting of: "the
work-capable, the disabled, the educated and uneducated, the elderly, and the young."27
Policymakers, therefore, should not expect all public housing residents to bond and form
tight-knit relationships. Population groups tend to live amongst those who are like them.
This applies to race, ethnicity, age, and socioeconomic status. Therefore, any future
studies or analyses must take into consideration the needs of a diverse population, not
necessarily a homogenous group.
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY OUTCOME EVALUATION
"The test of any policy or program is how well it produces the desired outcomes,
and at what cost."1 Public policy must be evaluated on "what the policy intended, how
the policy was implemented, and what happened to the people whom the policy was
supposed to affect."2
Policy evaluation, according to James H. Spencer, should examine more than the
intended outcomes of policy. Rather, policy evaluation must also examine the
unintended outcomes that were experienced by policy beneficiaries.3 While this policy
review examines intended outcomes of HOPE VI policy - e.g., to deconcentrate poverty
- it also examines the unintended outcomes impacting the lives of Atlanta's poor
residents.
When examining anti-poverty policies, Spencer maintains that policies - since the
1930s - have been implemented as either people-driven or place-driven. He writes,
The defining characteristic of each approach is the target of policy
investment. People-based programs target individuals or households,
whereas place-based ones target particular poor areas and neighborhoods.
Thus, for example, wage subsidies, housing vouchers, transportation
vouchers, and other sorts of direct transfers of valued assets to individuals
are people-based strategies, whereas business tax credits for specific
areas, investments in improved fixed-place public transportation, and
improved infrastructure are examples of place-based strategies.4
133
134
Spencer offers an "empirically-driven 'people-place' policy framework" for
examining anti-poverty policies.5 Since the 1960s, says Spencer, policies have promoted
both people and place approaches, usually within the same legislation. Such an example
is found in HOPE VI. However, says Spencer, it is challenging for federal legislators to
develop a "one-size-fits-all" approach to policymaking given the varying differences in
people and places across regions.6 For example, residential segregation varies from city
to city. How Atlantans view their housing resources may differ from how Chicagoans
view theirs. Again, a policy such as HOPE VI engages both a people policy and a place
policy. While the overriding goal of utilizing HOPE VI funds was to replace "severely
distressed" housing,7 there is also a people component. Ridding the city of dilapidated
housing structures will help to deconcentrate poverty, but will also lead to improved
lives, to include, for example, better job opportunities, better educational outcomes, and
better overall health among public housing residents.8
Furthermore, an emphasis on one approach versus the other (i.e., people versus
place) can be problematic, says Spencer. The avoidance of a singular approach is
harmful to those needing assistance because one approach is sacrificed at the expense of
the other. Spencer, therefore, offers a theoretical policy framework that simultaneously
engages both people and place policy approaches. He attempts to develop a "new
heuristic model for understanding antipoverty policy in the United States that may help
scholars, state, and federal legislators and others ask complex questions about the
effectiveness of the many approaches currently implemented to fight spatially
concentrated poverty."9 In light of Spencer's policy framework, this policy evaluation
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examines the intent, accomplishments, and critiques of the Atlanta Housing Authority's
HOPE VI policy implementation. Policy suggestions are offered that takes into
consideration the multifaceted social needs of Atlanta's poor population.
The Intent of AHA and HOPE VI
The number one essential function of local housing authorities is public
accountability, according to David A. Smith, a financial services advisor for affordable
housing initiatives. All other services are merely technical. Smith explains,
A housing authority holds a public trust - to provide quality housing at
very low cost to those who are least able to find it in the private market
place. In essence, they are publicly accountable charitable institutions,
receiving public subsidy (via the indirect collection agent of government)
and deploying it for public benefit - affordable housing and healthy low-
income communities.10
How to deploy government subsidies to benefit low-income communities is the
goal of public policy. HOPE VI is but one federally-subsidized approach to combat
spatially concentrated poverty. Through the expenditure ofHOPE VI funds, the intent of
the Atlanta Housing Authority was to rethink and revamp how public housing is offered
and managed. Prior to the implementation of HOPE VI, says Glover, "More often than
not, AHA did not fulfill even its most basic mandate - to provide 'safe and decent'
housing. Its forty-three properties were in deplorable condition ... It should have been
obvious to anyone who was paying attention that the practice of concentrating poor
people in public housing was not working."1'
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However, says Glover, public policy is often based on false assumptions as to
who comprises the poor and why. Generalizations and assumptions often inform public
policy that negatively and disproportionately impact the lives of low-income groups.
Glover writes,
For decades, our society has struggled with the social issues surrounding
poverty. Some believe that people are poor because they were born into
the wrong family, race or culture, while others believe poverty is a matter
of being unlucky, unwilling or incapable. Sound reasoning shows us that
there is no single reason why, at any given time, an individual has fewer
resources. Yet, public policies are often based on such generalities or
assumptions, and that's wrong.12
The political opinions, assumptions, and decisions of policymakers are what led
to HOPE VI policy, ultimately resulting in the demolition of Atlanta's public housing. In
addition, the assumptions of Glover and the AHA held that improving the physical
environment of public housing residents along with the deconcentration of poverty would
lead to an improved quality of life for the residents.
Borrowing from sociological theory, assumptions are often held by the political
power structure that the poor cannot make decisions in their own best interest, cannot
thrive in "mainstream" society, and most importantly, are viewed as the proverbial
"other." The problems of the poor are often characterized as "pathologies," rather than
attributable to the structural and social institutions that perpetuate poverty. Bureaucrats
within municipal power structures are seen as more capable of determining the best
outcomes for marginalized groups than they themselves. The power structure - in its
attempt to remedy these "pathologies" of the poor - develops public policy emanating
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from the assumption that poor people must live up to their potential,13 and are incapable
of doing so without political help.
For example, Glover states: "In order to realize their potential, these families and
individuals must be nurtured and protected from the pathologies that have become
endemic to poverty-stricken communities."14 Likewise, a report by the National Housing
Law Project sums up this outlook:
The emphasis on wholesale displacement and exclusion to accomplish
income-mixing in HOPE VI suggests a pessimistic attitude about the
ability of public housing residents to achieve greater self-sufficiency. This
is a toxic brand of pessimism that assumes that public housing residents as
a class are somehow unable to realize their potential as individuals, to
participate more fully in the broader economy and society. Pessimistic
assumptions of this kind are contrary to basic American values.13
However, while "pessimistic assumptions" about the poor prevail, problems
within governmental structures are characterized as emanating from within "the system,"
and not as inherent flaws within bureaucratic personalities. In other words, when
considering the government, problematic characteristics are attributable to "the system,"
and not to the people within the system. For example, in an AHA publication, Glover
writes,
[L]aw-abiding residents . . . questioned why a system was allowed to exist
when it so overwhelmingly favored thugs and predators over children,
mothers and the elderly. Ultimately, all families learned they couldn't trust
housing authority officials, elected officials, or government officials of
any ilk because they had been compromised and entrapped by the system
itself.16
138
Notice that it is "the system" that "favored thugs over children, mothers and the elderly."
Glover does not implicate bureaucrats as favoring thugs and predators. Rather, the
bureaucrats are merely "entrapped by the system itself."
To reiterate, when one perceives weaknesses in the poor, the weakness is
presumably inherent within the person, not in the structural system that contributes to the
so-called "weakness" - e.g., unemployability, poor education, etc. Again, those in
positions of power not only create inequitable social structures, they also give definition
to who needs "fixing" and who does not.
Politics, says Spencer, "drive policy."17 The type of policy that gets legislated is
related more to partisan political environment than to the historical evolution within
which populations are dealt.18 In other words, antipoverty policy is correlated with "core
beliefs" found within partisan parties. Says Spencer, antipoverty policy support may also
be bolstered by the potential effectiveness of the policy on the lives of the poor.19
However, Spencer maintains that well-intentioned antipoverty policies have done little to
advance the lives of policy beneficiaries. "At worst," says Spencer, "they seem to have
solidified the intergenerational nature of the underclass by subsidizing barriers to
economic opportunities, diminishing the expectations of the poor, or gentrifying poor
neighborhoods."20
Barney Simms (now retired from AHA) gives voice to a changing paradigm shift
in the Atlanta Housing Authority. The goal of AHA in using HOPE VI funds is to
remedy the trend towards a paternalistic approach to policymaking. He states,
139
This is a dramatic shift in policy and worldview from the early 1990s,
when the prevailing philosophy across the nation was that public housing
residents were somehow flawed and that society needed to care for them.
That paternalism has smothered potential for generations. Everyone -
man, woman and especially the children - should have the same rights and
opportunities to compete as anyone else.21
The intent of HOPE VI policy, therefore, is to deconcentrate poverty and to find
sustainable alternatives to "warehousing" the poor, says Glover. But, examined in this
study is the question of whether or not Atlanta residents were brought to the table of
discourse during AHA meetings with partners and developers. Were the voices of
residents fully represented in those discussions?
If the goal of AHA policy was to effect positive outcomes of public housing
residents, then it would behoove the housing authority to consider the voices of the
intended beneficiaries. Although HUD stipulates the integration of beneficiaries in
HOPE VI policymaking, there is no indication in the literature that AHA effectively
included residents. According to residents questioned in the Capitol Homes studies,
residents were merely informed of AHA decisions. They were not brought to the table
prior to decisionmaking.
The National Housing Law Project (NHLP) is most critical in its assertion that
residents lacked involvement in the HOPE VI process. Despite HUD's own mandate that
residents be allowed full participation in the entire HOPE VI process, the NHLP insists
that residents were not granted this right. HUD, according to NHLP, never issued
regulations that would have allowed residents to enforce their rights of participation.
Instead, HUD has primarily relied on Notices of Fiscal Agreements (or NOFAs) to
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administer the HOPE VI program.22 "By refusing to issue regulations, HUD has violated
its own policies regarding public rulemaking."
This research study and policy review, therefore, set as a primary goal the
illumination of public housing residents' experiences and their migration patterns
following public housing demolition. First, what were the experiences of public housing
residents prior to demolition? Second, what happened to residents once the demolition of
public housing forced them to relocate to other housing - either other conventional public
housing or private-market housing? Were HUD goals met? Have residents achieved
better outcomes as a result of HOPE Vl-led demolition and revitalization of public
housing communities?
Although the literature is interspersed with criticisms about lack of resident track
ing following relocation, there are, in fact, two well-known studies that have attempted to
address this issue. The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study is an early and retrospective
examination of relocation outcomes by residents from eight (8) HOPE VI sites across the
country. Subsequently, The HOPE VI Panel Study documents residents' preferences for
replacement housing and tracks residents from five (5) sites developed since 2001. Both
studies were commissioned by HUD to track the post-relocation outcomes of public
housing residents.
Although The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study provides an overview of HOPE
VI through multi-city case studies, Atlanta was not included in the tracking study.
Furthermore, there are variations in findings across the literature in terms of how effect-
tive HOPE VI was in its impact on the lives of families. In a 2010 report, it states: "there
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is no consensus in scholarly literature regarding the outcomes, cause and effect relation
ships, and appropriate empirical methodologies for examining residential mobility out
comes accompanying public policy interventions."24 Researchers, however, continue to
"explore new empirical techniques and various quasi-experimental research designs to
establish more convincing cause and effect relationships."25
Given that Atlanta has been touted as a HOPE VI success, and given that Atlanta
is the first major city to have demolished all of its public housing stock (with the excep
tion of a few senior high-rises),26 this policy review provides an important addition to the
growing literature on HOPE VI outcomes. This study has sought to provide clarity on
two research questions: (1) Did the implementation of HOPE VI policy in Atlanta
produce the desired outcomes as originally set forth by HUD, and (2) To what extent did
public housing residents have a voice in policy-making decisions? As an innovative
policy initiative, understanding its effects on families and the surrounding communities is
key to developing subsequent housing policy in Atlanta and around the nation.
Did Hope VI in Atlanta Meet the Goals Established by HUD?
The initial goals ofHOPE VI policy in the city of Atlanta were,
• To improve the living environment for residents of severely
distressed public housing through the demolition, rehabilitation,
reconfiguration, or replacement of obsolete projects (or portions
thereof);
• To revitalize sites on which such public housing projects are
located and contribute to the improvement of the surrounding
neighborhood;
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• To provide housing that will avoid or decrease the concentration of
very-low income families; and
• To build sustainable communities.28'29
Goal 1: To Improve the Living Environment for Residents
There is little dispute among HOPE VI analysts that improving the structural units
of public housing communities was achieved. HOPE VI funds did indeed help to finance
the demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration and replacement of obsolete public housing
units. What has been achieved is the development of quality, attractive, low-density
housing units that have replaced the high-density, dilapidated, and "severely distressed"
units that served the housing needs of Atlanta's poorest residents. The improvement of
"brick-and-mortar" structures is indisputable. However, what is yet to be determined is
whether or not the removal of these "severely distressed" public housing units led to an
overall improvement in the living environment of low-income residents.
As stated earlier, HOPE VI incorporates both a place-based and a people-based
approach to implementing housing policy. Improving the living environment of residents
is both a place policy as well as a people policy. The place policy refers to the brick-and-
mortar structure of public housing. The people policy refers to other non-tangible
components of living environment.
Merriam-Webster defines "environment" as "the aggregate of social and cultural
conditions that influence the life of an individual or community."3 It involves a sense of
community. Therefore, let us establish that "environment" is more than the physical
structure of housing - that is, "brick-and-mortar." Rather, "environment" also
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encompasses non-physical and social components. The goal of this policy review, then,
is to examine to what extent HOPE VI impacted the living environments of low-income
residents - i.e., socially, physically, and economically.
According to Crowley, "[t]he one improvement that studies of HOPE VI out
comes have consistently shown is that people feel safer."31 Feeling safe, secure, and
removed from criminal influence is important to one's overall sense of well-being. If the
physical environment is free from criminal activity, then families are perhaps able to
focus on improving their quality of life through education and employment.
In the focus group responses, residents discuss the totality of their living
conditions - e.g., physical structure of the units, location, acquaintance with neighbors,
and the safety of their children. Missing from these findings, however, are educational
assessments and outcomes. How have children fared in schools as a result of HOPE VI
relocation? Although findings in this study reveal that children and family are important
to respondents, the focus group responses do not indicate educational improvement in the
lives of the children.
In addition, very little is indicated as to how the changed physical environment
has impacted health or physical well-being. Other than proximity to doctors' offices and
Grady Hospital, residents did not indicate whether or not relocation impacted their over
all state of health.
One frequent concern expressed by Renee Glover is that public housing residents
find the opportunity to use their "God-given talents." She writes: "The true intent of the
work ... was never to make mere brick-and-mortar improvements. The overarching goal
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was to create holistic environments that encouraged and inspired public housing residents
to unlock their God-given human potential."32 But how does one determine, define, and
evaluate "God-given human potential?" How is this goal objectified in housing policy,
and how does one measure the outcome? What role do residents play in achieving their
own "God-given human potential?"
The paternalistic nature of AHA policymaking effectively renders public housing
residents powerless to effect change in their own lives. Glover implies that residents
cannot achieve real improvements in their lives without the "nurturing and protection"
from poverty and racial segregation that only policymakers and housing experts can
provide. Yet, Glover, by her own admission, is a product of racial segregation. She
writes,
Racial segregation was a painful part of my past. But my family and my
social network did not allow it to define my life, limit my prospects, crush
my character, or hinder my dreams. As a consequence ofmy upbringing,
when I interact with Atlanta public housing tenants who are confined by
the modern-day version of racial and economic segregation, I see children
of God, who are blessed with unlimited human potential and are destined
to become the next leaders of our nation.33
The implication of this statement is that the social networks that helped to define
and shape her life are presumably absent in the lives of public housing residents. It was
not housing policy that ignited positive change in her life. Rather, it was family and
social networks. Yet, Glover persists in her belief that innovative housing policy is the
primary key that will unlock human potential in her low-income constituents.
Interestingly, research reveals that the residents themselves find HOPE VI
expectations rather impertinent. For example, the notion that residing in a mixed-income
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community will improve the life chances and social mobility of low-income residents is
viewed by residents as insulting, paternalistic, and condescending. Despite their low
economic status, some residents do not view themselves as "needy" or in need of
"fixing."34 This disempowering characteristic of Atlanta's housing policy is one that
many critics would like to improve.
Critics of HOPE VI also point out that little attention is paid to the social
networks already existing within public housing or low-income communities. Prior to
demolition, many residents may have enjoyed strong social ties with a network of friends
and family in close proximity to their residence. These tightly-knit social networks were
often relied upon for childcare or other family assistance. Relocation may have led to a
loss of these vital social networks. As Popkin et al. state, "HOPE VI relocation disrupted
these social ties, leaving many feeling less secure, uncertain where to turn when they
encountered problems, and often simply lonely and isolated." 3
And so, in evaluating the impact of HOPE VI on the living environments of
public housing residents, analysts can point to the undeniable improvement in housing
structure and aesthetics, as well as the elimination or reduction in criminal activity from
residents' daily living environment. However, unintended outcomes of HOPE VI may be
found in other social components - e.g., the elimination of social networks.
The mixed-income model of public housing has gained interest across the nation.
But despite HUD's enthusiasm for the mixed-income model, the NHLP reports that there
is little empirical evidence to support the theory that this model actually improves the
lives of residents. Community cannot be artificially created by having residents "share
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the same physical space,"36'37 Community must be developed over time with persons
who share identity and interests.
Future housing policy should consider how best to relocate residents without
destroying vital ties to the community. For example, local pastors indicated the
severance of relationships with public housing residents as a result of HOPE VI
relocation. If church involvement is used as a proxy for community connection, then
severance from this important network is one that policy-makers may want to consider in
future policy development. Collaborating with church leaders, local librarians, and
community social workers (in addition to the residents themselves) will ensure that all
stakeholder voices are adequately heard in policymaking decisions.
Goal 2: To Revitalize Sites and Contribute to Neighborhood Improvement
There is little dispute within the literature that the razing of dilapidated public
housing structures contributed to a more pleasing neighborhood aesthetic. This met the
primary goal of demolishing "severely distressed" housing under HOPE VI. But while
the goal of revitalizing housing structure was inarguably met, what about the overall
improvement of the neighborhood? How has public housing revitalization contributed to
neighborhood improvement? What does "improvement" entail? Who gets to define what
is or is not "improvement?" Is it policymakers and housing leaders, or residents who call
the neighborhood "home?"
Focus group responses from the evaluation studies reveal residents' comments
and opinions regarding the revitalized sites. Most residents who commented on moving
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back to the revitalized sites did not remark on the surrounding neighborhood. Residents
were primarily concerned with the direct impact to their personal lives - e.g., having to
undergo background checks or repayment of moving expenses.
However, the most detailed and academic comments regarding neighborhood
revitalization came from interviews with property managers. Because they are "in the
business" so to speak, they viewed the situation with a more critical eye. For example,
one property manager praised the razing of Atlanta's public housing because it rid
communities of large tracts of blighted real estate, which, in his opinion, leads to the
potential for crime. He is also in support of mixed-income communities because having
low-income families reside amongst higher-income families, he says, will raise the
standards for personal conduct. He states, "Their (public housing residents') living
standard is so low that they weren't capable of assimilating in a neighborhood that have
(sic) higher standards for personal conduct." Furthermore, he asserts that the housing
policy must allow residents to marry and maintain their housing vouchers. Penalizing
voucher holders for getting married (by terminating housing assistance) will only lead to
illegitimate families, which tends to breed cycles of poverty. In other words, the very
conduct that housing policy is designed to prevent is inadvertently reinforced by the
policy.
The aggregate of stakeholder comments do not reveal that the surrounding
neighborhoods are necessarily better. Granted, crime has decreased in the affected areas.
Poverty, overall, is less visible. But the quality of living for low-income residents is not
necessarily better.
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Workers "in the trenches" - i.e., social workers, librarians, etc. - have strong
opinions as to how HOPE VI has impacted the community. For example, stakeholders
who perform direct services to the residents indicated that the residents were "scared"
during the demolition and relocation processes. The consensus among providers is that
the residents did not have sufficient knowledge as to how to pay utility bills or how to fill
out applications for assistance. Furthermore, there was a general lack of trust towards
AHA amongst the residents. Residents sought help from local librarians rather than
AHA. Also, county social workers saw an increase in "walk-ins" seeking housing
following AHA demolition.
Again, while the intended goal of HOPE VI was to revitalize neighborhoods, the
unintended outcome was that it destroyed communities. Prior to demolition and
relocation, the residents looked out for one another. They also looked out for persons in
the community whom they trusted - e.g., local branch librarians. As one librarian stated,
"They told me to 'watch my back.' They looked out for me."
Furthermore, the stated goal of neighborhood "improvement" is not defined
clearly. Other than a reduction in crime, deconcentration of poverty, and racial
desegregation, for what other "improvements" were housing leaders aiming? As one
religious interviewee stated, housing officials were not sensitive to the fact that people
were being displaced. "The intent of HOPE VI sounded good, but quite a few (residents)
fell through the cracks," he said.
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Goal 3: To Decrease the Concentration of Very-Low Income Families
A primary goal in HOPE VI policy implementation is to decrease the
concentration of low-income families by developing the mixed-income model of public
housing, or by utilization of housing vouchers in low-poverty neighborhoods. The intent
of such dispersal policies is good in theory. However, the reality can lead to unintended
outcomes. An important question to consider is: Where do poor people go when
displaced from public housing in the inner city?
It has been established that many of the public housing residents chose to move to
private market housing with the use of a voucher rather than return to the revitalized
community. But voucher relocation does not guarantee that the householder will obtain
housing in low-poverty communities. While poverty deconcentration was achieved in
pre-demolition areas, did concentrated poverty simply move to the suburbs and outlying
areas?
While many researchers have not been able to answer this question, Boston
provides a more definitive response. He tracks residents' relocation outcomes for several
public housing communities between 1995 (pre-demolition or revitalization) and 2001
(following revitalization). The housing communities include: Clark Howell, John Eagan,
East Lake, Grady Homes, McDaniel Glen, and Bowen Homes. Of the revitalized
communities (Clark Howell, John Eagan, and East Lake), 47% of pre-demolition
residents exited the public housing system by the year 2001. Of those remaining, 23% of
residents moved to other housing projects, 17% moved to mixed-income communities,
and 60% moved with housing vouchers. Likewise, of the communities not revitalized
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(Grady Homes, McDaniel Glen, and Bowen Homes), 51% of residents exited public
housing assistance by the year 2001. Of those remaining within the AHA system, 63%
remained in the same housing projects, 12% relocated to other projects, 1% returned to
mixed-income housing, and 24% utilized housing vouchers.38
Holliday and Dwyer (2009) discuss poverty in suburban areas. While extant
literature largely focuses on poverty in inner-city rings, they claim, studies have been
scarce in examining poverty in the suburbs.39 However, Holliday and Dwyer write:
"Recent evidence suggests that suburbs grew even more stratified at the end of the
twentieth century, with substantial increases in poverty in some areas (Lucy and Phillips,
2000; Frey, 2001; Orfield, 2002; Puentes and Warren, 2006; Murphy, 2007)."40
One theory reflected in the literature, say the authors, is that suburban poverty is a
reflection of poverty in the inner city. That is to say, boundaries between inner city and
suburbs are pushed further out as residents from the inner city relocate to the outer rings
of metropolitan areas.41 They maintain: "Scholars conclude that suburban poverty
represents the spread of central city problems outward, with similar patterns of
disinvestment, population transition, and economic decay (e.g., Lucy and Phillips, 2000;
Murphy, 2007)."42
But much of the literature on suburban poverty is outdated, say Holliday and
Dwyer, "and more sophisticated approaches in both ecological and place stratification
traditions suggest a more complex spatial pattern of suburban poverty, and a more diverse
set of determinants."43 For example, the deconcentration of poverty in the City of Atlanta
does not necessarily implicate public housing demolition as a primary or significant
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determinant of suburban poverty. According to Holliday and Dwyer, "suburban poverty
cannot be interpreted solely as the extension of central city poverty."44 Rather, other
determinants of suburban poverty might include migration to the suburbs for job-related
reasons.45
Deirdre Oakley and cohorts have also written extensively on HOPE VI relocation
outcomes, both in Atlanta and in Chicago. For example, Oakley and Burchfield suggest
that displaced public housing residents - most ofwhom are African-American - tend to
relocate to predominantly Black neighborhoods perhaps because of familiarity and
comfort with like-populations.46 In a study of HOPE VI in Chicago (2009), they make
the case that although public housing residents were forcibly evicted out of the
"projects," they were nonetheless relocated to other low-income neighborhoods.47 The
authors state that "voucher housing tends to be spatially clustered in disadvantaged
neighborhoods; there is a clear link between these spatial trends and where relocated
public-housing families are likely to move."48 In other words, displaced public housing
residents in Chicago were not evenly relocated across the metropolitan area. Rather, they
were "concentrated in poor Black neighborhoods on the south and west sides of the
city."49
These findings regarding spatial relocation of displaced public housing residents
can lead one to question the goal of HOPE VI policy. Is the goal of HOPE VI, really, to
relocate residents to upwardly mobile communities, or merely to deconcentrate poverty in
the inner city? In the City of Atlanta, was the goal of utilizing HOPE VI funds to
demolish public housing a matter of revitalizing real estate, or reinvesting in the lives of
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real people? Was HOPE VI a concerted effort to enhance poor people's lives, or was it a
disguised attempt to enhance the city's racial and socio-economic balance in preparation
for the 2006 Olympic games?
Findings from HOPE VI studies may lead to questions as to whether or not
federal housing policies actually look to potential relocation outcomes when formulating
policy. As Oakley and Burchfield conclude, HOPE VI policy does not consider
relocation outcomes in its stated goals. Therefore, the original stipulation of the 1949
Housing Act - i.e., "providing decent housing in a suitable living environment for all
U.S. citizens" - has not been met in HOPE VI policy.50
Was HOPE VI, therefore, a significant determinant in suburban poverty in
metropolitan Atlanta? Given that transportation was a prominent concern amongst
survey and focus group respondents, we can surmise that displaced residents may have
moved to a nearby suburban or county area. Figure 3 (in Chapter 5 of this paper) shows
poverty rate increases or decreases in the City of Atlanta and surrounding counties
between 2000 and 2010. While rates of poverty shifted in various census tracts within
Fulton County (Figures 4 and 5), the overall poverty rate for the City of Atlanta has not
shifted from 2000 to 2010 (24.4% and 24.3%, respectively). However, there are
significant increases in overall poverty for several surrounding counties. In the decade
spanning 2000 to 2010, Clayton, Cobb, Coweta, Dekalb, Douglas, and Henry counties
have all had significant increases in poverty rates, while Fayette and Gwinnett counties
have had poverty rates doubling or more. The only two counties examined that have not
seen significant increases in poverty rates are Cherokee County (from 5.3% to 7.7%) and
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Fulton County (from 15.7% to 15.9%). So, while the razing of Atlanta's public housing
may have alleviated the concentration of poverty in pre-demolition communities, it did
not significantly alter the rate of poverty in Fulton County or the City of Atlanta overall.
Findings from this study and others suggest that future endeavors to formulate a
national housing policy should take into consideration potential relocation outcomes for
displaced families. This may be challenging given the fact that public housing residents
are not a homogenous group. Rather, they represent diversity in race, culture or ethnicity,
age, family size, educational attainment, employment and employability, health, and
socioeconomic status.51 The needs of the poor vary no less than the needs of the general
population. However, the needs of the poor can be exacerbated by lack of access to
needed resources such as transportation, income, or quality healthcare.
Goal 4: To Build Sustainable Communities
In addition to demolition of severely distressed public housing, a primary goal of
HOPE VI is to build sustainable communities. AHA established as one of its goals: "To
rebuild communities, not just housing."52 In sustainable communities, residents continue
to prosper and thrive through job attainment, decent and affordable housing, and quality
education for their children. Businesses and services are available and accessible to its
residents, such as quality child care, recreation, health care, and after-school programs.
However, researchers are unclear as to whether or not HOPE VI has met this goal.
One important factor in sustainability is the viability of mixed-finance, mixed-
income communities. Popkin et al. maintain that a mixed-income model has several
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advantages. Mixed-income developments are generally better managed communities
than conventional public housing communities. Mixed-income developments foster a
more positive social environment, attract and retain higher-income tenancy, create better
schools, and attract better community services such as shopping or job opportunities.
Overall, mixed-income developments are more attractively designed and provide a stable,
long-term environment for residents.54
The mixed-income housing model is a planned HOPE VI strategy for achieving
sustainability and economic integration. Regulatory changes in 1996 led to the Mixed-
Finance Rule, which allowed housing authorities to leverage a mixture of public and
private funding to revitalize and develop public housing.55 In addition, the "1998 Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) also contributed to progress in
leveraging new funds for public housing."56
According to Popkin et al., the success of mixing private funds with HOPE VI
funds is more likely if new construction public housing developments also address social
needs of the community.37 Nonetheless, the viability of sustaining mixed-funding
projects over the long-term has yet to be determined. Popkin et al. maintain,
Each element of a mixed-income, mixed-finance project - public housing,
market rate, and tax credit units - must be financially feasible, marketable,
and sustainable over the long term. Although a number of HOPE VI
developments have achieved these goals in the short term, the extent to
which they can weather neighborhood and market changes over the years
is yet to be determined. If some housing authorities - or their private
partners - are unable to continue to attract a mix of residents, maintain
rental income, and service their financial obligations, the viability of the
new public housing units could be at risk.58
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Despite the potential positive outcomes of mixed-income models, other data have
not supported guaranteed benefits to low-income residents. Popkin et al. point out that
evidence is still emerging about exactly how mixed-income communities
function and how they benefit low-income residents (Popkin, Buron et al.
2000). For example, research conducted to date suggests that there is
relatively little interaction between higher- and lower-income residents of
mixed-income developments and that the interactions that do occur are
relatively superficial (Brophy and Smith 1997; A. Smith 2002). Further,
the one study of short-term employment outcomes found no evidence that
lower-income residents were more likely to find jobs as a result of living
in a mixed-income housing development (Rosenbaum and Stroh 1998).
Thus, while it is clearly feasible to create a healthy mixed-income
development that will attract higher-income residents and provide a
pleasant and safe community for all residents, it remains less clear what
conditions are required to ensure that living in these communities will
have substantial payoffs for the social and economic status of low-income
families over the long term.59
In an unpublished study outlined by Popkin et al., Xavier de Souza Briggs
compared movers with non-movers (or residents who remained in traditional public
housing). In his findings, Briggs "found relatively little evidence that movers had
significant interaction with their new neighbors or gained access to social capital. In fact,
a number of movers maintained ties to their previous neighborhoods, returning regularly
to attend church or socialize."60
Yet, theories abound that HOPE Vl-led mixed-income environments will have a
positive effect on the poor. For example, The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study states,
Low-income families will interact with neighbors in their new commun
ities, forming new social networks. These networks are hypothesized to
offer a range of benefits for original residents, including positive role
models for adults and children, access to information about economic
opportunities, and peer groups for children and youth that are less likely to
support delinquent activity.6
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Despite these theories, findings from the Tracking Study indicate low levels of
interaction between respondents and their new neighbors, a finding that mirrors
comments made in the Capitol Homes baseline and evaluation update studies. Therefore,
future policy developments should revisit the assumption that low-income residents are
eager to form social networks with upper-income neighbors and vice-versa. Policy
makers should seek input from low-income residents to ascertain their needs and levels of
comfort in moving towards sustainability and self-sufficiency. Housing leaders,
policymakers, and stakeholders alike should assume that all residents have preferences
for where they reside, not just middle- and upper-income residents. Efforts should be
made to allow low-income residents more choices in where they reside, even if they must
remain in traditional public housing.
One unexplored concern among some analysts is whether or not mixing incomes
will have a reverse impact on other populations groups. While proponents of mixed-
income communities laud the positive influence upper-income groups will have on low-
income residents, little has been discussed about reverse influence. Will behaviors found
among low-income groups transfer upwards into other population groups and beyond (for
example, the working poor)? Ronald D. Utt writes,
While housing vouchers have generally received strong support from most
conservatives, some conservative-leaning analysts oppose vouchers
because they may have an adverse impact (through income mixing) on
those who have successfully struggled to escape poverty but nonetheless
are still close to the edge, in terms of income and neighborhood, and thus
vulnerable to slipping back.
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Utt further maintains that "HOPE VI... rests on the presumption that the poor among us
are susceptible to certain negative influences from other poor households from which
other income classes apparently are immune."63 He advances the notion that middle-
class residents are not supportive of the voucher program out of fear that they will have
imposed on their neighborhood increasing crime and economic deterioration. But, if
middle-class residents are, in fact, immune to negative influences from lower classes,
then why would they reject income-mixing? Utt argues in favor of more research and
analysis in this area.
And so, an important question for future policy development is: Does an
improved social environment inevitably lead to sustainability and self-sufficiency? Do
low-income residents achieve economic self-sufficiency over the long-run simply by
living in close proximity to middle- and upper-income residents?
Utt argues that HOPE VI has been largely credited with many of the
improvements in social outcomes following relocation, when in fact, there may be other
contributing factors. He argues that many social ills are due to low income, not
inadequate housing. People residing in public housing do so because of low income. It is
not the reverse. In other words, HOPE VI analysts tend to blame low-income (and the
consequences thereof) on lack of housing opportunity, when, in fact, lack of housing
opportunity is a result of low income. HOPE VI proponents presume that once the
housing environment is improved, so will income improve.
But, Utt argues that policies to address improved social outcomes must primarily
focus on strategies to improve jobs and income. Policies should focus on personal
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development rather than community development. "[PJerhaps a more productive
approach might be to consider major revisions . . . based on approaches that emphasize
the fundamentals of human advancement and put the burden of improvement on the
beneficiary, rather than on the manipulated neighborhood environment,"64 says Utt.
Sheila Crowley advances a similar theory. She maintains that policy interventions
that fail to take into consideration the reality of poverty on the life chances of those living
in it will not prove successful or sustainable. She writes: "Interventions that focus only
on people's limitations or that deny their reality will fail. Interventions that either
romanticize or pathologize the people to be helped and that are not based on a complete,
accurate assessment of a family or a community are disempowering, reducing chances for
positive change. False promises deepen alienation."65 In other words, Crowley believes
that HOPE VI, overall, never sought to empower residents to live up to their "God-given
potential," as Glover has proclaimed. Rather, HOPE VI has only led to false promises
that have left residents in still precarious living situations. Given that the evaluation
studies have determined that residents did not take full advantage of counseling services
offered by the Atlanta Housing Authority, the outcomes of HOPE VI did not measure up
to the promises made to residents.
In short, outcomes leading to sustainability have yet to be determined by HOPE
VI evaluations. Numerous studies to date have increasingly shown that, although
tremendous gains have been made in improving the aesthetics of public housing stock,
more research is needed to ensure that low-income residents are able to fully realize
positive outcomes for a better quality of living, self-development, and self-sufficiency.
159
Did public housing residents have a voice in policymaking decisions?
Whether or not the voices of residents were adequately represented in
policymaking discussions is up for debate. Depending on whom you ask, the perceptions
may vary.
According to the 1992 Final Report ofthe National Commission on Severely
Distressed Public Housing, residents were included in some of the preliminary research
conducted by the Commission. The Final Report indicates that the Commission spoke
"extensively with residents from some of the most and the least livable public housing
developments in America... ."66 Other reports have also suggested that residents were
involved. Renee Glover, in Atlanta, discusses face-to-face meetings between residents,
herself, and the Board of Directors.67
Despite these reported meetings, one of the chief complaints from residents was
their "lack of involvement and active participation in decisionmaking concerning their
communities."68 In the evaluation studies, comments made by former residents of
Capitol Homes indicate that they were only invited to informational meetings. The
residents allege that decisions by AHA and their partners were already made when the
residents attended the meetings. Housing leaders merely informed residents as to what
would happen, respondents insist. "Residents report that they were deceived even in the
application process [for obtaining HOPE VI grants], when sign-in sheets for
informational meetings about HOPE VI were used as documentation that the people who
attended the meeting supported the application."69
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But HOPE VI grants were constructed with the stipulation by HUD that public
housing residents are consulted and involved in the planning for revitalization prior to
demolition. Residents, some officials believe, should have a voice in the design and
development of where they will reside. However, while housing officials in Atlanta
made attempts to yield to the "spirit of the law," inconsistencies in the statutes may have
contributed to a lack of full compliance.
For example, according to the Harvard Law Review, HUD's Revitalization Grant
Agreement for fiscal year 2001 does not allow for residents' full involvement. Because
the Grant Agreement is expressly between HUD and the public housing authority (PHA),
residents cannot be considered third-party beneficiaries of the grant. "By denying
residents standing as third-party beneficiaries, HUD and PHAs reap the political benefits
of a stated commitment to protecting residents' rights, while effectively ensuring that
those who hold those rights cannot enforce them."70 At best, says the Harvard Law
Review, residents' input came only after substantial plans had been all but cemented by
"consultants, architects, developers, and PHA officials."71 Evictions and the razing of
their homes were often seen by some residents as unfair. As one resident from Bankhead
Courts stated, "We didn't ask to be moved."72
Popkin et al. maintain, "[Resident participation is particularly important during
efforts to transform public housing properties into mixed-income communities, because it
gives residents a stake in their new communities . . . Residents often fear change,
particularly when it comes to creating mixed-income communities, because of concerns
about displacement."73
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This notion was indeed bome out in the Capitol Homes responses. Residents who
participated in the focus groups were apprehensive about moving back to the revitalized
housing. Responses pertaining to moving back were characterized by concerns for
stringent rules, new neighbors, and credit or background checks. Many of the residents
believed that they would not be allowed back (based on their credit background), or that
they would eventually be evicted for a minor infraction (e.g., cooking out on their porch).
However, in an Emory study on the McDaniel Glenn revitalization (another
housing project), residents were mostly favorable in their opinion of public housing
demolition. In the Emory study, "more than eight out often (83%) former residents
interviewed in 2009 agreed that the razing and redevelopment of McDaniel Glenn was
the "right thing to do."74
Critiques of HOPE VI Policy Implementation in Atlanta
The Atlanta Housing Authority employed two housing assistance strategies in the
implementation of HOPE VI policy. First, mixed-income communities are at the heart of
AHA's neighborhood revitalization efforts. Second is the distribution of housing
vouchers - i.e., through the Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP).
The literature is laden with commentaries on both strategies. However, there is
yet to emerge a general consensus as to which strategy is the preferred or more ideal
strategy. One scholar, Robert C. Ellickson, overwhelmingly favors housing choice
voucher assistance.
162
Ellickson maintains that tenant-based housing vouchers will allow tenants and
prospective tenants the same respect and credibility as non-assisted renters to make
demands on landlords should a dispute arise. With the portability of a housing voucher,
should a tenant become dissatisfied with the rental unit for any reason, he or she can
simply vacate the property and move to another dwelling of his or her choice.75
However, the portability of vouchers also lends itself to the reconcentration of poverty in
rental housing. If mixed-income housing proves to be unsustainable, or if the very low-
income residents are unable to secure housing in the mixed-income units, then the most
vulnerable residents will likely end up in other communities with concentrations of low-
income families.76 Voucher-holders are more likely to seek rental housing in
communities where they are most comfortable, and this may include communities with
like ethnicity and economic status.77
In project-based housing, the favorable outcomes projected by developers and
public housing authorities are not quite as favorable as anticipated. Project-based
housing, says Ellickson, has "lock-in" effects - that is, effects that all but hinder tenants
from relocating if and when the unit becomes unsuitable.78 In addition, project develop
ers and project managers are less likely to respect the needs or desires of unit dwellers.
Given that the units are government subsidized, developers and project managers are
beholden to the government agency who is subsidizing the unit - not to the unit dweller.
Furthermore, should the renter or unit dweller become dissatisfied with the unit, and
given the long waiting list for project-based assistance, he or she is less likely to vacate
the unit for fear of losing the housing subsidy. In short, project-based housing assistance
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is not portable as are housing vouchers. If a tenant vacates a project-based unit, the
housing subsidy is also relinquished.
In terms of economic and/or racial integration, neither project-based housing nor
tenant-based housing is ideal. Both strategies have their drawbacks. Regarding
economic integration, housing vouchers may offer more success than project-based,
mixed-income housing. In the latter housing community, residents may experience
stigmatization. In project-based housing, residents know which units are subsidized and
which are not, thereby adding an unnecessary stigma to families living in subsidized
units. Furthermore, tenants of project-based housing may eventually come to resent their
higher-income neighbors if efforts to "keep up with the Joneses" are frustrated.80
However, the same stigma and frustration associated with project-based housing
does not necessarily occur with the use of vouchers. When families move into neighbor
hoods using housing vouchers, their subsidized status can go undetected, thereby
increasing their likelihood of integrating successfully into the community.81
On the other hand, attempts at racial integration may fall short with tenant-based
housing vouchers. Renters with housing vouchers are more likely to select communities
of like-individuals. Tenants tend to prefer neighborhoods consisting of their own racial
or ethnic group, and therefore, racial integration is often compromised with voucher
portability.82
Overall, in Ellickson's estimation, housing vouchers, such as in the Section 8
program, are perhaps a preferred strategy for achieving economic integration in housing
assistance. "The program was specifically targeted to serve the needs of families
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paying more than half of their income for rent, a situation HUD refers to as 'worst case'
housing need."84 "Families who receive a Section 8 voucher must pay thirty percent of
their income towards rent, and the voucher covers the remaining cost."85
Although vouchers allow renters wide latitude in housing choice, the downfall is
that landlords also have a choice in whether or not to accept the voucher. Critics point
out that landlords in affluent or Anglo-dominated communities can "simply refuse" to
accept the vouchers, thereby limiting the "desegregative effects" of housing choice.
Furthermore, critics also question whether or not private market rental housing can
accommodate the number of residents evicted from conventional public housing.87
Since its inception in 1992, HOPE VI has undergone changes in "legislation,
regulation, implementation, and practice."88 But researchers have highlighted the fact
that public housing authorities, at least in the early days of HOPE VI, have failed to keep
track of residents following relocation. According to Popkin et al., "we know relatively
little about the impact of the transformation of public housing, including basic informa
tion about where former residents of HOPE VI developments - and their children - have
moved."89
A major point of contention between HOPE VI advocates and its detractors is that
a majority of pre-demolition residents were not able to return to the original site of
revitalized housing. In early HOPE VI evaluation studies, researchers suggested that
fewer than 50% of original residents will return to the revitalized public housing sites.
Findings from a 2003 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) indicate that,
"grantees expected 46 percent of residents to return. At the extremes, 40 sites expected
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fewer than 25 percent of original residents to return, while 31 sites expected 75 percent or
more (U.S. GAO 2003b)."90 Popkin et al. maintain that "these tenants were the ones who
suffered the terrible conditions of distressed public housing - and, per the commission's
report, were intended to benefit from the revitalization. For this reason, the housing
authority - and society - has an obligation to ensure that at minimum, original residents
do not end up worse off than they were before."91
On the other side of the argument, HOPE VI proponents suggest that residents
who did not return to the original public housing site may have been ones who no longer
qualify for public housing assistance under new guidelines. Furthermore, residents who
moved into private housing - with or without housing choice vouchers - may have
wanted out of public housing anyway. In the opinion of some, "HOPE VI should not be
judged on the basis of what has happened to them."
Housing Policy Models That Work
This study has examined the implementation of HOPE VI in Atlanta. While
largely a success by most analyses, it is but one model. Another model of public housing
that, by some accounts, has also worked is found in the New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA). Nicholas Dagen Bloom outlines in detail how NYCHA has
managed to maintain its public housing stock, despite its many challenges. Despite
enduring crime, vandalism, and a tenancy comprised ofNew York's poorest - the
NYCHA has stayed the course. For this reason, revitalization of New York's housing
stock is a feasible option. Demolition, however, is not.
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The New York public housing system is one of the largest employers in the city,
and houses thousands of the city's working poor. It is also the largest public housing
authority in the nation.94 To dismantle its affordable housing system would be to turn
away solid, working families, who although struggling, are nonetheless managing under
this system. Likewise, although the housing authority continues to struggle with its
myriad challenges to the housing infrastructure, the employees are carrying the load. The
facilities are repaired when broken - even at astronomical costs - and crime is managed
with a mixture of law enforcement and tenant "eyes on the street." The NYCHA
employs a crime prevention strategy called Crime Prevention through Environmental
Design (CPTED). "CPTED ... consistently reduces crime by 20 percent because the
redesign reduces crimes of opportunity. Essentially the system gives tenants control of
their spaces . .. ."95
The NYCHA, for decades, operated under the model of a welfare-state. It housed
the poorest of the poor, despite major challenges in housing administration. Its intentions
were good. If the city were going to provide affordable housing to those who needed it,
then it sought to focus on the neediest of the needy first.
But, these good intentions can also backfire. This policy of "the worst shall be
first" can also lead to a race to the bottom. Families in search of available (and
affordable) housing will find little incentive for upward mobility if they are aware that
"the worse shall be first." Remaining poor under this model would ensure continued
housing provided by the city's housing authority. Why, then, should the poor seek
market rate housing? But since the 1990s, the NYCHA is gradually undergoing a
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paradigm shift. No longer does it look to house the poorest of the poor; it is now looking
to offer affordable housing to the working poor.96
Bloom makes the point that the success ofNYCHA is not due to its staff doing
everything right the first time. Rather, it is due to "constant revision and updating to
meet new challenges" and "good public administration."97 In short, efforts have been
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taken to revitalize housing structures without having to displace its residents. Bloom
states,
Renovation ... includes new windows, facade renovation (replacing and
repointing brickwork), elevator replacement, new stainless steel front
entrances, and extensive landscaping. This is not touch-up work but
complete overhaul of buildings by private contractors working for
NYCHA. The results are dramatic to say the least. Billions of dollars set
aside for renovation sounds like a great deal of money, but it is important
to remember that this large amount is spread across a system housing over
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four hundred thousand people.
Another factor which may contribute to the working relationship between
NYCHA and housing residents is the fact that many of the NYCHA employees are also
tenants. According to Bloom, 29% of the housing authority employees were tenants in
2004. "Approximately one-third of employees, then, have a personal stake in the well
being ofNYCHA as a whole."100 The Resident Advisory Board - "a city-wide tenant
organization composed partly of resident association presidents" - encourages tenant
input and participation in the authority's annual decision-making.101 This helps to reduce
the system of paternalism that is often endemic of housing authority structures.
Furthermore, many of the tenant youth help to maintain the grounds during the
summer months. Residents, thus, have a working and amicable relationship with the
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housing authority, and all stakeholders work together to ensure the success of the housing
complex.
The end result of all this effort is evident to the naked eye. In spite
of the fact that crime and vandalism remain endemic to New York's
housing system, the average NYCHA project today has limited or no
exterior graffiti, neatly kept grounds ..., shading trees, modern windows,
glazed brick lobbies and hallways, slow but satisfactory elevators, and
mostly tidy interiors. NYCHA has succeeded by pursuing a modified
philosophy of environmental determinism.
Finally, community centers are also a hallmark ofNew York's public housing.
"Over more than a decade more than $100 million has been spent on sixty-two new or
renovated facilities (with twelve more underway); almost 70 percent ofNYCHA's
centers have experienced some renovation."104 These community centers may include
large spaces for multipurpose activities such as dance, art, computer learning, cooking,
fashion shows, spelling bees, and even studio recording.
New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) chose a model of "selective
housing." That is to say, the focus shifted from housing the poorest of the poor to
housing the working poor. Its focus is on affordable housing, not welfare housing.
NYCHA chose not to concentrate families of very poor people; rather, they chose to turn
their attention to the working-poor who are better able to pay "a more reasonable
proportion of the cost"106 of housing. Under the welfare-state, it was the working poor
who could not secure low-income housing because the "race to the bottom" model
ensured that public housing went to the homeless and emergency cases.
In summary, it is the housing management scheme of the NYCHA that is credited
with the sustainability of its public housing program. Bloom concludes with this state-
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ment: "The long-term success of Hope VI redevelopment projects in other cities is still
unknown, but beyond reducing poor people to a minority of the redeveloped site (one of
the primary activities of Hope VI) these new projects will only prosper to the extent that
new management practices emerge."107
What's Next for HOPE VI and a National Housing Policy?
Undoubtedly, HOPE VI has many notable "successes." In particular, many
blighted and distressed housing units have been demolished and replaced with quality,
well-designed, mixed-income developments. Crime has been reduced in many of the
formerly blighted areas. And overall, families feel safer.
Despite the aesthetic success of revitalized housing units, questions still remain as
to whether or not the HOPE VI initiative was successful for public housing residents.
Critics of HOPE VI and advocates for the poor have continued to point out the lack of
affordable housing made worse by public housing demolition.108 For example, Popkin et
al. state: "Most seriously, there is substantial evidence that the original residents of
HOPE VI projects have not always benefited from redevelopment, even in some sites that
were otherwise successful... As a consequence, some of the original residents of these
developments may live in equally or even more precarious circumstances today."
Crowley summarizes this point:
While HOPE VI has resulted in the removal of blighted buildings and the
development of some lovely new homes, it also has resulted in the
involuntary displacement of tens of thousands of poor, predominantly
African American families from their homes and communities, made the
housing situation for some of the nation's most vulnerable citizens even
170
more precarious, and exacerbated the shortage of affordable homes for
people in the lowest income brackets. The promise (and rhetoric) of HOPE
VI as a means of improving opportunities for residents of distressed public
housing never matched the reality. Many more displaced residents were
promised improved housing and economic uplift than have actually
received both or are ever likely to ... Overall, more people who lived in
public housing communities redeveloped under HOPE VI were hurt by the
program than helped. Thus, the core tenet of government intervention in
the lives of its citizens - "First, do no harm" - has been violated.110
According to Nunnally and Carter, structural discrimination continues to account
for much of Black Americans' inability to rise up the socioeconomic ladder.
Furthermore, pathologizing the dilatory behaviors of poor Blacks "can be detrimental for
the advancement of social policies that can enhance the socioeconomic conditions of
[B]lacks."IH
But others continue to blame the poor for their lack of social mobility. According
to a 1991 national study, nearly 52% of all Black Americans believe that poor Blacks are
to blame for their own poverty. A failure to take advantage of opportunities is cited as a
contributing factor."2 This outlook by powerful Black Americans - such as found within
AHA - speaks to the paternalistic nature of decision-making in HOPE VI
implementation.
The implementation of Atlanta's HOPE VI policy initiative intersects with both
race and poverty. HOPE VI - as implemented by the Atlanta Housing Authority -
disproportionately impacted African Americans and other families of color. Given that
the majority of Atlanta's pre-demolition public housing residents were African-American
and poor, HOPE VI policy decisions made by the Atlanta Housing Authority would have
done well to consider what level of impact HOPE VI policy would have on this
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population group. A question to ponder is whether or not any other population group -
poor or otherwise - would have allowed for such an undemocratic process in housing
policy development without political mobilization. What other population group has had
to endure forcible displacement in the recent U.S.? Dominant population groups would
hardly tolerate evictions en masse without a political fight.
The reality is that poor people lack the resources to attain political leverage.
Without political leverage, the poor are often hard-pressed to realize personal or
individual agency that will move them out of poverty. In the absence of agency, African
Americans continue to bear the brunt of disproportionality in urban politics, no matter
how well-intentioned the policy.
Jerome Rabow et al. discuss a type of "learned helplessness" that sets in when
poor populations believe that they have no ability to control their own environment.
Within the context of HOPE VI and housing relocation, if the poor have come to believe
in the insolvability of their "distressed" living conditions prior to demolition, then the
motivation to control future situations is diminished.113 Furthermore, when people
believe that fate controls their outcomes, they are less likely to engage in goal-oriented
behavior."4 In order to alleviate states of "helplessness," residents must believe that their
own actions can influence the outcome of their situation."3
While there are certainly other racial groups that were impacted by HOPE VI -
e.g., Hispanics - Black families have become the proxy for poverty in urban cities.
The poor are the disenfranchised. Not only were public housing residents spatially
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displaced, the decisions of the Atlanta Housing Authority also led to their political
displacement as well.
The deconcentration of poverty in public housing inevitably leads to the dispersal
of African Americans and the dispersal of community. Edin and Kissane discuss poverty
among African Americans, particularly in light of the recent economic downturn in the
U.S. According the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recent recession in the
U.S. began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, a critical time in Atlanta's HOPE
VI implementation. One cannot ignore the fact that public housing for Atlanta's poorest
residents was being systematically demolished at the height of the recession.
Furthermore, marked by a deteriorating labor market, the recession is the longest in U.S.
history since World War II, lasting 18 months."7
According to Federal Reserve Chair, Janet Yellen, several indicators (other than
the unemployment rate) point to a slow-recovering economy:
1. Wages are slow to rise. Over the past few years, wages have only increased
by 2% per year - "very low by historical standards."
2. Too many Americans (about 7 million) are having to settle for part-time
employment rather than full-time employment.
3. Fewer people are leaving their jobs voluntarily (for fear of not finding another
one).
4. Employers are reluctant to hire new employees. And,
1 1 O
5. The labor force participation is low (at 63%).
173
Furthermore, more employees are relying on low-wage jobs. According to an
article published by CNNMoney, "They're not just teenagers or spouses - they're
workers whose families depend on them... These low-income breadwinners now make
up roughly 14% of all workers in the country - the highest share on record since at least
the 1980s....""9
Industries most likely to see low-wage earners include "restaurants and bars,
agricultural production and private households - like maids and nannies."120 Although
this articles does not specifically discuss the feminization of poverty (i.e., the notion that
women are disproportionately represented in low-wage jobs), these statistics should
invite strong consideration by housing policymakers given that the face of public assisted
housing is increasingly single females with children.121 "Families headed by single
women of color now predominate in subsidized housing,"122 says Howard. No longer do
families "fit the traditional model of husband and wife and children", and therefore,
nontraditional families should be reflected in housing policy. As Howard states, when
government attempts to define "family," housing policy can exclude families from
accessing affordable housing based on archaic concepts of what constitutes "family" and
what does not.123
Given the slow economic return following the recent recession, policymakers
should consider the diversity of population when formulating housing policy. Comments
from interviewees in this case study can inform policy considerations. For example,
many of the interviewees expressed concern for women and children left in precarious
housing situations with little benefit of support services. Interviewees feared the
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possibility of homelessness for these families and educational challenges for children
who are not stably housed. Furthermore, how we choose to treat the poor through policy
- especially those with children - will have a direct impact on the future of poverty in
America. Housing policy should address social issues that are particular to this
population, yet flexible enough to meet the diverse needs of all householders.
Howard emphasizes that housing policy for the poorest of the poor should address
both gender and race. Popkin agrees. She argues that "public housing transformation
cannot achieve more than limited impact on the well-being of HOPE VI families without
addressing race directly.. .."l24 Using "poverty as a proxy for race," says Polikoff, has
not worked.125
Further still, Buron et al. contend that future HOPE VI policy should also address
crime in its revitalization efforts. They maintain,
if original residents are the source of crime, then occupancy and screening
criteria need to be enforced to keep people who are creating an unsafe
environment from returning to the development. If neighborhood residents
are the source of the crime problem in and around the development, then
the housing agency needs to work with the police and community groups
to implement crime reduction strategies in the neighborhood.
But as one interviewee pointed out, it is low-income residents who live on the
margins of society. And when one is living on the margins, he is more likely to engage in
noncompliant or deviant behavior. Once caught up in the criminal justice system, access
to social services and housing becomes problematic, thereby, further exacerbating efforts
to secure a stable environment. As the interviewee stated, these persons need housing,
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too. Depriving them of affordable housing will only create a vicious cycle of poverty,
crime, and unstable housing, leading to a perpetual crisis in urban social problems.
These perspectives may lead to service innovations in future HOPE VI or housing
policy. Not only does HOPE VI revitalize or replace outdated, dilapidated housing, it
also provides funds for needed social services. "Services provided include a range of
programs designed to help residents move toward self-sufficiency, such as case
management, education, job training, and child care."127 But, more efforts should be
made towards utilization of these services. Research has already shown that few
residents have taken advantage of support services offered by the Atlanta Housing
Authority and HOPE VI.128 Why is this so? According to Rabow et al., "(a) structural
analysis approach alone does not explain why the most severely oppressed seldom rise
up, let alone receive the benefits of poverty programs (Zurcher, 1970; Feagin, 1975)."
There may be other factors (e.g., cultural or psychological) that explain why poor
families do not take advantage of support services offered. If the poor have learned a
sense of helplessness in situations beyond their control, then they may be likely to view
subsequent situations as also beyond their control. What is key, says Rabow et al. is that
the poor learn to realize that "one's behavior can effect change."130 (italics in original)
This current study found that residents either did not utilize support services to the
extent which policymakers had envisioned, or the residents found working with social
services personnel problematic. Many residents complained that social service workers
were not attentive to their needs. Residents could not get in touch with workers, or their
phone calls went unreturned. Furthermore, according to interviewees in this study,
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residents were often distrustful of social service workers, preferring instead to seek
assistance from local branch librarians or county social workers.
Future housing policy should, therefore, include better provisions for social
services to families before and after relocation. For many critics, the revitalization of
"brick-and-mortar" housing is not enough to lift public housing residents out of the
myriad challenges they face. Supportive services are necessary to assist many residents
and families in relocation, job readiness, education, financial counseling, mental health,
and childcare services. As pointed out in the Panel Study, housing choice vouchers force
residents to deal with the real world - e.g., "findings units (sic), negotiating relationships
with landlords, and managing utility payments."131 Support services are needed not only
for those exiting public housing, but for new public housing residents who move into
revitalized units.132
In addition to supportive services offered by the housing authority, Rankin and
Quane maintain that institutional resources can serve as barriers to social isolation. If
poor residents are socially isolated due to their poverty status, then community
institutions such as "businesses, schools, churches, social clubs, voluntary associations,
and community organization"133 may provide the access and assistance needed to
overcome social challenges. They further maintain that the poor are "doubly
disadvantaged," that is, "by the individual experience of poverty and by the concentrated
poverty of the neighborhoods in which they reside."134 However, one might add that the
poor have a triple disadvantage if also belonging to a racial and/or ethnic minority group.
This multi-level of disadvantage, say Rankin and Quane, can foster adaptive behaviors
177
that are incongruous to mainstream societal behaviors. Jennifer Price Wolf agrees. She
examines poverty from various sociological perspectives, and advances the idea that
poverty can become "a way of life."135 She explains by stating that "mainstream
organizations operate under cultural values that differ significantly from those of African-
Americans. When poor [B]lacks, with less exposure to mainstream social norms, fail to
achieve as much as whites, this lack of success is often seen as evidence that [BJlacks are
less competent, intelligent, or motivated than whites."136 However, Wolf departs from
conventional wisdom that holds the poor responsible for their own upward mobility.
Rather, she places the burden on social institutions. She advances the notion that
mainstream organizations must become "bicultural" instead, "adapting to the strengths
and beliefs of multiple racial groups."137 If organizations fail to adapt to their minority
and poor constituency, then only those who are able to adapt - i.e., whites and the
middle- and upper-classes - will ever prosper.
This brings us back to the provision of support services by housing authorities.
Although housing authorities have a great deal of latitude in how and what services are
provided, services should be tailored towards the specific needs of the residents, some
critics say. "For example, if there is a large population of elderly or disabled residents,
the site should consider an on-site health care facility, or if there are a large number of
children under age 5, an on-site day care facility would be appropriate. HUD has given
HOPE VI grantees tremendous flexibility in designing a service package that meets the
needs of the residents."139 However, due to the wide variation in support services design,
evaluating the overall effectiveness of support services is challenging, analysts say.
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The future of policy formation leaves plenty of room for researchers to test new
and alternative theories in housing policy. While HOPE VI implementation largely
centered around the deconcentration of poverty, Curley maintains that there are draw
backs to deconcentration theories. First, says Curley, while the concentration of poverty
arguably leads to various social ills - e.g., crime, a lack of social capital, etc. - an
obvious drawback to dispersing poverty is that long-held social networks are also lost.
Despite low socioeconomic status, public housing residents do indeed form community.
As one interviewee stated, regardless of the condition of public housing units, pre-
demolition public housing, nonetheless, provided community. In fact, it is because of
poverty that community is formed. Residents form tight social networks in order to help
one another with child care, financial support, or job networking. Forcing residents to
move from a long-term residence may deprive them access to friends and family who
lived in close proximity to one another. Findings in this study suggest that this may be
the case with former Capitol Homes residents. The baseline and evaluation studies both
include comments suggesting that residents are not forming close networks with their
new neighbors.
Buron et al. discuss similar findings:
Unsubsidized households and voucher holders are less likely than public
housing residents to report having friends and family in the area and
reported the lowest levels of interaction with their neighbors. Our in-depth
interviews suggest that the low levels of interaction are associated with a
number of factors including lack of opportunity (e.g., neighbors are not
around during the day), language or cultural barriers, and personal
preferences for keeping social distance from neighbors.141
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Another drawback to deconcentration is the lack of positive effects on employ-
ability. Says Curley, "research does not show that [HOPE VI] is successful in preparing
residents for or connecting them to the job market."142 Residents are not finding
employment through their association with "weak ties." As has been already stated,
forming social networks with new neighbors is but a theory of policymakers. There is no
empirical evidence to support this theory, nor does it represent the reality of residents'
lives.
A final drawback is that demolition of distressed housing inevitably leads to fewer
affordable units for those most in need. Housing policy should address the needs of all
populations who need housing. It should not generate even more challenges for people
already in precarious living situations.
One key area that seems lacking in this HOPE VI discourse is homeownership by
the lowest-income population. According to the data, residents desired more assistance
in the areas of homeownership and entrepreneurship. According to Landis and McClure,
"Homeownership has been the cornerstone of federal housing policy for nearly 80
years...."143 Homeownership is associated with better outcomes for residents such as
residential stability, better upkeep of the housing unit, and higher educational
achievement for children. Furthermore, Landis and McClure maintain that "the central
theme of U.S. housing policy since the early 1990s has been to expand homeownership
among minorities and other previously underserved groups."144 But, is support for
homeownership more favorable than appropriations for rental subsidies?
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The path to homeownership for low-income families is met with numerous
barriers, some of which include: a general lack of knowledge about buying a home, a
lack of financial resources or savings, poor credit history, a lack of affordable housing,
questionable mortgage lending practices, and discrimination.145 Furthermore, research
has shown that it is even more challenging for minority groups to own a home. Given
that pre-demolition HOPE VI public housing communities are predominantly African-
American,146' l47 barriers to homeownership disproportionately affect African Americans
over White residents. Grinstein-Weiss et al. state, "In addition to predatory lending
practices, numerous studies have shown that, even after controlling for other factors,
minorities are more likely than Caucasians to have their mortgage applications denied ...
African Americans were denied conventional home loans twice as often as Caucasian
applicants (24 per cent versus 12 per cent....).148
Heather MacDonald offers an evaluation of housing policy during the Clinton
Administration (1993-2001). She writes,
The first and most politically powerful item on Clinton's agenda
was expanding homeownership, especially among minorities and
impoverished inner-city communities, constituencies that had felt
excluded during the Reagan/Bush years. Expanding homeownership was a
politically astute theme, differentiating federal policy sharply from direct
subsidy programs such as public housing that had undermined popular
support in the past (Dreier, 1997). Homeownership offered a way to re-
incorporate disenfranchised racial minorities into the political (and
economic) mainstream, and to address racial discrimination in a way that
was far less threatening than housing integration, and far less expensive
than traditional federal housing programs.149
Michal Grinstein-Weiss et al. advance the use of Individual Development
Accounts (IDAs) in promoting homeownership. "IDAs represent a community-based
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program that encourages asset accumulation for the purpose of homeownership,
education or business development."150 Participants receive financial counseling and are
educated in the home-buying process. "Unlike other programs..., IDAs encourage
saving behaviors by using public and private funds to match participants' deposits."151
Thus, in tandem with public-private partnerships of HOPE VI housing revitalization,
perhaps public-private partnerships can also be used to help finance first-time home
mortgages. Matching funds are provided by both government and private sources. With
this type of assistance, low-income homebuyers may overcome many of the barriers and
challenges to homeownership.152
HUD Assistant Secretary, Sandra Henriquez, concurs. "To be truly successful,
any future programs will have to be designed as public-private partnerships."15 "I want
to make public and private collaborations ... the rule rather than the exception at our
public housing authorities," she says.154
But Grinstein-Weiss et al. maintain that simply promoting homeownership is not
sufficient to fostering saving behavior of low-income residents. Rather, sustainable
institutional support mechanisms must be in place to encourage saving behavior (e.g.,
direct deposit, incentives to saving, financial counseling and education, and credit
repair).155 They explain,
Study findings suggested that institutional factors, not merely individual
characteristics, were important to saving performance. Sustainable home-
ownership in the United States represents both an individual and a societal
stepping-stone to prosperity. Therefore, it is vital that low-income
Americans are afforded equal access to the institutional savings vehicles
that have long benefited middle- and upper-income Americans by helping
them achieve and maintain prosperity.156
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What is missing in this discourse is a thorough examination of social structure as
it relates to poverty. Within the United States, there are structural factors that contribute
to why people are poor. Poverty is not happenstance, nor is it always personal or
pathological. Poverty is structural. Granted, there are those who do not or cannot find
the internal motivation to overcome economic and cultural barriers to self-sufficiency.
But why do barriers exist in the first place? Contrary to the theories that Glover purports,
bureaucrats are not merely "caught up" in social systems. Rather, social structures are
hierarchical and exist to create and perpetuate systems of inequality.
Overall, critics point to a desire for a national housing policy reform that will
allow for greater involvement by the residents in the redevelopment of public housing.157
Nonetheless, despite criticisms of HOPE VI, the majority of analysts agree that HOPE VI
did much to revitalize public housing and alleviate low-income residents of the most
severe of distressed living conditions. Success notwithstanding, critics still question
whether or not depriving residents of the communities in which they are most comfort
able is indeed the best policy. "Goetz contends that rather than focusing on poverty
deconcentration, public policy should be based on a broad antipoverty agenda that
includes revenue sharing, inclusionary zoning, eradicating housing discrimination, and
ending exclusionary land use practices."158
And finally, a point to consider in future housing policy is the alleviation of fear
and anxiety in relocation processes. As stated in the Panel Study, HOPE VI movers are
"involuntary" movers.159 Despite reported levels of satisfaction with relocation out
comes, residents were still forcibly displaced from homes, communities, and social
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networks they may have occupied for years. Partnering with community leaders whom
residents trust - such as branch librarians or church leaders - may help to improve
relocation outcomes. Religious association can help to alleviate feelings of isolation and
helplessness. According to Oscar Lewis, religion can perhaps offer residents a shared
identity with a community of faith, and may thereby lead to housing stability and better
overall outcomes.160
This research study has raised important questions about housing policy, public
housing demolition, involuntary displacement, and relocation. Granted, HOPE VI
provided a giant step towards alleviating the distressed lives caused by "severely
distressed" housing units. Nonetheless, a major concern in housing policy is the ability to
track the location of public-assisted housing residents. If the goal of housing policy is to
improve the lives of individuals and families with the greatest need, then it would
behoove policymakers to keep track of where these individuals and families reside.
Without a well-designed tracking system of residents' relocation, the future of housing
policy is irresolute at best.
A challenge in designing a viable tracking system is residents' preference for
privacy. Many of the voucher holders indicated their preference for voucher-assisted
housing because it allowed more freedom, flexibility, and privacy than relocating to
revitalized public housing units. Interestingly, however, the Panel Study found that the
majority of residents preferred the stability and support of returning to revitalized public
housing, "because they find the prospect of searching for housing in the private market
overwhelming."161 Furthermore, residents in the Panel Study "expressed mistrust of the
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Housing Choice Voucher program, which was described as 'less permanent,' 'less
flexible,' and 'more expensive' than living in public housing."162
Finally, this policy review would not be complete without a word about
homelessness in America. Howard points out that those who utilize public housing
assistance in America do not represent the full population who needs such assistance.
Less than a third of the population needing public-assisted housing actually receive it,
says Howard.163 Given that there are approximately 633,782 homeless persons in the
United States (according to the latest 2012 figures),164 a discussion on subsidized housing
is remiss without including this population. Critics continue to worry about the potential
for homelessness when residents continue to live in precarious housing. With fewer
public housing units available to meet the growing need for affordable housing,
homelessness must remain on the radar of national housing policy.
In summary, a national housing policy prescription should: 1) take into
consideration the needs of a diverse population group - e.g., women and children, racial
groups, ex-convicts, etc.; 2) offer support services that are accessible and responsive to
the needs of policy beneficiaries; 3) include a homeownership component in addition to
rental options; 4) promote partnerships with religious or faith-based organizations in
order to relieve fear and anxiety on the part of residents; and most importantly, 5) allow
for extensive engagement by all community stakeholders, especially the residents.
A national housing policy should lead to the best possible outcomes. It should not leave
vulnerable residents in a continued state of precariousness.
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Research has shown that what matters most in promoting and achieving positive
social outcomes in families and children are occurrences within individual households,
and less what happens in the broader community. Housing policy is about real people,
not just real estate. The future of housing policy should ensure that all beneficiaries -
especially the residents - are brought to the table of discourse. As subtle as it is, there
remains an underlying assumption in HOPE VI policies that the poor are incapable of
decision-making in their own best interest. The power structure continues to wield its
power, making decisions on behalf of the poor, whether or not the poor oppose it. In the
end, what matters most are not the academic theories of policy experts. What matters
most is that the voices of public-assisted housing residents - the people - are heard and
adequately considered in policymaking decisions. Housing policy should not originate
from a presumed social deficit in poor people. Rather, a national housing policy should
allow extensive engagement of all beneficiaries in an effort to ensure that common goals
and aspirations of all citizens are met.
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APPENDIX A
HOPE VI STUDY CONSENT FORM
Study Title: "Where Have All The People Gone? A HOPE VI Policy Review and
Geospatial Analysis"
Principal Investigator: Valerie J. Alexander (doctoral student)
Contact: (404)625-1891 Email: Valerie.Alexander@students.cau.edu
Institution and Address: Clark Atlanta University
Dept. of Political Science, Knowles, 3rd Floor
223 James P. Brawley Drive, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30314
Faculty Advisor: Dr. William H. Boone Phone: (404)880-8719 Email:
WBoonefaJcau.edu
Prospective Participant:
You are invited to take part in a research study about the effects and outcomes of public
housing demolition in Atlanta.
About the study: This study will examine the effects and outcomes of public housing
demolition in the city of Atlanta. A federal housing initiative called HOPE VI was
implemented in Atlanta for the purpose of demolishing public housing units. The study
will survey former public housing residents to determine how their lives have changed
since moving out of public housing.
In addition, the study will look at communities of former public housing residents to
analyze broad patterns of relocation. No individual residence will be identified. Rather,
broad patterns of relocation will be examined to understand the consequences of forced
evictions.
As a study participant, you will be invited to do one of the following:
Survey participants - You will be asked to complete a simple questionnaire
containing 10 questions. Your participation is strictly voluntary.
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Interview participants - You will be asked to give approximately 30 minutes
of your time for a one-on-one interview with the principal investigator (doctoral student
listed above). Your participation is strictly voluntary.
As a participant in this study, your participation is strictly voluntary and your responses
are strictly confidential. No personal identifying information will be captured or
maintained in the data records. There is no known risk to the participant. However,
study participants will have the opportunity to contribute to social science knowledge that
pertains to affordable housing issues in Atlanta.
Should you have any questions about the study at any time, you may contact the principal
investigator (listed above), or faculty advisor, Dr. William H. Boone at (404) 880-8719 or
wboone@cau.edu.
Statement of Consent: I have read the above statement and have had my questions
answered to my satisfaction. My participation in this study is strictly voluntary, and I
have not been coerced in any way by anyone.
Participant's signature Date
APPENDIX B
FORMER PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENT SURVEY
This survey is intended for former residents of Atlanta's public housing units during the years
1990 to 2010. It is an attempt to understand how the demolition of public housing units affected
the lives of residents. The survey is optional; however, your thoughtful answers are appreciated.
The researcher is a doctoral student of political science at Clark Atlanta University. Any
questions or concerns should be directed to: Valerie J. Alexander,
Valerie.Alexander(a),students.cau.edu, or advisor, Dr. William H. Boone, wboone(5),cau.edu.
Thank youfor your participation!
ONLINE STATEMENT OF CONSENT: I have read the above statement and have had
my questions answered to my satisfaction. By taking this survey, I certify that I am
currently OR have been a resident of Atlanta public housing. My participation in this
study is strictly voluntary, and I have not been coerced in any way by anyone.
1. Gender: □ Male □ Female
2. Age group: □ 18 - 30 □ 31 - 50 □ 51 and above
3. Are you a former resident of Atlanta public housing? If so, which one(s)?
(please check all that apply)
□ Bankhead Courts □ Kimberly Courts
□ Bowen Homes □ Leila Valley
□ Carver Homes □ Martin Street Plaza
□ Clark Howell Homes □ Mechanicsville
□ East Lake Meadows □ Palmer House
□ Herndon Homes □ Roosevelt House
□ Hollywood Courts □ Techwood Homes
□ John Eagan Homes □ Thomasville Heights
□ John Hope Homes □ University Homes
□ Jonesboro North □ U-Rescue Villa
□ Jonesboro South □ Other (please specify)
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4. How long were you a resident of Atlanta public housing? (please check one)
□ 0 - 5 years
□ 6 - 10 years
□ 11-15 years
□ 15-20 years
□ More than 20 years
5. What was your reason for moving? (please check one)
□ Voluntary move to other housing
□ Eviction (for reasons other than demolition)
□ Forced eviction (involuntary move due to demolition)
6. In what type of housing do you now live? (please check one)
Q Apartment
□ Rental single-unit house
□ Own home
□ Shelter
Q Living with a friend or relative
□ None (living in car or on the street)
□ Other (please specify)
7. Did you have school-age children while living in public housing? □ Yes □ No




□ Close to transportation
□ Close to other resources (e.g., doctor's office, grocery store, etc).
□ Other (please specify)








□ Isolation from family, friends, or other support systems
□ Problems with landlord
□ Crime
□ Other (please specify)
10. Overall, would you say your life today is better or worse than when you were






This study seeks to provide an analysis ofhousing policy as implemented by the Atlanta
Housing Authority (AHA). As such, community stakeholders (e.g., churches, religious
organizations, schools, etc.) have been identified that were located in near proximity to
theformer public housing communities.
1. What is your role or job title within this church or organization?
2. How long have you been in this position? How long have you been in this
organization or location?
3. What is the overall purpose of your organization?
4. What outreach services (if any) does this church/organization provide to the
surrounding community?
5. Prior to this study, have you been familiar with the HOPE VI initiative as
implemented by the Atlanta Housing Authority?
6. In your opinion, what were the initial goals of HOPE VI?
7. If applicable, how was your job affected by policy changes in housing (e.g., housing
demolition) as a result of HOPE VI?
8. In your opinion, what has been the positive impact(s) of HOPE VI on the lives of
your constituents and the community that you serve?
9. In your opinion, what negative impacts have occurred in the lives of your constituents
and the community that you serve as a result of HOPE VI?
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10. What overall changes would you like to see in housing policy in the city of
Atlanta?
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